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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is comprised of three experimental studies that examine corporate tax 
aggressiveness through an investigation of judgment and decision making in the corporate tax 
environment. Studies 1 and 2 examine individual judgment involved in decision making (i.e., 
assessments of tax positions based upon tax scenario facts and tax authority). Study 1 examines 
how advice from external tax advisors and a tax advisor’s association with the company’s audit 
firm influences the aggressiveness of experienced in-house corporate tax decision makers. Study 
2 examines how situational factors in the corporate tax environment interact with individual 
traits to affect individual-level tax aggressiveness, focusing in greater depth upon the process of 
individual judgment and decision making. Study 3 extends the investigation of situational factors 
from individual-level decision making to a group-level analysis, examining individual-level and 
group-level decision making in a tax setting (i.e., tax compliance decisions). 
Overall, results reflect the complexity of the corporate tax environment. The effects of 
the situational factors examined in the dissertation generally influence decision makers’ own 
perceptions. For example, Study 1 results suggest that tax advisor identity influences how 
corporate tax directors weight advice only if the advice is conservative and if the tax directors 
agree with the advice. Additionally, in Studies 2 and 3, decision maker perceptions are found to 
mediate the effects of manipulated situational factors. In Study 2, regulatory focus state 
indirectly influences individual tax aggressiveness through the perception of the tax advisor’s 
level of client advocacy. In Study 3 decision maker type, a situational factor, affects tax 
compliance decision riskiness indirectly through feelings of responsibility for the possible 
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outcomes of the decision. Collectively these studies contribute to the nascent literature on 
decision making in a corporate tax environment, helping to lay the groundwork for future studies 
in this area.  
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is comprised of three studies investigating judgment and decision 
making in the corporate tax environment. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010, p. 145) note that little is 
known about who is making corporate tax decisions and how these decisions are made, 
lamenting that “tax avoidance may be highly idiosyncratic and determined by a number of 
factors and interactions, not all of which can be measured.” This complexity combined with the 
fact that most experimental tax compliance research to date looks only at individual (rather than 
corporate) taxpayer decision making suggests a need for investigating decision making in a 
corporate tax setting.  
Navigating the corporate tax environment requires tax decision makers to use 
professional judgment to interpret complex tax authority (e.g., tax law, regulations, and court 
cases) (Magro 1999; McGuire et al. 2012). Tax professionals may identify differing tax positions 
that vary in how much they affect a taxpayer’s tax calculation, forming a range of possible tax 
minimization opportunities (Slemrod 2007; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Lisowsky 2010). This 
dissertation employs the relative term “tax aggressiveness” to describe where a tax position falls 
along a range of possible tax minimization. More aggressive tax positions have weaker 
underlying facts, are not clearly supported by relevant tax authority, and reduce taxes to a greater 
extent than less aggressive tax positions (Cuccia et al. 1995; Roberts 1998; Hanlon and Heitzman 
2010). This dissertation investigates corporate tax aggressiveness by examining both individual 
judgment involved in decision making (i.e., assessments of tax positions based upon tax scenario 
facts and tax authority in Study 1 and Study 2) as well as individual-level and group-level 
decision making (i.e., tax compliance decisions in Study 3). The first study in this dissertation 
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examines the influence of external tax advisor recommendations on the tax aggressiveness of 
decisions made by in-house corporate tax professionals (e.g., tax directors). The second study 
focuses on the judgment and decision making processes of individuals in a corporate tax 
environment, investigating how individual traits and contextual factors interact to affect 
individual-level tax aggressiveness. The third study extends the investigation of contextual 
factors from individual-level decision making to a group-level analysis, examining decision 
making in individual and group tax compliance settings. The following subsections describe the 
manner in which each study approaches the investigation of decision making in corporate 
taxation. The final subsection contains the overall contribution of this dissertation.      
Study One: Accounting Professionals, Tax Advice, and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness 
The first study investigates corporate tax aggressiveness through an examination of 
individual-level judgment and decision making, specifically the influence of advice on individual 
tax aggressiveness. The primary individuals of interest in this study are corporate tax decision 
makers, such as tax directors, that have authority to make tax compliance and planning decisions 
on behalf of the corporation. The study draws upon social categorization theory and the belief-
adjustment model to explore how tax advice may influence tax directors’ judgments differently 
depending upon whether or not the tax advisor is from the corporation’s audit firm. I conduct an 
experiment in which the identity of the tax advisor and the nature of tax advice are manipulated. 
Experienced corporate tax directors are asked to make an assessment of a tax position based on 
an ambiguous tax scenario. The external tax advisor is described within the scenario as either 
from the accounting firm engaged to audit the corporation or from a different accounting firm. 
Tax directors make their judgment about the tax position after receiving either conservative or 
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aggressive advice from the external tax advisor. Social categorization theory, client advocacy 
roles, and the belief-adjustment model are used to interpret the influence of advice, leading to 
predictions that the effect of advice depends upon the nature of the advice and the identity of the 
tax advisor. Results suggest the nature of advice and tax advisor identity influence how tax 
directors weight conservative advice when they are in agreement with the advice. However, the 
nature of advice and tax advisor identity do not appear to influence the weight of advice when 
tax directors agree with aggressive tax advice.  
Study Two: Corporate Tax Aggressiveness: The Effects of Promotion and Prevention Focus on 
Individual Decision Making 
The second study investigates the tax aggressiveness of business entities through an 
examination of individual-level judgment and decision making. The study draws upon 
Regulatory Focus Theory to examine the process through which individuals make tax 
compliance decisions on behalf of the corporation. Regulatory Focus Theory suggests that 
individuals have two fundamentally different self-regulatory mindsets that influence the way in 
which they pursue their goals: promotion regulatory focus (i.e., motivated to maximize 
successful outcomes) and prevention regulatory focus (i.e., motivated to minimize failed 
outcomes) (Higgins 1997; Higgins et al. 2001). Regulatory focus is exhibited as an individual 
trait (i.e., trait promotion focus or trait prevention focus); however, situational factors in the 
decision environment can activate a regulatory focus state (i.e., promotion state or prevention 
state) (Higgins 2000). Corporate tax decision makers with a trait promotion focus are predicted 
to be more tax aggressive than those with trait prevention focus. However, induced regulatory 
focus state is predicted to moderate this relationship so that inducing a regulatory state may 
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amplify the effects of trait regulatory focus on the tax aggressiveness of corporate tax decision 
maker judgment when trait and state align. I conduct an experiment in which participant trait 
regulatory focus (promotion trait or prevention trait) is measured and state regulatory focus is 
manipulated by framing corporate management’s view of the external tax advisor as either an 
advocate (positive frame activating a promotion state) or an overseer (negative frame activating a 
prevention state). Results do not support study hypotheses; however, supplemental analysis 
suggests that regulatory focus state indirectly influences individual tax aggressiveness through 
the perception of the tax advisor’s level of client advocacy. Decision makers perceive tax 
advisors to be stronger client advocates when management views the tax advisor as an advocate 
(promotion state) than when management views the tax advisor as an overseer (prevention state). 
Furthermore, perceiving the tax advisor to be more of an advocate amplifies the influence of “fit” 
between regulatory focus trait and state: compared to individuals with a lower trait promotion 
focus, tax decision makers with a greater trait promotion focus react more strongly to the induced 
promotion state.  
Study Three: Self-Other and Multi-Agent Decision Making in Taxation 
The third study investigates risky decisions made in different tax compliance contexts. 
Prior research on taxpayer judgment and decision making has typically examined individual 
taxpayer compliance; however, little is known about how components of the decision making 
environment influence compliance in business tax settings. The study draws upon diffusion of 
responsibility theory (i.e., how feelings of responsibility differ in individual and group decision 
making) to examine the effect of the type of decision maker on the riskiness of tax compliance 
decisions. Additionally, construal level theory and social value theory are used to explore how 
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self-other decision making (i.e., whether decisions are made for oneself or on behalf of others) 
and decision maker type (i.e., individual or group decision maker) influence tax compliance. I 
conduct an experiment in which decision makers are asked to make a tax compliance decision. 
Decision maker type (individual or group) and decision target (self or other) are manipulated 
through the structure of the tax compliance task. I use a compliance task with minimal context to 
intentionally minimize the differences between conditions to determine the effect of only the 
specific contextual factors of interest. 
Taxpayers making decisions in a group are predicted to make riskier tax compliance 
decisions than taxpayers making decisions individually. Self-other decision making is predicted 
to influence tax compliance differently depending upon whether or not the decision is made 
individually or in a group. Results do not support study hypotheses; however supplemental 
analysis suggests decision maker type affects tax compliance decision riskiness indirectly 
through feelings of responsibility for the possible outcomes of the decision. Group members 
report feeling lower levels of personal responsibility than individual decision makers, and feeling 
less personally responsible for the decision leads to riskier tax decisions.  
Overall Contribution 
Collectively these studies contribute to both the tax professional judgment and decision 
making literature and taxpayer compliance research by examining decision making in a corporate 
tax setting. Fair and objective evaluation of tax positions should reduce unmeasured tax risk. 
Corporate tax decision makers should be made aware of how components of the decision making 
environment (e.g., situational factors, dispositional characteristics, advice, and advisor 
characteristics) influence interpretation of evidence and impact objectivity in the evaluation of 
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possible tax positions. Additionally, this dissertation also contributes to the corporate tax 
avoidance/aggressiveness literature, given that these studies are some of the first to employ 
experimental methods to examine why and how these specific components of the decision 
making environment influence the tax aggressiveness of corporate tax director judgment. This 
dissertation also has policy implications as policies designed to influence firm-level corporate tax 
aggressiveness should be grounded in a solid understanding of the underlying judgment and 
decision making processes of individuals acting on behalf of the corporation. 
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STUDY ONE: ACCOUNTING PROFESSIONALS, TAX ADVICE, AND CORPORATE 
TAX AGGRESSIVENESS 
Introduction 
Corporations are separate legal entities; however, given that corporations function based 
upon decisions made by individuals, this study investigates the tax aggressiveness of business 
entities through an examination of individual-level judgment and decision making. The primary 
individuals of interest in this study are corporate tax decision makers, such as tax directors,1 that 
have authority to make tax compliance and planning decisions on behalf of the corporation. Tax 
rules are complex, particularly those for corporate taxation (Barney et al. 2012; Sullivan 2011). 
Corporations have the option of conducting tax planning and compliance internally or engaging 
external tax professionals (i.e., tax advisors2 such as public accounting firms) for assistance with 
some or all of the tax work to achieve objectives while managing tax risk (Donohoe et al. 2014; 
EY 2014).  
Tax advisors provide corporate tax directors with additional resources and expertise 
through the provision of tax advice. The decision to outsource some or all of the corporate tax 
function to a tax advisor has been linked to a greater focus on tax planning than on tax 
compliance (Dunbar and Phillips 2001). A corporation may have options for outsourcing tax 
work. A corporation may engage its audit firm to provide tax services, subject to audit committee 
approval for publicly traded companies, or the corporation may hire an alternate tax advisor 
                                                 
1 This study is focused on the judgment and decision making of individuals within the corporation that are involved 
in corporate tax matters. These individuals are labeled as tax directors for purposes of this study. The term “tax 
director” is intended to also represent individuals who could have other job titles such as CFO, controller, tax senior 
manager, or tax manager. 
2 The term “tax advisor” is used throughout this study to describe the individuals that assist taxpayers such as 
corporations with their tax work. Tax advisors are accounting professionals, external to the corporation, engaged to 
provide tax services to the corporation. “Tax advisor” is intended to encompass alternate terms such as tax preparer, 
tax service provider, and tax consultant.   
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(PCAOB 2014). Corporate tax aggressiveness3 appears to be associated with the party that signs 
the corporate tax return. Corporations that sign their own tax returns or whose returns are signed 
by an external non-auditor tax advisor are associated with more aggressive positions than 
corporations whose returns are signed by an external auditor tax advisor (Klassen et al. 2015). 
However, it is unclear if the identity of a corporation’s tax advisor shapes a corporate tax 
director’s aggressiveness. If a corporation’s tax aggressiveness is influenced by the identity of 
the tax advisor, as suggested by Klassen et al. (2015), does tax advisor identity influence how 
advice affects internal corporate tax decision making? This study employs an experimental 
design that enables controlled testing of targeted factors in this relationship. Specifically, the 
purpose of this study is to draw upon social categorization theory and the belief-adjustment 
model to investigate how tax advice may differentially influence corporate tax director judgment 
depending upon both the identity of the tax advisor and the nature of the advice. 
Social categorization is the cognitive process underlying how individuals perceive and 
make sense of an overwhelming number of sensory inputs in a complex and ever-changing 
environment (Hogg 2001). Corporate tax directors may categorize a tax advisor from the 
accounting firm engaged to audit the corporation (“tax-audit” category) differently than a tax 
advisor from an accounting firm that is not the audit firm (“tax-nonaudit” category). The “tax-
nonaudit” category may be more strongly associated with a tax advisor’s client advocacy4 role. 
The different categorization may lead to differing perceptions about a tax advisor’s function and 
                                                 
3 As explained in more detail later, the present study considers tax aggressiveness to be a relative term used to 
describe where a tax position falls along the range of possible tax minimization. Tax positions that are more 
aggressive have weaker underlying facts and are not clearly supported by relevant tax authority (Cuccia et al. 1995; 
Roberts 1998). 
4 Mason and Levy (2001, 127) define client advocacy as “a state of mind in which one feels one’s primary loyalty 
belongs to the taxpayer. It is exhibited by a desire to represent the taxpayer zealously within the bounds of the law, 
and by a desire to be a fighter on behalf of the taxpayer.” 
10 
 
expected behavior, which may influence corporate tax director judgment. This study predicts that 
advice affects tax director judgment differently depending on both tax advisor identity and 
whether or not the advice is surprising, given the tax advisor’s identity. In this study, advice is 
considered to be surprising if incongruent with the tax advisor’s identity (i.e., conservative 
advice from a non-auditor tax advisor or aggressive advice from an auditor tax advisor). 
Specifically, the study predicts that aggressive advice from the audit firm tax advisor (i.e., 
surprising advice) will have a stronger effect on the corporate tax director’s judgment than 
aggressive advice from the non-audit firm tax advisor (i.e., unsurprising advice). Likewise, 
conservative advice from the non-audit firm tax advisor (i.e., surprising advice) is predicted to 
have a stronger effect on the tax director’s judgment than conservative advice from the audit firm 
tax advisor (i.e., unsurprising advice). 
One hundred and nineteen experienced corporate tax professionals (Vice Presidents of 
Tax, Tax Directors, and Tax Managers) are included in the study. As suggested by their job 
titles, the vast majority have a great deal of tax experience and most are employed by multi-
national US-based corporations. An experimental design is used to examine how the identity of 
the tax advisor and the nature of advice influence how corporate tax directors weight advice. 
Participants are given a corporate tax scenario with ambiguous underlying case information and 
relevant tax authority. The tax advisor’s identity is manipulated in the tax scenario information 
as a tax advisor either from the audit firm or from a different accounting firm. Participants 
receive advice from a tax advisor and then make a judgment about their likelihood of taking the 
aggressive tax position. The advice is manipulated as either aggressive or conservative, which is 
considered to be surprising or unsurprising based upon the identity of the tax advisor. The study 
does not find evidence overall that nature of advice and tax advisor identity influence the weight 
11 
 
of advice. However, more interesting findings emerge when examining the weight of advice 
when tax directors agree with the advice. The study finds that tax advisor identity influences the 
weight of conservative advice when the tax director agrees with the conservative advice. Tax 
directors in agreement with conservative tax advice weighted advice from the audit firm tax 
advisor (“tax-audit”) more heavily than when advice came from a tax advisor from a different 
firm (“tax-nonaudit”). However, when tax directors agree with aggressive advice, tax advisory 
identity does not appear to influence the weight of advice.  
The study contributes to both the tax professional judgment and decision making 
literature and taxpayer compliance research by examining decision making in the corporate tax 
environment. Corporate tax directors are sophisticated decision makers, attuned to many 
components of the corporation’s overarching tax risk management (Donohoe et al. 2014; 
Graham et al. 2014). As a component of the tax risk management process, corporate tax directors 
should be made aware of how the identity of the tax advisor may affect their judgment and 
evaluation of potential tax positions. Tax directors need to make unbiased risk assessments in 
order to accurately align tax positions with a corporation’s tax risk appetite (COSO 2004; 
Donohoe et al. 2014). Failure to accurately assess tax positions may expose the corporation to 
unmeasured tax risk, which could have implications for tax compliance, accounting for income 
taxes in financial reporting, and reputational concerns (Donohoe et al. 2014).     
The study also contributes to the corporate tax avoidance/aggressiveness literature, as this 
study is one of the first to employ an experimental design to investigate corporate tax 
aggressiveness by examining the judgment and decision making of tax directors who make tax 
decisions on behalf of corporations. An experimental design enables this study to examine why 
particular factors influence aggressive tax behavior in a business entity context. The study uses 
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an experimental method to address this issue by isolating tax advisor identity and the nature of 
advice to examine the effect on tax director judgment. Prior research on corporate tax 
aggressiveness has examined firm-level characteristics of corporations that engage in aggressive 
tax reporting behavior (Chen et al. 2010; Lisowsky 2010; Lanis and Richardson 2011; Rego and 
Wilson 2012; Honaker 2013; Higgins et al. 2014; Klassen et al. 2015), as well as performance 
measures and incentive structures for key decision makers (Phillips 2003; Robinson et al. 2010; 
Armstrong et al. 2012; Gaertner 2014). Recently, studies have focused on key individuals to 
investigate the association of individual-level characteristics with corporate tax aggressiveness 
(Cleaveland et al. 2010; Dyreng et al. 2010; Chyz 2013; Honaker 2013; Koester et al. 2013; 
Laws and Mills 2014). These studies have treated firm-level and individual-level characteristics 
as determinants of aggressive tax reporting; however, as a result of using an archival 
methodology, these studies are more appropriately described as showing an association between 
these characteristics and the presumed outcomes of aggressive corporate tax decisions. Thus, 
these prior studies provide information about corporations that are tax aggressive, but they do not 
unravel the why behind the factors thought to influence aggressive corporate tax behavior.  
The following section of this research study contains a review of the relevant literature 
and development of the hypotheses. The second section describes the research method. The third 
section presents results. The final section draws conclusions.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
Tax Risk Preferences and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness 
Tax advisors use professional judgment to navigate the tax law (Magro 1999; McGuire et 
al. 2012). Due to the complexity of the tax rules, a definitively “correct” tax position may not 
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always be determinable, so tax advisors may identify differing tax positions using the same set of 
information (Slemrod 2007). These differing tax positions could vary in how much they affect a 
taxpayer’s tax calculation; forming a range of possible tax minimization (Hanlon and Heitzman 
2010; Lisowsky 2010). The present study considers tax aggressiveness to be a relative term used 
to describe where a tax position falls along the range of possible tax minimization. Tax positions 
that are more aggressive have weaker underlying facts and are not clearly supported by relevant 
tax authority (Cuccia et al. 1995; Roberts 1998). Given any one issue, a more aggressive tax 
position reduces taxes to a greater extent than a less aggressive tax position (Hanlon and 
Heitzman 2010).  
The corporate tax rules are complex and often ambiguous, creating uncertainty (Slemrod 
2007; Barney et al. 2012). The current convention in practice is to refer to this uncertainty in 
terms of managing tax risk5 (Donohoe et al. 2014). Borrowing from the COSO definition of 
enterprise risk management, tax risk management can be equated to a corporation’s process of 
identifying potential events with tax implications and managing risk to be within its “risk 
appetite” (COSO 2004; Donohoe et al. 2014). For each individual corporation there is an optimal 
level of tax aggressiveness that most benefits the shareholders (Armstrong et al. 2014). 
Theoretically, after risk preference has been identified, the tax aggressiveness of tax director 
judgment should be guided by the overarching tax risk preference. Thus, corporate tax 
aggressiveness may be viewed as the operationalization of a corporation’s tax risk preference 
(aka “risk appetite”).  
                                                 
5 Big 4 public accounting firms produce publications targeted at corporate tax risk and tax risk management. See for 
example EY’s 2014 tax risk and controversy survey (EY 2014). 
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Several factors have been shown to be associated with corporate tax aggressiveness. At 
the organizational level, overall corporate business strategy has been linked to corporate tax 
strategy (Higgins et al. 2014). Corporations that structure their business around a strategy of 
innovation are more tax aggressive than corporations focused on stability and defending market 
share (Higgins et al. 2014). Relatedly, evaluating the tax department as either a cost center or a 
profit center is also associated with tax aggressiveness, with the latter having been shown to be 
correlated with lower cash effective tax rates (ETR) (Robinson et al. 2010). Also, companies can 
effectively incentivize the tax aggressiveness of decision makers through executive 
compensation arrangements (Phillips 2003; Hanlon et al. 2005; Rego and Wilson 2012; Gaertner 
2014). Recent studies have begun to examine associations between individual corporate decision 
makers and tax aggressiveness. Tracking the movement of individual corporate executives 
between companies suggests that tax aggressiveness may be attributable to individual decision 
makers (Dyreng et al. 2010). Further, an executive’s personal tax aggressiveness may be 
associated with corporate tax aggressiveness (Chyz 2013). Additionally, decision maker gender 
appears to be related to corporate tax aggressiveness; female CFOs have been associated with 
less tax aggressiveness than male CFOs (Francis et al. 2014). Management may choose to seek 
corporate tax directors with likeminded tax risk preferences. 
Top management and the corporate tax department are not the only individuals involved 
in corporate tax decisions. Corporations may engage tax professionals from public accounting 
firms to provide or assist the corporate tax function. The interactions of internal corporate tax 
directors, tax advisors, and tax authorities collectively shape corporate tax aggressiveness 
(Gracia and Oats 2012). Tax advisors perform an important function of serving as interpreters of 
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tax rules by drawing upon firm-wide experiences interacting with tax authorities (Picciotto 
2007).  
Corporate Tax Advisors 
Companies may choose whether or not to receive tax services from the same accounting 
firm that is engaged to audit their financial statements. U.S. publicly traded companies must first 
receive preapproval from their audit committee before the audit firm is engaged to provide tax 
services; however, if preapproval is granted, even publicly traded corporations may engage their 
audit firm for tax services (PCAOB 2014). The audit committee is specifically tasked with 
oversight of financial reporting and disclosure (SOX 2002). The requirement for preapproval 
from the audit committee stems from concerns that auditor independence could be threatened by 
sizeable revenues from non-audit services that could unduly influence auditor judgment 
(PCAOB 2014, SOX 2002).  
The existence of publicly traded companies that continue to engage the same accounting 
firm for both audit and tax services suggests that in some instances the benefits of this 
arrangement outweigh the costs (Gleason and Mills 2011). Indeed, investors perceive the 
benefits of enhanced financial reporting due to knowledge spillover from auditor-provided tax 
services to be greater than the potential threat to auditor independence (Krishnan et al. 2013). 
Collaborations between same-firm audit and tax functions can generate tax strategies for 
optimizing outcomes for both tax reporting and financial reporting. McGuire et al. (2012) only 
examine companies that engage the same accounting firm for both audit and tax services; they 
find that companies engaging an audit firm with tax-specific industry expertise are linked to 
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greater tax aggressiveness compared to other companies in their sample6 (McGuire et al. 2012). 
The sample for the McGuire et al. (2012) study contains only companies that engage the same 
accounting firm for both audit and tax services. Though companies may choose to engage the 
same accounting firm for both audit and tax services, many companies do not (Klassen et al. 
2015). Companies using their audit firm as their tax advisor are associated with less tax 
aggressiveness than companies using non-auditor tax advisors (Klassen et al. 2015). Klassen et 
al. (2015) use confidential IRS data to classify a company’s tax advisor as an auditor, a 
nonauditor, or the internal tax department. The Klassen et al. (2015) study is able to observe the 
association between tax advisor identity and tax aggressiveness through the use of confidential 
IRS data, a relationship which had been previously inaccessible using only publicly available 
information. However, the data in the Klassen et al. (2015) study do not reveal why using a tax 
advisor from the audit firm is associated with less tax aggressiveness, more specifically if 
knowing whether or not the tax advisor is from the company’s audit firm influences how advice 
affects tax director judgment.  
ASC 740 requires that companies evaluate tax positions for financial reporting purposes 
(FASB 2009). A corporation’s tax accounts are included in the audit of the corporation’s 
financial statements. Thus, a tax director may consider the financial reporting implications when 
assessing potential tax positions. One perspective could be that corporate tax directors perceive a 
tax advisor from the audit firm as more likely to favorably assess a tax position due to reduced 
independence or a knowledge spillover effect. The knowledge spillover literature examines 
whether auditor provided tax services impair independence (possibly impacting audit quality) or 
                                                 
6 The McGuire et al (2012) study uses the term tax avoidance, but I have consistently used the term tax 
aggressiveness to avoid confusion generated by the use of multiple terms. 
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whether using a tax advisor from the corporation’s audit firm allows knowledge to be transferred 
between tax and audit functions, generating potential benefits such as increased audit 
effectiveness and audit efficiency. Prior research has found support for the knowledge spillover 
effect (Kinney et al. 2004; Gleason and Mills 2011; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2011). Joe and 
Vandervelde (2007) examine knowledge transfer between audit tasks and nonaudit tasks, and 
note that auditors performing both services display less professional skepticism.7 Choudhary et 
al. (2015) also find reduced professional skepticism when a corporation’s auditor also provides 
the corporation’s tax services.  
Joe and Vandervelde (2007) and Choudhary et al. (2015) focus on the effects of the 
provision of nonaudit services on auditor judgments. Tax services are one type of non-audit 
services provided by auditors. Auditor-provided tax services may be associated with reduced 
auditor skepticism. If auditor-provided tax services are associated with reduced auditor 
skepticism, then the corporation’s tax director may view the option to use the same accounting 
firm for both tax and audit services as an opportunity to lessen auditor scrutiny of the 
corporation’s tax positions during the audit of the tax accounts. Consistent with a knowledge 
spillover effect, the tax director may also expect a tax advisor from the audit firm to have greater 
knowledge of the corporation. Thus, a tax director could expect a tax advisor from the audit firm 
to be more comfortable with seemingly more aggressive tax positions than a tax advisor from a 
different accounting firm. However, this inference is inconsistent with the Klassen et al. (2015) 
study which finds that corporations using their audit firm as their tax advisor appear to engage in 
less tax aggressiveness than corporation using non-auditor tax advisors. Rather than viewing a 
                                                 
7 Though the Joe and Vandervelde (2007) study examines knowledge transfer between audit and nonaudit tasks, the 
particular nonaudit task examined in the study is not the provision of tax services. 
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tax advisor from the audit firm as more likely to accept aggressive tax positons due to knowledge 
spillover or reduced skepticism, corporate tax directors may perceive the differing professional 
roles for tax and audit professionals to be more influential on tax advisor judgment, which may 
lead the tax director to interpret evidence in accordance with a tax advisor’s professional role.    
Tax advisors and auditors have differing objectives and responsibilities. A tax advisor has 
the responsibility to act as an advocate on behalf of taxpayers when recommending a tax position 
or preparing a tax return (AICPA 2009). Though a client advocate, a tax advisor is also required 
to exercise due diligence in determining the accuracy of tax information furnished to the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS 2014). Thus, a tax advisor has a dual role: taxpayer advocate and overseer 
of tax information. Auditors have the responsibility to obtain reasonable assurance about whether 
the financial statements are free of material misstatement (AICPA 1972a). Auditors are tasked 
with maintaining a questioning mind and critically assessing evidence (AICPA 1972b).  
This study draws upon social categorization theory to examine how differing professional 
roles associated with the identity of the tax advisor (either from the audit firm or a different firm) 
influence tax director judgments. As this study investigates the influence of advice from two 
categories of tax advisors with differing professional roles, social categorization theory and 
professional roles are used to interpret a tax director’s categorization of the tax advisor and how 
this categorization may affect tax director judgment. Categorization is the cognitive process 
through which individuals perceive and interpret stimuli in their surroundings (Hogg 2001). 
Perception is accomplished via the categorization process (Bruner 1957). Individuals receive 
stimuli input and unconsciously form mental categories based on defining attributes (Bruner 
1957). Accumulated stimuli input is stored in memory and used to categorize subsequent input 
by comparing the new input to stored individual exemplars or prototypes (Smith and Zarate 
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1990). Categories function as mental shortcuts, enabling individuals to perceive their 
surroundings and quickly process information to inform individual judgment and behavior (Hogg 
2001).  Within the broad concept of categorization, social categorization specifically involves the 
categorization of individuals by a perceiver (Hogg 2001). The way in which a perceiver 
categorizes an individual may lead to selective processing of relevant information, which 
influences interpretation of evidence and ultimately biases judgment (Bodenhausen and Wyer 
1985; Bodenhausen 1988). 
The knowledge spillover/reduced skepticism perspective presented earlier involves 
auditor judgment and the possible effects on audit quality; however, it does not consider the 
impact of differing professional roles on the tax director’s perception of tax advisors. Corporate 
tax directors may categorize a tax advisor from the audit firm (“tax-audit”) differently than a tax 
advisor from an accounting firm that is not the audit firm (“tax-nonaudit”). The different 
categorization of the tax advisor may lead to differing perceptions about a tax advisor’s function 
and predicted behavior and may influence how tax directors interpret evidence in making 
judgments about the likelihood that a corporation should take an aggressive tax position. When 
the corporate tax director categorizes the tax advisor as “tax-audit,” this categorization may be 
associated with the tax advisor’s obligation regarding the accuracy of tax information. The 
corporate tax director may perceive a tax advisor in the “tax-audit” category as having more of 
an oversight function due to the tax advisor’s affiliation with the audit firm engaged to attest to 
the appropriateness of information reported in the corporation’s financial statements. Conversely, 
when the corporate tax director categorizes the tax advisor as “tax-nonaudit,” an advisor in the 
“tax-nonaudit” category may be more strongly linked to a client advocacy function than an 
advisor in the “tax-audit” category. The corporate tax director may perceive a tax advisor in the 
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“tax-nonaudit” category as more of a client advocate due to the absence of affiliation with the 
corporation’s audit firm. The tax director’s categorization of a tax advisor as either “tax-audit” or 
“tax-nonaudit” may affect the lens through which the tax director interprets a tax advisor’s 
recommendation and how the advice influences tax director judgment. 
The Influence of Advice 
Little research has examined the influence of advice on professional decision making in 
the accounting domain. Research on advice in the tax context is particularly sparse. The demand 
for advice increases as uncertainty increases, which is compatible with a tax risk management 
perspective (Beck et al. 1996). However, demand for advice does not necessarily translate into 
utilization of advice (Beck et al. 1996). This study employs the belief-adjustment model to 
examine the influence of advice received by corporate tax directors. The belief-adjustment model 
posits that belief revision occurs through an anchoring-and adjustment process of evidence 
evaluation (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). An anchor, the initial belief, is adjusted in response to 
additional evidence, forming a new anchor, the revised belief (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). Each 
piece of evidence adjusts the previous belief, forming a series of revised beliefs. Belief 
adjustment depends upon both the level of the anchor and the direction of subsequent evidence 
(Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). The level of the anchor (e.g., a larger anchor versus a smaller 
anchor) is the strength of the initial belief regarding a hypothesis (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). 
For example, if in response to Hypothesis A, an individual believing that Hypothesis A is 80 
percent likely to be true would have a larger anchor compared to an individual believing that 
Hypothesis A is 20 percent likely to be true. The direction of subsequent evidence can be 
positive or negative; subsequent positive evidence increases the degree of an individual’s initial 
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belief and subsequent negative evidence decreases the degree of an individual’s initial belief 
(Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). The model posits that a large anchor (initial belief) will have a 
larger adjustment in response to negative evidence than in response to positive evidence. The 
model also predicts the converse: a small anchor (initial belief) will have a larger adjustment in 
response to positive evidence than in response to negative evidence (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). 
Thus, a recency effect is predicted such that the most recent evidence is more influential than 
previous evidence when evidence is surprising (Ashton and Ashton, 1988; Hogarth and Einhorn 
1992). Evidence is surprising when it is inconsistent with previous evidence (e.g., positive 
evidence followed by negative evidence), and evidence is unsurprising when it is consistent with 
previous evidence (e.g., positive evidence followed by positive evidence) (Ashton and Ashton, 
1988; Hogarth and Einhorn 1992).   
The present study is interested in how tax advisor identity and the nature of advice 
influence tax director judgment due to input of both of these factors as evidence in the 
anchoring-and-adjusting process.  As agents of the corporation, tax directors should have a 
default preference for tax minimizing positions. Social categorization theory suggests that tax 
directors will perceive tax advisors differently, categorizing tax advisors from the audit firm as 
“tax-audit” and tax advisors from a different firm as “tax-nonaudit.” The categorization of a tax 
advisor as “tax-audit” may adjust the tax director’s default anchor towards a more conservative 
tax position. Likewise, the categorization of a tax advisor as “tax-nonaudit” may adjust the tax 
director’s default anchor towards a more aggressive tax position.  
The amount of belief adjustment is determined by both the level of the anchor and the 
direction of subsequent evidence (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). The level of the anchor is the 
strength of the initial belief regarding a hypothesis, theoretically dichotomized as either a large 
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anchor or a small anchor (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992).  Regarding the tax aggressiveness of 
corporate tax director judgment, the hypothesis at issue concerns the likelihood that an 
aggressive tax position is the appropriate position. Thus, a large anchor represents a greater 
likelihood that an aggressive tax position is appropriate and a small anchor signifies a lesser 
likelihood that an aggressive position is appropriate.  
Advice received from the tax advisor is expected to act as a subsequent piece of evidence 
in the tax director’s anchor-and-adjusting process. The belief-adjustment model describes a 
contrast or surprise effect in which a large anchor will move more in response to negative 
evidence than in response to positive evidence (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). Thus, a tax director 
receiving advice from a tax advisor not from the audit firm (“tax-nonaudit” category) will have a 
greater belief adjustment if the tax advisor gives conservative advice (negative evidence) than if 
the tax advisor gives aggressive advice (positive evidence). Likewise, a tax director receiving 
advice from a tax advisor from the audit firm (“tax-audit” category) will have a greater belief 
adjustment if the tax advisor gives aggressive advice (positive evidence) than if the tax advisor 
gives conservative advice (negative evidence). Consistent with the belief-adjustment model, 
pairing either a large anchor with negative evidence or a small anchor with positive evidence 
creates a surprise (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992).  A recency effect is predicted such that the most 
recent evidence is more influential than previous evidence when evidence is surprising (Ashton 
and Ashton 1988; Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). Thus, a tax director receiving surprising advice 
will be more heavily influenced by the advice than by the advisor; however, whether the advice 
is surprising depends upon the identity of the tax advisor. Stated formally: 
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H1a: Conservative advice from the non-audit firm tax advisor (i.e., surprising advice) 
will have a stronger effect on the corporate tax director’s judgment than conservative 
advice from the audit firm tax advisor (i.e., unsurprising advice). 
H1b: Aggressive advice from the audit firm tax advisor (i.e., surprising advice) will have 
a stronger effect on the corporate tax director’s judgment than aggressive advice from 
the non-audit firm tax advisor (i.e., unsurprising advice). 
Research Method 
Participants 
Corporate tax professionals with job titles such as VP Tax, Tax Director, Head of Tax, 
etc. were contacted via email to request participation in the study.8 Email addresses were 
obtained from an academic research database. Participants were recruited using a multi-contact 
method (Dillman et al. 2009). As an incentive for participating, I offered to make a contribution 
of $2 on behalf of each participant to one of three national-level charities. Screening questions 
were used to insure that potential participants had adequate experience for inclusion in the study. 
In order to be eligible to participate in the study, participants must have had experience making 
in-house corporate tax decisions on behalf of a company. Screening questions assessed the 
following types of experience: supervision of a company’s income tax return preparation and 
filing, researching income tax matters on behalf of a company, conducting income tax planning 
                                                 
8 This study collects potentially sensitive information about a company’s tax aggressiveness; thus, corporate tax 
executives were assured any responses would be anonymous (i.e., responses would not be linkable to their identity 
or the identity of their corporate employer). I sent a recruitment email containing an anonymous link to the study to 
4,579 email addresses. 269 emails were undeliverable. It is unclear how many emails may have been blocked by 
company filters. 243 participants clicked the link to view information about the study; 139 actually completed the 
study.  
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on behalf of a company, and preparing or reviewing a company’s tax provision calculations. The 
screening questions instructed potential participants to consider only their experience while they 
were employed in-house by a company and not to consider any experience they may have had 
working for a public accounting firm.  
One hundred and nineteen experienced corporate tax professionals completed the 
experiment, with 115 participants (96.7 percent) having more than seven years of experience in 
taxation. Participants with more than seven years of experience were asked to specify total years 
of experience; 96 responded with a mean (standard deviation) of 23.9 years (7.87). Participants 
were primarily employed by multi-national US-based corporations (79.9 percent), with others 
employed by domestic US multistate corporations (15.1 percent) and multi-national foreign-
based (5.0 percent). The vast majority of participants indicated their corporation’s financial 
statements were audited by a public accounting firm (99.2 percent). Regarding the percentage of 
tax services outsourced (rather than conducted in-house), responses ranged from 0 percent to 100 
percent with mean (standard deviation) of 33.0 percent (22.5). Additionally, some corporations 
chose to outsource tax services to the same accounting firm that conducted their audit (43.7 
percent) and other corporations used different accounting firms for tax and audit services (55.5 
percent). Table 1 presents demographic data. Study 1 tables are presented in Appendix A. 
Materials and Design  
The experiment was computer-based and administered via Qualtrics software. 
Participants were first provided with a link to begin the study. The opening screen of the 
Qualtrics study presented the explanation of research (general study overview, estimated time to 
complete, contact information for the experimenters, etc.). Individuals that agreed to participate 
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proceeded to the next screen to answer screening questions before beginning the study. 
Participants were asked to work independently and complete the study in one continuous sitting, 
without outside interruptions.  
The experimental materials consisted of five sections: background information and tax 
scenario about a hypothetical corporation (Maylor Corp), select guidance relevant to the tax 
scenario and the in-house tax staff opinion, a recommendation from Maylor Corp’s tax advisor 
regarding the tax scenario, the participant’s response section, and demographics. See Figure 1 for 
a diagram of the experimental procedures.  
 
 
Figure 1: Diagram of Experimental Procedures 
Background Information and Tax Scenario
(Tax Advisor Identity Manipulated: 
Tax-Nonaudit or Tax-Audit)
Relevant Tax Authority and 
In-House Staff Opinion
Tax Advisor's Recommendation
(Nature of Advice Manipulated: 
Aggressive or Conservative)
Measure Tax Aggressiveness 
(Likelihood)
Measure IRS Permits, Perceived Client 
Advocacy, Tax Risk Preference, Agreement 
with Advice, & Demographics
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Participants were presented with background information for a hypothetical scenario in 
which they were asked to assume the role of Maylor Corp’s Tax Director. Each participant 
received one of two possible variations of background information, differing only in who was 
said to sign Maylor Corp’s tax returns and review research projects conducted in-house by 
Maylor Corp’s tax department: tax professionals from an accounting firm that is not Maylor 
Corp’s audit firm or tax professionals from Maylor Corp’s audit firm. After reading through the 
background information for Maylor Corp, all participants then received the same tax scenario. 
The tax scenario involved the Research and Development (R&D) Credit and the qualification of 
certain research expenses for the R&D Credit. Specifically, participants were told that Maylor 
Corp had incurred costs for supplies related to a new research and development project and 
provided with facts about the new project.  The tax scenario was derived from an actual court 
case on the proper treatment of supplies for the R&D Credit.9  
Following the tax scenario, participants were provided with relevant information from the 
Internal Revenue Code and Regulations. The potential classification of the supplies as “qualified 
research expenses” for the R&D Credit was a matter of judgment as it was not directly addressed 
in the tax guidance provided in the experimental materials.10 Participants were informed that 
Maylor Corp’s in-house tax department staff had compiled the tax authority and provided a 
preliminary opinion that, should Maylor Corp include the supplies in the R&D Credit 
calculation, there was a 60% likelihood that the position would be successfully upheld. The 
purpose of the 60% likelihood was to anchor the participants on the same starting point prior to 
receiving advice from Maylor Corp’s external tax advisors.   
                                                 
9 Union Carbide Corp. TCM 2009-50. 
10 Despite recent legislative activity, the tax rules for claiming the R&D Credit for supplies remain complex and 
ambiguous (Frank et al. 2010).  
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After participants had read the relevant tax authority and the preliminary opinion of 
Maylor Corp’s tax department staff, they were given advice from the party designated as Maylor 
Corp’s tax advisor in the background information. Participants were provided with either a 
recommendation that Maylor Corp should include the supplies in the R&D credit calculation 
(aggressive advice) or that Maylor Corp should not include the supplies in the R&D credit 
calculation (conservative advice). After receiving the tax advisor’s recommendation, participants 
were asked the likelihood of including the supplies as qualified expenses for the R&D Credit. 
The study also included an adapted measure of client advocacy, a measure of tax risk preference, 
manipulation checks, and demographic information. Experimental materials are included as 
Appendix B. 
Independent Variables 
Tax Advisor Identity 
Tax advisor identity is manipulated within the background information for Maylor Corp 
that participants receive early in the experiment. The experimental materials indicate that Maylor 
Corp’s tax advisors are either tax professionals from an accounting firm that is not the same as 
Maylor Corp’s audit firm (Tax-Nonaudit) or tax professionals from Maylor Corp’s audit firm 
(Tax-Audit). The materials state that research projects are often conducted in-house by Maylor 
Corp’s tax department and then reviewed by Maylor Corp’s tax advisor. After participants read 
through the tax scenario about Maylor Corp’s research and development and view the tax 
department staff’s preliminary opinion and relevant tax authority, participants view the tax 
advisor’s recommendation on the appropriate tax treatment. In both the Tax-Nonaudit and Tax-
Audit conditions, the accounting firm is described as a Big 4 public accounting firm.       
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Nature of Advice 
Maylor Corp’s tax advisor provides a recommendation about the treatment of the supplies 
for purposes of the R&D credit. The materials indicate that the tax advisor’s recommendation is 
based upon analysis of the facts and interpretation of the same relevant tax authority that was 
provided earlier in the study. The relevant tax authority is inconclusive regarding the appropriate 
treatment of the supplies for the R&D Credit, representing a grey area in the tax law. The tax 
advisor’s recommendation is either a Conservative or an Aggressive position. In the 
Conservative position, Maylor Corp’s tax advisor recommends that Maylor Corp should not 
include the supplies in the R&D credit calculation. In the Aggressive position, Maylor Corp’s tax 
advisor recommends that Maylor Corp should include the supplies in the R&D credit calculation.    
The nature of the advice (Conservative or Aggressive) is surprising or unsurprising given 
the identity of the tax advisor. Surprising tax advice is either conservative advice from a non-
auditor tax advisor or aggressive advice from an auditor tax advisor. Unsurprising tax advice is 
either aggressive advice from a non-auditor tax advisor or conservative advice from an auditor 
tax advisor. See Figure 2 for a diagram of surprising and unsurprising advice given the 2x2 
design manipulating the nature of advice and the identity of the tax advisor.     
 
  Nature of Tax Advice 
  Conservative Aggressive 
Tax Advisor Identity 
Tax-Nonaudit Surprising Unsurprising 
Tax-Audit Unsurprising Surprising 
Figure 2: Diagram of Surprising and Unsurprising Advice 
 
29 
 
Additional Measures 
IRS Permits  
IRS Permits is a measure of the perceived likelihood that the IRS will permit the position 
that the UltraX supplies are qualified research expenses for Maylor Corp’s Research and 
Development credit.  IRS Permits is measured with an eleven-point scale with labeled points 
ranging from 0% “Not At All Likely” to 100% “Extremely Likely.” A lower perceived 
likelihood that the IRS would permit the tax position of including the expenses represents greater 
perceived riskiness of the tax position. A participant’s assessment of the likelihood that the IRS 
will permit the position is expected to covary with the dependent variable, Weight of Advice. 
Perceived Client Advocacy  
A nine item scale was adapted from the Mason and Levy (2001) measure of client 
advocacy. Similar to Stephenson (2007), the instructions were modified so that participants are 
asked to answer the questions as they think a corporation’s external tax professionals would 
respond. Specifically, participants in the Tax Advisor Identity – Tax-Nonaudit condition are 
asked to “please answer the following items as you think a corporation’s external tax 
professionals would respond in arrangements such as this when the corporation’s external tax 
professionals are not from the audit firm.” Participants in the Tax Advisor Identity – Tax-Audit 
condition are asked to “please answer the following items as you think a corporation’s external 
tax professionals would respond in arrangements such as this when the corporation’s external tax 
professionals are from the audit firm.”  
The original Mason and Levy (2001) items were worded to measure a participant’s client 
advocacy. The items used for this study have been rephrased so that each item measures 
participants’ perceptions of how a corporation’s external tax professionals would respond. Client 
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Advocacy is expected to help explain how participants are differentially influenced by the 
identity of the corporation’s tax advisor and how they respond to aggressive versus conservative 
tax advice from auditor and non-auditor tax advisors.      
Tax Risk Preference 
Tax Risk Preference is a tax risk measure of how certain an individual would want to be 
of his or her tax position within the experimental scenario. Participants are asked “how certain 
would you want to be of your tax position before including the UltraX supplies as qualified 
research expenses for the R&D Credit?” Tax Risk Preference is measured with an eleven-point 
scale ranging from 0% “Not At All Certain” to 100% “Extremely Certain.” An individual who 
prefers a higher degree of certainty is considered to have a lower tax risk preference. Thus, 
responses are reverse coded such that a greater score reflects a greater tax risk preference. Tax 
Risk Preference is measured for use as a possible control variable.   
Agreement with Advice  
Agreement with Advice is measured as the extent to which a participant agrees with the 
advice provided by Maylor Corp’s tax advisor in the scenario. Specifically, participants are 
asked, “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the recommendation of the external tax 
professionals?” Agreement with Advice is measured on a seven-point Likert-type scale with 
labeled points ranging from 1 “Strongly Disagree” to 7 “Strongly Agree.” Responses are 
dichotomized based upon the mid-point of the scale into High or Low Agreement with Advice; 
the mid-point 4 “Neither Agree nor Disagree” is categorized as Low. The extent to which a 
participant agrees with the advice is expected to influence the weight of the advice.  
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Dependent Variable 
The tax aggressiveness of tax director judgment is operationalized as the likelihood of 
taking an aggressive tax position (Likelihood). The aggressive tax position is the likelihood of 
including the cost of specific supplies (described in the tax scenario) as qualified research 
expenses for the Research and Development (R&D) credit calculation. The authoritative 
guidance provided in the experimental materials is ambiguous as to the appropriate tax treatment 
of supplies for the R&D credit.11 Including the supplies in the R&D credit calculation would be 
advantageous for tax purposes.  Thus, a greater likelihood of including the cost of supplies in 
R&D credit research expenses reflects more aggressive tax reporting. 
Likelihood is used to calculate Weight of Advice. Weight of Advice is calculated as the 
absolute value of the difference between the 60% anchor from the in-house tax department and 
Likelihood, divided by the absolute value of the difference between the tax advisor’s 
recommendation and the 60% anchor.12 Weight of Advice is used to evaluate how much the tax 
advisor’s recommendation influenced the participant’s likelihood of taking an aggressive tax 
position.  
                                                 
11 The tax scenario in this study was intentionally designed such that the appropriate tax treatment is ambiguous. 
Conversations with a senior manager from a national firm suggest that, as anticipated, the tax scenario does not 
generate a clear-cut solution. Additionally, a few of the experienced corporate tax professionals contacted me after 
participating in the study to share their thoughts and opinions. Feedback suggests the tax treatment is subject to 
interpretation (i.e., ambiguous) and the case had sufficient detail and realism to engage the experienced corporate tax 
professionals. 
12 The weight of advice (WOA) is calculated as follows: WOA = |(Likelihood – Initial Anchor)| / |(Recommendation 
– Initial Anchor)| (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006). Initial Anchor equals 60%. In the Conservative Nature of Advice 
condition, Recommendation equals 0%. In the Aggressive Nature of Advice condition, Recommendation equals 
100%. WOA values for Likelihood assessments falling outside the range bounded by the tax advisor’s 
recommendation and the initial anchor are adjusted to zero.   
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Results  
Manipulation Checks 
The manipulation of Tax Advisor Identity was presented in the background information, 
which was provided to the participants before they read the tax scenario. The manipulation check 
was conducted at the end of the experimental materials to provide assurance that the participants 
were aware of facts vital to the successful manipulation of the variable. To verify the 
manipulation of tax advisor source, participants were asked, “Which best describes the party that 
reviewed your decision about the UltraX supplies?” Participants were asked to specify whether 
Maylor Corp’s tax advisors were “tax professionals at Firm A, which is also Maylor Corp’s audit 
firm” or “tax professionals at Firm A, which is not Maylor Corp’s audit firm.”  
Additionally, there was a manipulation check to verify that participants knew the nature 
of the advice that Maylor Corp’s tax advisor provided: Maylor Corp should not include the 
supplies in the calculation (Conservative Tax Advice) or should include the supplies in the R&D 
credit calculation (Aggressive Tax Advice). To be included in the study, participants had to pass 
both manipulation check questions. A total of 119 participants are included in the study.13 
Tests of Hypotheses 
This study predicts that advice affects tax director judgment differently depending on 
whether or not the advice is surprising, which is based upon the nature of the advice and the 
identity of the tax advisor. H1a predicts that conservative advice from the non-audit firm tax 
advisor (Tax-Nonaudit) will have a stronger effect on the corporate tax director’s judgment than 
                                                 
13 139 participants completed the experimental materials. 18 participants failed manipulation check questions and 
are excluded. Additionally, two participants are excluded because their current job titles indicate they switched from 
taxation and currently work in audit (“VP, Internal Audit” and “Former Tax Director, currently Director of Audit”).    
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conservative advice from the audit firm tax advisor (Tax-Audit). H1b predicts that aggressive 
advice from the audit firm tax advisor (Tax-Audit) will have a stronger effect on the corporate tax 
director’s judgment than aggressive advice from the non-audit firm tax advisor (Tax-Nonaudit). 
H1a and H1b are tested with an ANOVA measuring the effect of Nature of Advice and Tax 
Advisor Identity on Weight of Advice. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics (Panel A) and the 
results of the ANOVA (Panel B). Nature of Advice is significant in the model (F1, 115 = 12.987, p 
< 0.000). Tax Advisor Identity (F1, 115 = 0.012, p = 0.912) and the interaction of Nature of Advice 
x Tax Advisor Identity (F1, 115 = 0.149, p = 0.700) are not significant in the model. H1a and H1b 
are tested using a simple effects analysis (Table 2, Panel C). Tax Advisor Identity is not 
significant in the “conservative advice” (F = 0.129, p = 0.720) condition or the “aggressive 
advice” condition (F = 0.036, p = 0.849); thus, H1a and H1b are not supported.  
Supplemental Analysis – Weight of Advice  
Due to participants’ considerable experience in corporate taxation, they may have formed 
their own strong opinions about the tax scenario. As such, participants were possibly less 
affected than intended by the anchor provided in the experimental materials via the tax 
department staff opinion. Thus, additional analysis is conducted to examine the influence of 
Nature of Advice and Tax Advisor Identity on Weight of Advice when the participant’s agreement 
with the advice is high separately from when agreement with advice is low.  
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics (Panel A) and the results of an ANOVA (Panel B) 
measuring the effect of Tax Advisor Identity on Weight of Advice and includes only participants 
who are categorized as “high” in Agreement with Advice. Nature of Advice is not significant in 
the model (F1, 73 = 0.079, p = 0.779). However, Tax Advisor Identity (F1, 73 = 4.750, p = 0.033) is 
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significant and the interaction of Nature of Advice x Tax Advisor Identity (F1, 73 = 3.568, p = 
0.063) is found to be marginally significant in the model.  
A simple effects analysis is conducted to further examine the effect of the interaction on 
Weight of Advice for those who agreed with the advice. Tax Advisor Identity is significant in the 
“conservative advice” condition (F = 6.277, p = 0.014); Weight of Advice for those in the Tax-
Nonaudit condition has a mean (standard deviation) of 0.461 (0.406) and has a mean (standard 
deviation) of 0.800 (0.270) for those in the Tax-Audit condition. This indicates that conservative 
advice was given more weight when it came from a tax advisor who was also the auditor. 
Conversely, Tax Advisor Identity is not significant in the “aggressive advice” condition (F = 
0.062, p = 0.804). Weight of Advice in the Tax-Nonaudit condition has a mean (standard 
deviation) of 0.595 (0.356) and a mean (standard deviation) of 0.619 (0.281) in the Tax-Audit 
condition.  
Descriptive statistics for participants categorized as “low” in Agreement with Advice are 
presented in Table 4. As shown in Table 4, few participants disagreed with aggressive advice. 
This finding is particularly evident in the Tax-Nonaudit condition, in which only one participant 
disagreed with the aggressive advice. Of the 57 participants in the Aggressive advice condition, 
50 agreed with the advice (87.7 percent) and only 7 disagreed with the advice (12.3 percent). No 
further analysis is conducted for low Agreement with Advice due to the small number of 
participants who disagreed with aggressive advice. 
Supplemental Analysis – Likelihood  
The main analysis in this study examines the effect of Nature of Advice and Tax Advisor 
Identity on Weight of Advice. The Weight of Advice dependent variable incorporates the initial 
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anchor provided in the experimental materials via the tax department staff opinion. As previously 
discussed, participants may have formed their own strong opinions about the tax scenario. To 
address potential concerns about the effectiveness of the initial anchor, supplemental analysis is 
conducted using Likelihood as the dependent variable. Table 5 presents ANOVA results of the 
effect of Nature of Advice and Tax Advisor Identity on Likelihood. Nature of Advice is significant 
in the model (F1, 115 = 28.965, p < 0.000). Tax Advisor Identity (F1, 115 = 0.139, p = 0.710) and the 
interaction of Nature of Advice x Tax Advisor Identity (F1, 115 = 0.095, p = 0.758) are not found to 
be significant in the model. However, the analysis is more informative when split by whether 
Agreement with Advice is high or low. 
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics and the results of an ANOVA measuring the effect 
of Tax Advisor Identity on Likelihood and includes only participants who are categorized as 
“high” in Agreement with Advice. Nature of Advice (F1, 73 = 143.865, p < 0.000) and Tax Advisor 
Identity (F1, 73 = 4.155, p = 0.045) are significant. Additionally, the interaction of Nature of 
Advice x Tax Advisor Identity (F1, 73 = 7.021, p = 0.010) is significant. A simple effects analysis 
is conducted to further examine the effect of the interaction on Likelihood. Tax Advisor Identity 
is significant in the “conservative advice” condition (F = 8.335, p = 0.005). When agreement 
with conservative advice is high, the mean (standard deviation) of Likelihood is 0.353 (0.285) in 
the Tax-Nonaudit condition and 0.120 (0.162) in the Tax-Audit condition. Meanwhile, Tax 
Advisor Identity is not significant in the “aggressive advice” condition (F = 0.274, p = 0.602).  
Likelihood has a mean (standard deviation) of 0.817 (0.207) in the Tax-Nonaudit condition and 
0.848 (0.112) in the Tax-Audit condition. Descriptive statistics for participants categorized as 
“low” in Agreement with Advice are presented in Table 7. Again, due to the small number of 
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participants who disagreed with aggressive advice, no further analysis is conducted on this 
group.  
Conclusion 
The study targets actual corporate tax decision makers, such as tax directors, and is one 
of the first studies to employ an experimental design to examine corporate tax aggressiveness. 
The study draws upon social categorization theory and the belief-adjustment model to explore 
how tax advisor identity and the nature of tax advice may affect how tax advice influences 
corporate tax director judgment. The process of tax risk management entails that potential 
corporate tax risks should be identified and assessed as part of the process of optimizing tax risk 
(COSO 2004; Donohoe et al. 2014). Assessment of competing tax positions should be as 
unbiased as possible in order to appropriately synchronize a corporation’s tax positions with 
overall corporate tax risk preference.  
The study predicts that the influence of tax advice on corporate tax director judgment 
may differ depending on the nature of the advice and whether the tax advisor is from the audit 
firm or from a different firm. Findings suggest that when tax directors are provided with 
conservative tax advice (i.e., advised not to take a client-favorable tax position not clearly 
supported by the tax authority) and they agree with the conservative advice, the identity of the 
tax advisor influences the weight given to the advice. Tax directors in agreement with 
conservative tax advice weighted advice from the audit firm tax advisor (“tax-audit”) more 
heavily than when advice came from a tax advisor from a different firm (“tax-nonaudit”). As 
such, tax directors that agreed with conservative advice indicated a smaller likelihood of taking 
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the position when the tax advisor was from the audit firm than when the tax advisor was from a 
different firm. 
Though findings do not align with the study’s predictions, the results may still be 
interpretable through the Belief-Adjustment model and social categorization theory. Perhaps the 
true “surprise” was not incongruence of the nature of advice provided given the identity of the 
tax advisor. Rather, the larger “surprise” for the tax directors in this study may have been 
receiving tax advice that did not align with the client-favored position (i.e., conservative tax 
advice). Thus, the more important context for the weight of advice may be the effect of tax 
advisor identity when advise is contrary to overall expectations (i.e., when advice is 
conservative). After the initial shock of receiving conservative advice, the weight of advice may 
then be influenced by tax advisor identity via differing professional roles. The categorization of a 
tax advisor as “tax-audit” may adjust the tax director’s anchor towards an even more 
conservative tax position, compounding the belief adjustment from surprising conservative 
advice. Conversely, the categorization of a tax advisor as “tax-nonaudit” may adjust the tax 
director towards a more aggressive tax position, mitigating to some extent the belief adjustment 
from the surprising conservative advice. Ultimately, corporate tax directors should be made 
aware that the identity of the tax advisor may influence their interpretation of advice and 
evaluation of potential tax positions in the tax risk management process.   
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STUDY TWO: CORPORATE TAX AGGRESSIVENESS: THE EFFECTS OF 
PROMOTION AND PREVENTION FOCUS ON INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING 
Introduction 
Regulatory agencies, such as the IRS and the SEC appear to be concerned about the 
aggressive tax reporting of business entities as evidenced by the shift towards increased 
disclosure of book-tax differences and uncertain tax positions. The introduction of Schedule M-3 
(Net Income Reconciliation), Form 8886 (Reportable Transaction Disclosure Statement), and 
Schedule UTP (Uncertain Tax Position Statement) reflect the IRS’s growing interest in the 
transparency of potentially aggressive tax reporting. Likewise, ASC 740 requires analysis of 
uncertain tax positions and reporting of unrecognized tax benefits in the tax footnote to the 
financial statements (FASB 2009). Not only is the IRS concerned with aggressive tax behavior 
of business entities, both financial accountants and auditors should be as well, given the 
complexity and risk associated with tax accounts in a corporation’s financial statements.  
Corporate tax aggressiveness14 research has examined characteristics of corporations that 
engage in aggressive tax reporting behavior (Phillips 2003; Chen et al. 2010; Lisowsky 2010; 
Robinson et al. 2010; Lanis and Richardson 2011; Armstrong et al. 2012; Rego and Wilson 
2012). These studies have linked corporate characteristics to the outcomes of aggressive tax 
behavior; however prior research has not examined the underlying individual judgment 
component of corporate tax behavior. Entity-level measures of corporate tax aggressiveness (tax 
shelter involvement, low effective tax rates, etc.) are a cumulative result of individual-level 
decisions made by corporate tax decision makers. Individuals make tax decisions that determine 
                                                 
14 As discussed in more detail later, the present study uses tax aggressiveness as a relative term describing where a 
tax position falls along the range of possible tax minimization. More aggressive tax positions have weaker 
underlying facts and lack clear support by relevant tax authority (Cuccia et al. 1995; Roberts 1998). 
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corporate tax aggressiveness, thus this study uses an experimental method to investigate the tax 
aggressiveness of business entities through an examination of individual-level judgment and 
behavior. The purpose of the study is to draw upon regulatory focus theory to examine how both 
the individual disposition of the corporate tax decision maker15 and contextual factors of the tax 
decision environment influence the tax aggressiveness of corporate tax decision makers.  
Regulatory focus theory refers to the manner in which individuals pursue the goals that 
they wish to achieve (Higgins 1997). Individuals with a promotion focus are motivated to 
achieve goals by maximizing successful outcomes, and individuals with a prevention focus are 
motivated to achieve goals by minimizing failed outcomes (Higgins 1997; Higgins et al. 2001). 
Regulatory focus theory is consistent with the view that an individual’s trait16 regulatory focus, a 
dispositional characteristic, may influence tax aggressiveness such that trait promotion-focused 
individuals will make more aggressive tax decisions than trait prevention-focused individuals 
(Higgins 1997). 
Regulatory focus is exhibited as an individual trait; however, situational factors in the 
decision environment can activate a regulatory focus state (i.e., promotion state or prevention 
state) (Higgins 2000). This study also examines the influence of the framing of the external tax 
advisor17 role (a situational factor) on an individual’s regulatory focus state,18 predicting that the 
corporate tax decision maker’s perception of the external tax advisor’s function will influence 
                                                 
15 In this study, the term “corporate tax decision maker” is intended to represent individuals such as the CFO, tax 
director, controller, tax senior manager, tax manager, or tax staff that make tax decisions inside the corporation.  
16 This study defines “trait” as a distinguishing personal quality. A trait is considered to be a chronic, personal 
characteristic.  
17 The term “tax advisor” is used throughout this study to describe the individuals that are engaged to assist 
taxpayers such as corporations with their tax work and is intended to encompass alternate terms such as external tax 
professional, tax preparer, tax service provider, and tax consultant. Tax advisors are not employees of the 
corporation; tax advisors are public accounting professionals.  
18 This study defines “state” as a mode or condition of being. A state is considered to be inducible.    
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the tax aggressiveness of decisions made on behalf of the corporation. Corporate management’s 
view of the external tax advisor as an advocate (i.e., positive frame inducing promotion state) is 
expected to increase the tax aggressiveness of tax decision makers within the business entity.19 
Viewing the external tax advisor as an overseer (i.e., negative frame inducing prevention state) is 
expected to decrease decision maker tax aggressiveness. This study applies regulatory fit theory 
which suggests matching between the dispositional trait regulatory focus of the corporate tax 
decision maker and external tax advisor role framing (i.e., induced regulatory focus state) may 
amplify the effects of regulatory focus trait (promotion and prevention) on tax aggressiveness. A 
mismatch between regulatory focus trait and the framing of the external tax advisor may allow 
regulatory focus state to overshadow trait regulatory focus depending upon the relative strength 
of both state and trait, providing a possible avenue to reduce the tax aggressiveness of corporate 
tax decisions made by promotion-focused individuals (Lisjak et al. 2012).  
To test the hypotheses, I conduct an experiment in which participant trait regulatory focus 
is measured and regulatory focus state is manipulated through whether management views the 
external tax advisor’s role as more of an advocate (i.e., inducing a promotion state) or an 
overseer (i.e., inducing a prevention state). Study participants are recruited from graduate tax 
courses at two public universities. Based upon the responses of 58 graduate students, results 
suggest that tax advisor role may not directly affect decision maker tax aggressiveness as 
hypothesized. However, tax advisor role does affect judgment indirectly through the decision 
maker’s perception of the tax advisor’s client advocacy. Decision makers perceive a company’s 
tax advisor to have significantly stronger client advocacy attitudes when management views the 
                                                 
19 When tax rules are ambiguous, an external tax advisor functioning as an “advocate” would seek to justify a tax 
minimizing position whereas an “overseer” would be more likely to adhere to a more conservative position favoring 
the taxing authority. 
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tax advisor as an advocate, compared to when management views the tax advisor as an overseer. 
Perceiving the tax advisor to be more of an advocate (i.e., a stronger promotion state) amplifies 
the influence of regulatory fit for trait promotion-focused decision makers. Compared to 
individuals with a lower trait promotion focus, tax decision makers with a greater trait promotion 
focus react more strongly to a situationally induced promotion focus state.       
The present study contributes to research on tax compliance and decision making and 
also to the corporate tax avoidance/aggressiveness literature. Additionally, by examining the 
framing of the external tax advisor, this study begins to unravel how a tax advisor’s dual role, as 
both an advocate and an oversight check-point, may influence decision making within a business 
entity (AICPA 2009). In particular, policy makers may be interested in how perceptions of 
external tax advisors as advocates of tax compliance have policy implications for corporate tax 
aggressiveness. 
The following section of this research study contains a review of the relevant literature 
and development of the hypotheses. The subsequent section describes the research method. The 
third section presents results, and the final section draws conclusions.   
Theory and Hypotheses 
Corporate Tax Aggressiveness 
The U. S. tax rules are comprised of various sources of authority, each of which may be 
vague and contradictory. Navigating tax law requires an in-depth analysis, which must be 
constrained to a specific set of facts in order to interpret the rules; however, the corporate tax 
rules are complex and often ambiguous, which makes interpretation difficult (Slemrod 2007). 
The complexity and ambiguity in the corporate tax environment can lead to various potential tax 
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positions with differing levels of tax minimization (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Lisowsky 2010). 
The present study considers tax aggressiveness to be a relative term describing where a tax 
position falls along the range of possible tax minimization. More aggressive tax positions have 
weaker underlying facts and lack clear support by relevant tax authority (Cuccia et al. 1995; 
Roberts 1998). Several metrics have been used to evaluate corporate-level tax aggressiveness 
(Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). One of the measures most commonly used in the tax literature is 
the effective tax rate (ETR).20 Lower ETRs are associated with greater tax aggressiveness.  
Several prior studies, primarily based upon archival data, have sought to identify 
determinants of corporate tax aggressiveness. Most prior work links aggressive tax behavior to 
firm-level characteristics. Tax shelter involvement and firm ownership structure are broad firm-
level characteristics that have been shown to be associated with tax aggressiveness (Lisowsky 
2010; Chen et al. 2010). Additionally, incentive structures such as equity risk incentives, board 
of director compensation, and tax director incentive-based compensation are also linked to more 
aggressive tax reporting (Rego and Wilson 2012; Lanis and Richardson 2011; Armstrong et al. 
2012; Phillips 2003). Robinson, Sikes, and Weaver (2010) analyze tax department structure, 
another firm-level variable, and find evidence that profit centers (i.e., tax departments evaluated 
by contribution to financial income) are associated with more aggressive behavior than cost 
centers (i.e., tax departments evaluated on cost minimization). Additionally, Graham, Hanlon, 
Shevlin, and Shroff (2014) survey corporate executives, finding that company reputational 
concerns as well as the potential for negative financial statement effects may influence the 
likelihood of engaging in tax planning. Together, these studies suggest a link between corporate 
                                                 
20The effective tax rate is book tax expense divided by book income. The effective tax rate should not to be confused 
with the statutory tax rate (from the tax rules), which is generally 35% for corporations. 
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tax decision maker incentives and tax aggressiveness; however, little is understood about the 
judgment of individuals making tax decisions on behalf of the corporation. The present study 
draws upon regulatory focus theory to investigate individual-level decision making in the 
corporate tax environment. 
Regulatory Focus   
The foundation of regulatory focus theory originates in Higgins’s (1997) examination of 
approach-avoidance motivation. Higgins critically analyzes motivation, reasoning that there must 
be a richer psychological explanation of the forces motivating individual goal pursuit than the 
simplistic concept that individuals seek to procure pleasure and avoid pain (Higgins 1997; 
Higgins et al. 2001). Rather, Higgins (1997) posits that individuals have two fundamentally 
different strategic ways of pursuing their goals (i.e., different self-regulatory mindsets or foci): 
promotion regulatory focus and prevention regulatory focus. Promotion focus reflects concern 
with maximizing successful attempts and ensuring against errors of omission for advancement 
purposes (Brockner and Higgins 2001; Crowe and Higgins 1997). Individuals with a promotion 
focus pay attention to the presence or absence of positive outcomes (Higgins et al. 2001). 
Prevention focus is characterized by attention to minimizing failed attempts and ensuring against 
errors of commission for safety and security purposes (Brockner and Higgins 2001; Crowe and 
Higgins 1997). Individuals with a prevention focus are concerned with the presence or absence 
of negative outcomes (Higgins et al. 2001). As an example, suppose two individuals have the 
same goal of advancing from supervisor to manager. If one has a promotion focus and the other a 
prevention focus, they would adopt dissimilar approaches to reach this goal. The individual with 
a promotion focus would likely display eagerness to learn more, attempting to achieve more 
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success. The individual with a prevention focus may choose to adhere to the job description of 
the desired manager position, attempting not to make any mistakes. A predisposition toward 
either a promotion or prevention focus represents a trait that impacts an individual’s decisions. 
When applied to a corporate tax setting, regulatory focus theory suggests that a corporate 
tax decision maker’s regulatory focus may influence decision making. Promotion-focused 
decision makers seek to maximize successful attempts and ensure against errors of omission (i.e., 
avoid missed opportunities) (Brockner and Higgins 2001; Crowe and Higgins 1997). Thus, in a 
corporate tax setting, decision makers with a predisposition toward a promotion focus may 
concentrate on maximizing tax opportunities, leading judgment to be more tax aggressive on 
behalf of the corporation. Conversely, prevention-focused decision makers endeavor to minimize 
failed attempts and ensure against errors of commission (i.e., avoid mistakes) (Brockner and 
Higgins 2001; Crowe and Higgins 1997). Corporate tax decision makers with a predisposition 
toward a prevention focus may concentrate on minimizing exposure in the event of tax authority 
scrutiny, leading judgment to be less tax aggressive. Hypothesis 1 is stated formally as follows:         
H1: Corporate tax decision makers will make more (less) aggressive tax compliance 
decisions when they have a trait promotion (prevention) focus. 
Prior literature has viewed regulatory focus as both an individual trait and a decision-
making state (Higgins 2000; Lanaj et al. 2012; Lisjak et al. 2012). As noted above, regulatory 
focus is an individual trait in that some individuals are generally more inclined to have a 
promotion focus or a prevention focus (Higgins 2000). However, situational factors in the 
decision task can activate either a promotion or prevention focus state (Higgins 2000). Indeed, 
different tasks may trigger either a promotion or prevention focus state depending upon the type 
of task (Van Dijk and Kluger 2011; Dimotakis et al. 2012). Prior research in persuasive 
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communication and management has examined how inducible regulatory focus state may be 
used to influence decision making and behavior (Zhu and Meyers-Levy 2007; Lanaj et al. 2012). 
Once induced, a regulatory focus state leads individuals to interpret information via underlying 
cognitive processes that are distinct for promotion focus versus prevention focus (Zhu and 
Meyers-Levy 2007). A promotion focus leads individuals to make connections between 
information items, clustering information into themes. Conversely, a prevention focus brings 
about attention to specific items and salience of distinct features of each specific item of 
information (Zhu and Meyers-Levy 2007).21  
Though induced regulatory focus state has much the same effect on decision making as 
individual regulatory focus trait, the state may not completely cloak the influence of the trait 
(Lisjak et al. 2012). Rather, regulatory focus traits have persistent influence, creating interference 
with induced regulatory focus state when induced state differs from an individual’s predominant 
regulatory focus trait (Lisjak et al. 2012). Thus, the overall influence of regulatory focus may 
depend upon both an individual’s trait regulatory focus and situationally-induced regulatory 
focus state. Congruity between an individual’s trait regulatory focus and situationally induced 
regulatory focus state leads to increased task engagement (Cesario et al. 2008). Incongruity 
between trait regulatory focus and induced regulatory focus state increases cognitive demands 
and negatively impacts performance (Lisjak et al. 2012).  
                                                 
21 Regulatory focus is distinct from risk propensity and risk perception. Risk propensity describes how individuals 
respond to risk in general, whereas trait regulatory focus differentiates two ways in which individuals may approach 
goal achievement, explaining individual differences in risk seeking propensity (Bryant and Dunford). The framing 
of information through either a positive or negative goal frame induces situational regulatory focus state, affecting 
risk perception. Promotion and prevention foci differentially affect an individual’s perception of omission risk and 
commission risk (Bryant and Dunford 2008).   
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Regulatory Fit   
Regulatory focus theory relates to how an individual’s regulatory focus influences 
motivation, decision making, and behavior. Regulatory fit theory extends regulatory focus 
theory, positing that “fit” (i.e., alignment) between an individual’s promotion or prevention 
regulatory focus and the way in which a goal is framed increases motivation in goal pursuit 
(Higgins 2000; Higgins 2005). Goals may be framed as “ideal” goals (i.e., a positive frame) to 
align with a promotion focus or as “ought” goals (i.e., a negative frame) to align with a 
prevention focus (Shah et al. 1998; Higgins 2000). Comparison of oneself to one’s ideal goals 
represents a positive goal frame as attention is directed at ensuring the presence of positive 
outcomes in maximizing advancement to the “ideal” self. Conversely, comparing oneself to how 
one ought to be is a negative goal frame as the individual seeks to minimize discrepancies with 
the “ought” self (Higgins 2000). Regulatory fit occurs when a promotion-focused individual’s 
task has a positive goal frame and when a prevention-focused individual’s task has a negative 
goal frame (Higgins 2000; Higgins 2005). Regulatory fit between a decision maker’s regulatory 
focus and goal framing may enhance the perceived value of the decision, improving goal 
motivation, task engagement, and task performance (Shah et al. 1998; Higgins 2000). Figure 3 
presents a conceptual model of regulatory fit, which was developed based upon Lanaj et al. 
(2012). 
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Figure 3: Conceptual Model of Regulatory Fit 
 
Regulatory fit has been used in a tax setting to examine the effect of fit between taxpayer 
regulatory focus and the framing of information campaigns on taxpayer compliance (Hollar et al. 
2008; Leder et al. 2010). If the tax authority’s goal is to increase compliance, the tax authority 
may attempt to do so either by emphasizing the benefits of high tax compliance (i.e., positive 
goal frame) or warning against the detriments of low tax compliance (i.e., negative goal frame) 
(Hollar et al. 2008). In either case the goal is to increase tax compliance; however, whether 
positive or negative goal framing is more effective for a particular individual depends upon the 
individual’s regulatory focus. Positive goal framing is more effective for individuals with a 
promotion focus and negative goal framing is more effective for individuals with a prevention 
focus (Hollar et al. 2008). The Hollar et al. (2008) study examined goal framing from the tax 
authority’s perspective. The present study examines goal framing from the corporate tax decision 
maker’s perspective.  
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Tax Professionals   
A tax professional working inside a corporate tax department may be a certified public 
accountant (CPA). A CPA has a dual role as both a client advocate and a regulatory entity. The 
AICPA’s (2009) Statements on Standards for Tax Services state that tax professionals should act 
as advocates22 on behalf of their clients. Tax professionals are also obligated to practice due 
diligence with regards to the accuracy of client information presented to the IRS (AICPA 2009). 
Thus, the potential for conflict exists between these two roles. Corporate tax decision makers 
within a corporation (e.g., a corporate tax department) may be assisted by tax advisors external to 
the corporation. External tax advisors are CPAs, and as such corporate management may view 
the tax advisor role as an advocacy or oversight function. Management’s belief about the nature 
of the external tax advisor’s role is predicted to influence corporate tax decision making such 
that framing as an overseer (i.e., negative goal frame) is expected to be associated with less 
aggressive tax behavior than framing as an advocate (i.e., positive goal frame). 
H2: Corporate tax decision makers will make less (more) aggressive tax compliance 
decisions when the external tax advisor is presented as an overseer (advocate).  
The present study applies regulatory fit to the context of individual-level decision making 
within the corporate tax environment. Regulatory fit theory indicates that a good “fit” between 
the framing of the external tax advisor as an advocate (positive frame) or an overseer (negative 
frame) and the regulatory focus of the corporate tax decision maker should result in increased 
motivation for goal pursuit. In the corporate tax environment, complexity and ambiguity make 
the corporate tax rules difficult to interpret (Slemrod 2007). Thus, the corporate tax environment 
                                                 
22 Mason and Levy (2001, 127) define client advocacy as “a state of mind in which one feels one’s primary loyalty 
belongs to the taxpayer. It is exhibited by a desire to represent the taxpayer zealously within the bounds of the law, 
and by a desire to be a fighter on behalf of the taxpayer.” 
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may provide few situational cues about the nature of the task to influence decision maker 
regulatory focus state, and individual regulatory focus traits may dominate absent additional cues 
from top management. However, the way in which management views the function of the 
corporation’s external tax advisors may introduce situational cues, inducing a regulatory focus 
state. Situationally-induced regulatory focus state and trait regulatory focus may together 
determine the overall influence of regulatory focus on an individual’s judgment. Congruity 
between an individual’s inherent trait regulatory focus and situationally induced regulatory focus 
state is predicted to amplify the effect of trait regulatory focus on the tax aggressiveness of 
individual judgment. Incongruity between trait regulatory focus and induced regulatory focus 
state is expected to diminish the influence of trait regulatory focus on judgment. Stated formally:  
H3: Congruence between trait regulatory focus and regulatory focus state will amplify 
the effect of regulatory focus on the tax aggressiveness of corporate tax decision maker 
judgment. 
Research Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from graduate tax courses at two public universities using a 
multi-contact method (Dillman et al. 2009). The study was first announced in class, after which 
students received an email containing study information and a link to the study. Students also 
received a reminder about the opportunity to participate in the study. Students who elected to 
participate received extra credit in their graduate tax class. Fifty-eight graduate students 
completed the experiment and are included in the analysis. The majority of the participants are 
male (56.9 percent). Most participants are between 21-25 years old (63.8 percent), with others 
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age 26-30 (24.1 percent), age 31-35 (6.9 percent), and over age 35 (5.2 percent). The majority of 
the participants indicate having experience in public accounting (58.6 percent); 34.5 percent 
indicate public accounting experience specifically in tax. All participants have taken tax classes. 
Most have taken one to two classes (67.2 percent), some have three to four tax classes (13.8 
percent) and five or more tax classes (19.0 percent). Participants are asked about the preparation 
of their most recent personal tax return. The majority prepared their own personal tax return 
(63.8 percent). Others hired a paid preparer (20.7 percent), received assistance from a friend or 
relative (12.1 percent), or did not need to file (3.4 percent). Table 9 presents demographic data. 
Study 2 tables are presented in Appendix C. 
Materials and Design 
The experiment is computer-based and administered via Qualtrics software. Participants 
are free to complete the study at their convenience; however, they are asked to work 
independently and to complete the study in one sitting without outside interruptions. All 
participants are first provided with a link to begin the study in a study recruitment email. The 
opening screen of the Qualtrics study presents the explanation of research and the study 
overview. Individuals that agree to participate proceed to the next screen to begin the study.  
The experimental materials consist of five sections: background information and a tax 
scenario about a hypothetical corporation (Sullivan-Reed Corp), select tax authority guidance 
relevant to the tax scenario, a participant response section, demographics, and a final response 
section measuring trait regulatory focus. See Figure 4 for a summary of the experimental 
procedures.  
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Figure 4: Diagram of Experimental Procedures 
 
Participants are presented with background information for a hypothetical scenario in 
which they are asked to assume the role of a tax department staff member employed by a 
company named Sullivan-Reed Corp. The background information describes Sullivan-Reed Corp 
(e.g., publicly traded manufacturing company, headquartered in the U.S., etc.) and the duties and 
responsibilities of Sullivan-Reed Corp’s in-house tax department. Additionally, the materials 
discuss external, third-party tax professionals hired by the company and their role in the 
Background Information and Tax Scenario
(Manipulated Tax Advisor Role: 
Advocate or Overseer)
Relevant Tax Authority
Measure Likelihood (DV), Perceived Client 
Advocacy, IRS Permits, and Tax Risk 
Preference 
Demographics
Measure Trait Regulatory Focus 
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company’s tax function. The materials note that research projects are often conducted in-house 
and then reviewed by the external tax professionals. Each participant received one of two 
possible variations of background information. The two variations differed only in the reason 
why Sullivan-Reed Corp’s management hired the external tax professionals. Participants are told 
that Sullivan-Reed’s CFO has stated that “the primary objective of hiring the external tax 
professionals at Firm A” is either to “help Sullivan-Reed Corp find the most advantageous tax 
opportunities” (advocate tax advisor role) or to “make sure Sullivan-Reed Corp follows the tax 
rules” (overseer tax advisor role).   
After reading through the background information, all participants receive the same tax 
scenario. The tax scenario involves the Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD) and 
the eligibility of certain activities for the DPAD. Specifically, the scenario indicates that 
Sullivan-Reed Corp has introduced a new product line consisting of hot cocoa sets containing 
gourmet, prepackaged items artfully arranged in decorative mugs. Participants are assigned the 
task of determining if the activities associated with assembling the hot cocoa product set line are 
eligible for the DPAD. The tax scenario presented in this study is based upon actual court cases 
on the eligibility of activities for the DPAD.23 Participants are provided with relevant portions of 
tax authority (the Internal Revenue Code, Treasury Regulations, and court cases). The potential 
classification of the hot cocoa set product line activities as eligible for the DPAD is a matter of 
judgment as the treatment is not clearly resolved by the tax authority provided in the 
experimental materials. Thus, participants need to evaluate the scenario facts and tax authority to 
determine their opinion about the appropriate treatment for tax purposes.  
                                                 
23 United States v. Dean. 945 F. Supp 2d 1110 (U.S. District Court, C.D. Cal. May 7, 2013); Precision Dose, Inc. v. 
United States, No. 3:12-cv-50180 (U.S. District Court, N.D. Ill.. September 24, 2015). 
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After reviewing the relevant tax authority, participants are asked “What is the likelihood 
that you would recommend that Sullivan-Reed Corp include the hot cocoa set product line in the 
Domestic Production Activities Deduction?” The instrument also includes an adapted measure of 
client advocacy, a measure of tax risk preference, a manipulation check, and demographic 
information. Following the demographics, the instrument collects a measure of trait regulatory 
focus. Experimental materials are included as Appendix D.   
Independent Variables 
Tax Advisor Role 
Tax Advisor Role is intended to induce a participant’s regulatory focus state by 
manipulating the participant’s perception of Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax advisors (via Perceived 
Client Advocacy).  Tax Advisor Role is manipulated within the background information that the 
participants receive about the tax scenario. The materials state that the corporation has external 
tax professionals from a Big 4 public accounting firm that prepare the corporate tax return and 
that work done in-house (i.e., by the participant and other corporate tax decision makers) is sent 
to them for review. The external tax advisor is either characterized as an Advocate or an 
Overseer. Participants in the Advocate condition are informed that “the CFO of Sullivan-Reed 
Corp states that ‘the primary objective of hiring the external tax professionals at Firm A is to 
help Sullivan-Reed Corp find the most advantageous tax opportunities in achieving our 30 
percent target effective tax rate.’ ” Participants in the Advocate condition also learn that the CFO 
continues to use the firm’s tax services “primarily due to the Firm’s eagerness and 
resourcefulness in seeking optimal tax outcomes.”  
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Participants in the Overseer condition are informed that “the CFO of Sullivan-Reed Corp 
states that ‘the primary objective of hiring the external tax professionals at Firm A is to make 
sure Sullivan-Reed Corp follows the tax rules in achieving our 30 percent target effective tax 
rate.’ ” Additionally in the Overseer condition, the materials state that the CFO continues to use 
the firm’s tax services “primarily due to the Firm’s vigilance and attention to detail in 
maintaining tax compliance.” 
Trait Regulatory Focus 
Trait Regulatory Focus is measured with an eighteen item scale developed by Lockwood 
et al. (2002) to measure an individual’s chronic, trait-like regulatory focus.24 The measure is 
comprised of two sub-scales, with nine items measuring promotion focus and nine items 
measuring prevention focus. The promotion sub-scale items address individual hopes and 
aspirations and the prevention items assess safety and responsibility (Lockwood et al 2002). 
Each of the items uses a seven-point Likert-type scale with labeled points ranging from 1 
“Strongly Disagree” to 7 “Strongly Agree.” Trait Regulatory Focus is a continuous measure 
calculated as the sum of the promotion focus items, less the sum of the prevention focus items. 
Cronbach’s alpha for the Trait Regulatory Focus scale is 0.765. Factor analysis indicates that, 
although Eigenvalues exceed 1 for multiple factors, the scree plot reveals the 18 item measure 
predominately captures two factors. Factor loadings suggest one factor consists primarily of 
promotion items and the other is comprised primarily of prevention items. 
                                                 
24 Though regulatory focus may be situationally induced, trait regulatory focus is a stable trait with persistent 
influence that creates interference with induced regulatory focus state (Lisjak et al. 2012).  
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Additional Measures 
Perceived Client Advocacy 
A nine item scale is adapted from the Mason and Levy (2001) measure of client 
advocacy. Cronbach’s alpha for the Perceived Client Advocacy scale is 0.788. Factor analysis 
indicates that, although Eigenvalues exceed 1 for multiple factors, the scree plot reveals that the 
nine item measure predominately captures a single factor. Both the instructions for the scale and 
the scale items have been modified for use in this study. Similar to Stephenson (2007), the 
instructions are modified so participants are asked to answer the questions as they think Sullivan-
Reed Corp’s external tax advisors would respond. The original Mason and Levy (2001) items are 
worded to measure an individual’s client advocacy attitude; however, the Perceived Client 
Advocacy items are rephrased so that each item measures participants’ perceptions of how a 
corporation’s external tax advisors would respond. Perceived Client Advocacy is expected to 
help explain how presentation of the external tax advisor as an advocate or an overseer may 
influence the tax aggressiveness of corporate tax decision maker judgment.    
Manipulating the tax advisor role as either an advocate or an overseer should create a 
promotion or prevention regulatory focus state, and it should do this by affecting participants’ 
perceptions of the client advocacy attitudes of Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax advisors (i.e., Perceived 
Client Advocacy). Thus, Perceived Client Advocacy is intended to be a situational factor in the 
corporate tax environment in which the participant is making his or her judgment. The 
perception of the tax advisor’s client advocacy attitudes is expected to situationally induce a 
regulatory focus state. An “advocate” tax advisor role should lead to the perception that the tax 
advisor has strong client advocacy, a situational factor expected to induce a promotion focus 
state. An “overseer” tax advisor role should lead to the perception that the tax advisor has weak 
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client advocacy, inducing a prevention focus state. Perceived Client Advocacy is thus expected 
to mediate the effect of Tax Advisor Role on the dependent variable, Likelihood.       
IRS Permits 
IRS Permits is a measure of the perceived likelihood that the IRS will permit the position 
evaluated in the tax scenario. IRS Permits is measured by asking participants, “In your opinion, 
if this position was examined by the IRS, what is the likelihood that the IRS would uphold the 
position that Sullivan Reed Corp’s hot cocoa set product line qualifies for the Domestic 
Production Activities Deduction?” IRS Permits is measured on an eleven-point scale with 
labeled points ranging from 0% “Not At All Likely” to 100% “Extremely Likely.” IRS Permits is 
presented as a percentage. Lower perceived likelihood that the IRS would permit the tax position 
of including the expenses represents greater perceived riskiness of the tax position. IRS Permits 
is expected to covary with the dependent variable, Likelihood. 
Tax Risk Preference 
Tax Risk Preference is a measure of how certain an individual would want to be of his or 
her tax position. Tax Risk Preference is measured by asking, “as Sullivan-Reed’s tax department 
staff, how certain would you want to be of your tax position before including the hot cocoa set 
product line in the Domestic Production Activities Deduction?” The level of certainty is obtained 
using an eleven-point scale ranging from 0% “Not At All Certain” to 100% “Extremely Certain.” 
Tax Risk Preference is presented as a percentage. An individual desiring a higher degree of 
certainty is considered to have a lower tax risk preference. Responses are reverse coded so that a 
greater score reflects preference for greater tax risk. Personal Tax Risk Preference is measured as 
a possible control variable.  
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Dependent Variable 
The tax aggressiveness of decision maker judgment is operationalized as the participant’s 
likelihood of taking an aggressive tax position (Likelihood). The aggressive tax position is the 
determination of certain activities (described in the tax scenario) as eligible for the Domestic 
Production Activities Deduction (DPAD). The authoritative guidance provided in the 
experimental materials is ambiguous as to the appropriate tax treatment of the activities for the 
DPAD. Considering the activities to be eligible for the DPAD would be advantageous for tax 
purposes. Thus, a greater likelihood of including the activities in the DPAD reflects greater tax 
aggressiveness. Likelihood is measured by asking, “What is the likelihood that you would 
recommend that Sullivan-Reed Corp include the hot cocoa set product line in the Domestic 
Production Activities Deduction?” Likelihood is measured using an eleven-point scale with 
labeled points ranging from 0% “Not At All Likely” to 100% “Extremely Likely.” Likelihood is 
presented as a percentage. Greater likelihood of including the expenses represents greater tax 
aggressiveness. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
The manipulation of tax advisor role is presented in the background information, which is 
provided to the participants before they read the tax scenario. The manipulation check is 
conducted later in the experimental materials to provide assurance that the participants are aware 
of facts vital to the successful manipulation of the variable. To verify the manipulation of tax 
advisor role, participants are asked, “Based upon the tax scenario, which of the following more 
accurately describes the primary function of Sullivan-Reed Corp’s external tax professionals at 
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Firm A?” Participants are asked to specify whether the primary function is either to “find the 
most advantageous tax opportunities for Sullivan-Reed Corp” or to “make sure Sullivan-Reed 
Corp follows the tax rules.” Participants had to pass the manipulation check question to be 
included in the study. A total of 58 participants are included in the study.25  
Descriptive Statistics    
Table 10 presents descriptive statistics by Tax Advisor Role for the dependent variable 
Likelihood, the continuous predictor variable Trait Regulatory Focus, the possible mediator 
Perceived Client Advocacy, and the possible covariates IRS Permits and Tax Risk Preference. 
Participants in the Advocate condition report a mean (standard deviation) Likelihood of 57.81 
percent (31.90), which is greater than the Likelihood of participants in the Overseer condition 
mean (standard deviation) of 50.77 percent (31.74); however, the difference is not significant (p 
= 0.406). Trait Regulatory Focus has a mean (standard deviation) of 14.28 (11.63) in the 
Advocate condition and 17.00 (9.59) in the Overseer condition, a difference which is not 
significantly different. Though the Trait Regulatory Focus measure could theoretically range 
from -56 to + 56, Trait Regulatory Focus for participants in the sample was predominately 
positive, having an overall mean (standard deviation) of 15.50 (10.76) and ranging from -10 to 
+38, indicating that few participants had a prevention trait. As expected, Perceived Client 
Advocacy is significantly greater in the Advocate condition than in the Overseer Condition with 
mean (standard deviation) of 43.13 (8.79) and 37.73 (5.69), respectively (p = 0.007). Neither IRS 
                                                 
25 83 participants completed the experimental materials. 25 participants failed the manipulation check question and 
are excluded from the analysis.  
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Permits nor Tax Risk Preference differs significantly between the Advocate and Overseer 
conditions. 
Tests of Hypotheses 
Correlation coefficients are presented in Table 11. Significant correlations exist between 
Tax Advisor Role and Perceived Client Advocacy, as well as between the dependent variable 
Likelihood and the covariate IRS Permits.  Due to the presence of a continuous predictor 
variable, Trait Regulatory Focus, hypotheses are tested using regression. Table 12 reports the 
preliminary regression results with Likelihood as the dependent variable.  The regression model 
is statistically significant at p < 0.000, with an adjusted R2 of 0.278. However, the regression 
model does not find support for study hypotheses as none of the variables in the model are 
statistically significant, with the exception of the covariate, IRS Permits, at p < 0.000. Although 
the study hypotheses do not include the mediator Perceived Client Advocacy, the Tax Advisor 
Role manipulation is designed to induce a regulatory focus state by influencing a participant’s 
perception of the tax advisor’s client advocacy (i.e., Perceived Client Advocacy). Perceived 
Client Advocacy may help explain how presentation of the external tax advisor as an advocate or 
an overseer influences the tax aggressiveness of corporate tax decision maker judgment. Thus, 
additional analysis incorporates mediation analysis of Perceived Client Advocacy into the model.  
Supplemental Analysis 
The mediation model is tested using the SPSS PROCESS script (Hayes 2013). Variables 
in the model include the dependent variable Likelihood, a manipulated binary independent 
variable Tax Advisor Role, a continuous predictor variable Trait Regulatory Focus, the mediator 
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Perceived Client Advocacy, and a covariate IRS Permits. The mediation model is presented in 
Figure 5.  
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Figure 5: Mediation Model 
Notes: Tax Advisor Role is the causal variable [X], Perceived Client Advocacy is the mediator 
[Mj], and Likelihood is the outcome [Y]. a, b1j, b2, b3j, and c’ are the regression coefficients in 
the estimation models of Perceived Client Advocacy and Likelihood; and eMj and eY are errors in 
the estimates of Perceived Client Advocacy and Likelihood, respectively. The indirect effect of 
Tax Advisor Role on Likelihood through Perceived Client Advocacy is ab1j. The direct effect of 
Tax Advisor Role on Likelihood after considering ab is c’. The figure is modified from Hayes 
(2013, 450) by insertion of variable names into the model.   
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Table 13 shows the results of the mediation analysis. The analysis includes two 
regressions and a test of the indirect effect of the manipulated variable on the dependent variable. 
Panel A presents the first regression, which shows that Tax Advisor Role is significantly related 
to the mediator Perceived Client Advocacy (p = 0.009) with R2 = 0.115. Panel B presents the 
second regression, which shows that Likelihood is a function of IRS Permits and is significantly 
related to Trait Regulatory Focus (p = 0.039) and the interaction of Perceived Client Advocacy 
and Trait Regulatory Focus (p = 0.013) with R2 = 0.413. The indirect effect of Tax Advisor Role 
on Likelihood, presented in Panel C, is significant (p < 0.05) at Trait Regulatory Focus values of 
15.5000 (mean) and 26.2593 (mean plus one standard deviation) based on a 95 percent 
bootstrapped confidence interval using 1,000 iterations. Additionally, Panel D presents the index 
of moderated mediation; the moderation of the indirect effect of Tax Advisor Role on Likelihood 
by Trait Regulatory Focus is significant (p < 0.05) based on a 95 percent bootstrapped 
confidence interval using 1,000 iterations.     
Hypothesis 1 predicts that corporate tax decision makers will make more (less) 
aggressive tax compliance decisions when they have a trait promotion (prevention) focus. Trait 
Regulatory Focus is significant in Panel B of the mediation model; however, since there is a 
significant interaction between Trait Regulatory Focus and Perceived Client Advocacy, the 
interpretation of this coefficient is unclear. Hypothesis 2 predicts that corporate tax decision 
makers will make less (more) aggressive tax compliance decisions when the external tax advisor 
is presented as an overseer (advocate). Although not formally hypothesized, Perceived Client 
Advocacy may theoretically mediate the effect of Tax Advisor Role on the dependent variable, 
Likelihood. Presenting the external tax advisor as an overseer is expected to induce a prevention 
regulatory focus state. Presenting the external tax advisor as an advocate is expected to induce a 
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promotion regulatory focus state. Tax Advisor Role is an indicator variable equal to 0 in the 
Overseer condition and equal to 1 in the Advocate condition. As indicated in Panel D of Table 
13, the indirect effect of Tax Advisor Role on Likelihood is significant with a positive 
coefficient.  
The final hypothesis predicts an interaction between trait regulatory focus and regulatory 
focus state (induced by tax advisor role: overseer or advocate). Specifically, Hypothesis 3 states 
that congruence between trait regulatory focus and regulatory focus state will amplify the effect 
of regulatory focus on the tax aggressiveness of corporate tax decision maker judgment. 
Although Perceived Client Advocacy was not included in study hypotheses, Perceived Client 
Advocacy may essentially function as a measure of regulatory focus state, theoretically 
mediating the effect of Tax Advisor Role and interacting with Trait Regulatory Focus to 
influence the dependent variable, Likelihood.  Table 13 Panel A indicates a significant positive 
relationship between Tax Advisor Role and Perceived Client Advocacy and Panel B shows that 
the interaction of Perceived Client Advocacy Role and Trait Regulatory Focus has a significant 
positive effect on the dependent variable Likelihood. Thus, Tax Advisor Role and Trait 
Regulatory focus interact through the mediator, Perceived Client Advocacy, to influence 
Likelihood. As indicated in Panel C of Table 13, the indirect effect of Tax Advisor Role on 
Likelihood is significant with a positive coefficient at higher values of Trait Regulatory Focus. 
Figure 6 presents the nature of the interaction’s effect on Likelihood using a median split for the 
continuous variables Perceived Client Advocacy and Trait Regulatory Focus. Given that Trait 
Regulatory Focus is predominately positive (i.e., most participants had a promotion focus) in the 
study sample, this finding provides partial support for H3.  
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Figure 6: Presentation of Continuous Predictor Variables Split upon Median Values: Effect of 
Perceived Client Advocacy (Induced Regulatory Focus State) and Trait Regulatory Focus on 
Dependent Variable Likelihood 
Conclusion 
This study examines the underlying individual judgment component of corporate tax 
aggressiveness. The study draws upon regulatory focus theory to explore how individual-level 
judgment may be influenced both by individual trait regulatory focus and also by regulatory 
focus state (via situational cues in the corporate tax environment). Regulatory focus theory 
involves an individual’s manner of goal pursuit (i.e., the lens through which an individual views 
goals and the means to obtain them). Thus the theory may be particularly relevant in the 
corporate tax setting as differing regulatory foci may influence a tax decision maker’s judgment 
in the application of ambiguous tax authority to complex corporate tax scenarios.   
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The study predicts that trait regulatory focus and regulatory focus state influence the tax 
aggressiveness of individual-level judgment. Specifically, a promotion focus is predicted to lead 
to greater tax aggressiveness than a prevention focus. The study also investigates the “fit” 
between trait and regulatory focus state. Dependent on “fit,” regulatory focus state is predicted to 
amplify or mitigate the influence of trait regulatory focus (e.g., management’s presentation of the 
external tax advisor as an overseer (prevention state) is expected to counter the tax 
aggressiveness of trait promotion-focused corporate tax decision makers). Study findings do not 
support these hypotheses; however, supplemental analysis suggests that perceived client 
advocacy (i.e., the degree to which the decision maker perceives the tax advisor to be a client 
advocate) mediates the influence of tax advisor role on decision maker judgment. Although tax 
advisor role may not directly affect decision maker tax aggressiveness, tax advisor role does 
affect judgment indirectly through the decision maker’s perception of the tax advisor’s client 
advocacy. Decision makers perceive a company’s tax advisor to have significantly stronger 
client advocacy when management views the tax advisor as more of an advocate than when 
management views the tax advisor as an overseer. Furthermore, perceiving the tax advisor to be 
more of an advocate (i.e., a stronger promotion state) amplifies the influence of regulatory fit for 
trait promotion-focused decision makers. Compared to individuals with a lower trait promotion 
focus, tax decision makers with a greater trait promotion focus react more strongly to 
situationally induced promotion focus state. This finding suggests that promotion-focused 
individuals may be particularly susceptible to the influence of situational factors in what should 
be an unbiased evaluation of tax positions.  
Interpretation of results is subject to the following limitations. First, it is possible that the 
nature of the tax task influenced the regulatory state of study participants. Participants were 
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provided with tax authority and asked to determine if certain activities described in the tax 
scenario were eligible for a deduction.  The task of determining if the company was allowed to 
take the deduction based upon guidance in the tax authority may have activated a prevention 
focus state, lessening the influence of the manipulated tax advisor role on regulatory focus state. 
However, to the extent this was the case, it would have diluted the manipulation, biasing the 
study against finding differences in the tax aggressiveness of decision maker judgment in 
promotion focus and prevention focus states. Another possible limitation is that study 
participants were graduate tax students rather than practitioners. Though they were not currently 
corporate tax professionals, many had experience in public accounting. Additionally, the 
experimental task involved forming a preliminary recommendation as a tax department staff and 
was designed to be appropriate for graduate student participants that may be similarly employed 
in the near future.    
Given the importance of judgment in the corporate tax setting, decision makers should be 
made aware of how situational factors such as management’s views may influence underlying 
interpretation in the evaluation of tax positions. Perhaps a constructive approach would be to 
structure tasks as neutrally as possible to reduce bias (i.e., unmeasured tax risk) so tax decisions 
may be made based upon an objective interpretation of tax authority, particularly regarding staff-
level corporate tax decision makers. Thus, when staff work is later reviewed, tax risk preferences 
may be consciously applied by a more senior tax decision maker within the company.   
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STUDY THREE: SELF-OTHER AND MULTI-AGENT DECISION MAKING IN 
TAXATION 
Introduction 
Accounting decisions are often made based upon input from multiple decision makers. 
Corporations and other business entities typically employ groups or teams of individuals to make 
accounting decisions. With respect to tax in particular, prior experimental studies have primarily 
examined these decisions from the perspective of individual decision makers, neglecting the 
potential influence of group decision making. Additionally, many tax decisions in practice are 
made on behalf of others (e.g., employees within corporate tax departments making tax decisions 
on behalf of the corporation). Most experimental studies that examine taxpayer decision making 
and compliance focus on how individual taxpayers make their own compliance decisions. Few 
studies have examined how the target of the decision (the decision maker or another entity) 
influences compliance. The purpose of this study is to extend research on tax decision making to 
the corporate tax setting by examining the effects of decision maker type (individual versus 
group) and decision target (making a decision for oneself versus making a decision on behalf of 
others) on a decision maker’s tax compliance behavior. 
The study draws upon diffusion of responsibility theory, which suggests that the presence 
of the group in group decisions diffuses felt responsibility between group members (Dion et al. 
1970). Decreased felt responsibility in group decisions leads groups to make riskier decisions 
than when decisions are made individually (Mathes and Kahn 1975). As such, this study predicts 
that tax compliance decisions made in a group will be riskier than tax compliance decisions 
made individually. The study also relies upon construal level theory and social value theory to 
investigate the effects of self-other decision making. Construal level theory posits that increased 
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social distance between oneself and others influences how decision makers evaluate and interpret 
information (Trope et al. 2007; Trope and Liberman 2010). Increased social distance between 
oneself (a more concrete construal) and others (a more abstract construal) affects how decisions 
are made differently on behalf of others (Pronin and Ross 2006; Pronin et al. 2008). Decision 
makers are less loss averse when deciding for others than for themselves (Beisswanger et al. 
2003; Polman 2012b). Reduced loss aversion may lead to more objective decision making on 
behalf of others, the effect of which may depend upon prevailing social values. Social value 
theory is used to interpret the way in which decision riskiness differs for oneself versus on behalf 
of others. Social values affect risk taking in groups more than in individual decisions (Stone and 
Allgaier 2008). Thus, the study predicts that the influence of self-other decision making on tax 
compliance decision riskiness depends upon whether decisions are made individually or in a 
group. Tax compliance decisions made individually are predicted to be riskier for oneself than 
for others. Tax compliance decisions made in a group are predicted to be riskier for others than 
for oneself.  
A lab experiment is used to investigate how decision maker and decision target influence 
the riskiness of tax compliance decisions. Fifty-one undergraduate accounting students are 
endowed with income and asked to make a reporting decision. The type of decision maker is 
manipulated in the task by having participants make the reporting decision either individually or 
in a group. The target of the decision is manipulated by having the outcome of the decision affect 
the cash payout of either the decision maker or an entity other than the decision maker. The 
amount of income decision makers choose to report corresponds to the riskiness of their tax 
compliance decisions. Reporting less income (i.e., a higher unreported income) indicates a riskier 
decision. Contrary to predictions, findings suggest that decision maker type does not directly 
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influence the riskiness of tax compliance decisions; however, decision maker type does affect 
riskiness indirectly through feelings of responsibility for possible outcomes of the decision. 
Feelings of personal responsibility are significantly lower for group members than for individual 
decision makers. Feeling less personally responsible is associated with riskier tax compliance, 
suggesting that decision maker type influences decision riskiness through feelings of 
responsibility. 
The study contributes to the sparse literature on decision making within the corporate tax 
environment by examining factors that differ between the individual and corporate tax decision 
making contexts. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010, p. 145) note that little is known about who is 
making corporate tax decisions and how these decisions are made, mentioning that “tax 
avoidance may be highly idiosyncratic and determined by a number of factors and interactions, 
not all of which can be measured.” This complexity combined with the fact that most 
experimental tax compliance research to date looks only at individual (rather than corporate) 
taxpayer decision making suggests a need for investigating decision making in a corporate tax 
setting. The present study is one of the first to examine both tax decision making by oneself 
versus with others and decision making for oneself versus for others. Additionally, this study 
contributes to tax policy by showing how individual and corporate taxpayer decisions may differ. 
The following section of this research study contains a review of the relevant literature 
and development of the hypotheses. The subsequent section describes the research method. The 
third section presents results, and the final section draws conclusions.  
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Theory and Hypotheses 
Group Decision Making and the Diffusion of Responsibility 
Diffusion of responsibility theory suggests increasing the number of decision makers 
involved in a decision decreases the responsibility felt by each, reducing fear of failure and 
leading groups to make riskier decisions than individual decision makers (Dion et al. 1970). The 
concept of responsibility diffusion stems from bystander intervention research examining how 
group size affects observers’ behavior in emergency situations (Darley and Latane 1968). The 
presence of multiple observers reduces each observer’s felt responsibility and lengthens the 
response time of observers who decide to help someone in need of emergency assistance (Darley 
and Latane 1968). The effect of a group on felt responsibility persists in virtual environments and 
in computer-mediated communication such as emails addressed to a group (Markey 2000; Blair 
et al. 2005). When others are perceived as available to help, an observer feels less responsibility 
to help (Fleishman 1980). Diffusion of responsibility theory incorporates the concept of felt 
responsibility from the bystander intervention literature and focuses on the influence of groups 
on risk preferences in judgment and decision making (Mathes and Kahn 1975).  
Differing levels of felt responsibility between individual decision makers and group 
members may be motivated by blame avoidance (Mynatt and Sherman 1975). An attribution 
effect has been observed in which self-attribution of responsibility decreases when the outcome 
of a group decision is unfavorable (Mynatt and Sherman 1975). Additionally, group size 
influences perceptions of how responsibility should be assigned to group members (Teigen and 
Brun 2011). Compared to a sole individual decision maker, assessed responsibility is lower for 
each member of a group regardless of group size; however, as group size increases, total 
assigned responsibility exceeds 100 percent, suggesting that group size distorts perceptions of 
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responsibility (Teigen and Brun 2011). Decision makers may be concerned with how responsible 
they are perceived to be if an unfavorable outcome can be linked back to the decision. 
Concern with external responsibility assessments may influence decision maker risk 
preferences. Decision makers in a group are less risk averse (i.e., they have a greater risk 
preference) (Brunette et al. 2015). Group decision makers may be willing to make riskier 
decisions than individual decision makers because some of the blame from an unfavorable 
outcome may be deflected to other group members involved in the decision. Congruence with 
perceived norms for risky decision making may also influence riskiness. Group decisions are 
more risky when widely-held values are perceived to favor risk and group members consider 
themselves to be riskier than the average decision maker (Stoner 1968). Though most prior 
research finds groups to make riskier decisions than individuals, group decisions may actually be 
less risky (than individual decisions) when widely-held values are perceived to favor caution and 
group members consider themselves to be relatively more cautious (Stoner 1968).  
In a tax setting, prior research suggests that individual taxpayers are generally more 
compliant than they should be based upon economic models of rational behavior (Alm and 
Torgler 2011). However, prior research has not examined tax compliance decision making in a 
corporate tax setting, namely how group decision making might affect corporate tax decision 
makers. Carnes et al. (1996) examine tax professional decision making and find evidence of a 
group polarization effect, a finding consistent with the Stoner (1968) study. Ambiguous tax 
scenarios that were rated independently by tax advisors as client-favorable were rated as even 
more favorable after a group discussion, and client-unfavorable ambiguous scenarios were rated 
as even more unfavorable after group discussion (Carnes et al. 1996). The Carnes et al. (1996) 
study investigates the influence of group decision making; however, the study does not examine 
80 
 
tax compliance decisions made by taxpayers in a group setting as in the present study. The 
present study makes the following prediction about the influence of decision maker type on the 
riskiness of tax compliance decisions:   
H1: Decision makers will make riskier tax compliance decisions when decisions are 
made in a group than when decisions are made individually.  
Self-Other Decision Making 
Prior research suggests that decision riskiness may also differ for decisions made for 
oneself versus made on behalf of others. On the surface, the effect of self-other decision making 
does not appear to be consistent across prior studies. In some studies decisions for self are riskier 
than decisions on behalf of others (McCauley et al. 1971; Teger and Kogan 1975; Fernandez-
Duque and Wifall 2007); however, studies have also found that decisions on behalf of others are 
riskier (Beisswanger et al. 2003; Wray and Stone 2005). Additionally, Stone et al. (2002) found 
no evidence of a self-other effect. The present study draws upon construal level theory and social 
value theory to disentangle the effects of self-other decision making.  
Construal level theory is a broad theory about how individuals think about events and 
entities across four dimensions of psychological distance (temporal, spatial, social, and 
hypotheticality) in comparison to their own egocentric view (Trope and Liberman 2010). As 
psychological distances increases, an individual thinks about events/entities at a more abstract 
level, which influences how an individual evaluates and interprets information as well as 
individual decision making and behavior (Trope et al. 2007; Trope and Liberman 2010). 
Increasing distance in any of the four dimensions increases psychological distance, moving the 
construal level from more concrete to more abstract (Trope and Liberman 2010). In particular, 
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the social dimension of psychological distance pertains to self-other decision making examined 
in the proposed study. See Weisner (2015) for a review of construal level theory literature 
pertaining to the accounting domain. 
Psychological distance is greater for “other” than for “self” (Pronin and Ross 2006; 
Pronin et al. 2008). Increasing psychological distance through an increase in social distance 
between oneself and others increases the construal’s level of abstraction in mental accounting: 
“self” is more concrete and “other” is more abstract (Hsee and Weber 1997; Polman 2012a). 
Construal level affects loss aversion26 such that decision makers are less loss averse when 
deciding for others (i.e., more abstract construal) than when deciding for themselves (i.e., more 
concrete construal) (Beisswanger et al. 2003; Polman 2012b). Thus, reduced loss aversion for 
“other” decisions may lead decisions on behalf of others to be less susceptible to this cognitive 
bias than decisions for oneself; however, the effect on risk preference (whether or not risk 
preference is greater for others than for oneself) may depend upon prevailing social values27 
(Stone and Allgaier 2008). Indeed, social values for risk influence decisions on behalf of others 
more than decisions for oneself (Stone and Allgaier 2008). When risk taking is valued, a decision 
is more risky on behalf of others than for oneself, but when risk aversion is valued, a decision is 
less risky on behalf of others than for oneself (Stone et al. 2013).  
Social values may influence decisions differently in the individual and corporate tax 
settings. Cohen et al. (2013) manipulated whether the prevailing social norm was for a more 
aggressive (i.e., more risky) or conservative (i.e., less risky) tax treatment and examined taxpayer 
                                                 
26 Loss aversion is the tendency of decision makers to weight possible losses more heavily than equivalent possible 
gains, preferring to avoid losses more than to acquire gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1984).   
27 This study considers social values to be beliefs about what people would deem to be desirable. Social values 
influence social norms for behavior (Stone and Allgaier 2008).  
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decision making for self versus on behalf of a group containing self and others. When the social 
norm was for aggressive tax treatment, a tax decision maker was more aggressive on behalf of 
others than for self (Cohen et al. 2013). Similarly, Brink and White (2014) also examine taxpayer 
decision making for oneself versus on behalf of a group containing self and another individual, 
finding that taxpayers in an individual decision-making setting are less likely to evade taxes on 
behalf of a group containing themselves than when making the evasion decision for only 
themselves. The present study targets not only individual self-other decision making, as in the 
Cohen et al. (2013) and Brink and White (2014) studies, but also group self-other decision 
making.  
Few studies have examined both the effect of the decision maker (individual or group) 
and self-other decision making in a single study. Wallach et al. (1964) investigate some of the 
possible configurations of individual/group and self-other decision making through examination 
of choice shift. Choice shift is measured by the difference in a decision maker’s risk taking in 
one condition compared to that same decision maker’s risk taking in a different condition. An 
increase in risk taking between conditions is termed a risky shift and a decrease in risk taking 
between conditions is termed a conservative shift (Wallach et al. 1964). Wallach et al. (1964) 
find that compared to an individual decision on behalf of oneself, an individual decision on 
behalf of others displayed a conservative shift and group decisions on behalf of self or others 
displayed a risky shift. Similarly, Zaleska and Kogan (1971) also examine choice shift and find a 
conservative shift for decisions made individually on behalf of others and a risky shift for group 
decisions on behalf of self or others. Group decisions on behalf of the decision making group 
(i.e., self) had a stronger risky shift than group decisions on behalf of another group (i.e., others) 
(Zaleska and Kogan 1971). These studies suggest that the influence of self-other decision making 
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on decision riskiness may differ when the decision maker is an individual or a group; however, 
research to date has not examined both of these components in a single tax compliance setting.  
Tax law may be more complex and ambiguous in the corporate tax setting (Slemrod 
2007; Barney et al. 2012). When faced with ambiguous tax law, a corporate tax decision-making 
group may substitute the group consensus in place of undeterminable widely-held social values 
(i.e., group think effect). Indeed, this polarization effect is evident in the Carnes et al. (1996) 
study in which tax professionals made decisions individually on behalf of hypothetical others. 
The present study predicts that decision riskiness differs when tax compliance decisions are 
made for oneself than when decisions are made on behalf of others; however, the direction of the 
difference (more or less risky) depends upon whether the decisions are made individually or in a 
group. Stated formally: 
H2a: When tax compliance decisions are made individually, decisions made for oneself 
will be riskier than decisions made on behalf of others. 
H2b: When tax compliance decisions are made in a group, decisions made on behalf of 
others will be riskier than decisions made for oneself. 
Research Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from an undergraduate tax class at a public university using a 
multi-contact method (Dillman et al. 2009). The lab experiment was conducted on campus in a 
behavioral laboratory to maintain a controlled experimental environment; thus, students who 
elected to participate were required to do so in person during one of several offered sessions. The 
study was first announced in class, after which students received an email containing study 
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information and a link to register for a study session. Students also received a reminder about the 
opportunity to participate in the study. Students who elected to participate received extra credit 
in their undergraduate course. In addition to receiving extra credit, participants were eligible to 
receive a cash payout based upon their decisions in the lab experiment task. Cash payouts ranged 
from $0 to $12.50 in US dollars with an average cash payout of $6.31. 
Fifty-one undergraduate students completed the experiment and are included in the 
analysis. The majority of the participants are female (56.9 percent). Most participants are 
between 21-25 years old (64.7 percent), with others age 18-20 (13.7 percent), age 26-30 (9.8 
percent), age 31-35 (3.9 percent), and over age 35 (5.9 percent). One participant elected not to 
provide age. Some of the participants have experience in public accounting (13.7 percent); 
however, most of the participants do not yet have experience in public accounting (86.3 percent). 
The majority of participants intend to take the CPA exam in the future (88.2 percent). Most 
participants have taken one to two tax classes (98.0 percent). The majority of participants 
prepared their most recent personal tax return (51.0 percent). Others hired a paid preparer (23.6 
percent), received assistance from a friend or relative (11.7 percent), or did not need to file (13.7 
percent). Table 14 presents demographic data. Study 3 tables are presented in Appendix E. 
Materials and Design 
The design of the experimental task is inspired by the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
model of income tax evasion.28 The income tax evasion model is structured as a tax system in 
which reported income is subject to a tax rate, unreported income is subject to a penalty in 
                                                 
28 Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model a tax compliance decision as E[𝑈] = (1−𝑝) 𝑈(Y) + 𝑝 𝑈(Z), where E[𝑈] is 
the expected utility of the reported income for a probability 𝑝 that the report will be inspected. Y represents post-tax 
income if not inspected and Z represents post-tax income if inspected.   
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addition to the regular tax rate, and only a percentage of reports are examined by the taxing 
authority (Allingham and Sandmo 1972).  The income tax evasion model suggests that a 
taxpayer should maximize expected utility, which is a taxpayer’s optimal amount of reported 
income based upon personal risk preferences and risk aversion under uncertainty, given a fixed 
tax rate, penalty rate, and probability of examination (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). In the 
present study, the experimental task involves endowing participants with Francs and asking them 
to decide how much to report. The Allingham and Sandmo (1972) income tax evasion model was 
used to select values for tax rate, penalty rate, and probability of examination that would result in 
equal expected value29 calculations for all levels of reported/unreported income in the 
experimental task. Thus, participants’ decisions about how much income to report should not be 
driven by differences in the expected value of the income reporting options. Instead, reported 
income should be linked to risk preference via changes in the range in possible post-tax net 
income (i.e., a mean-preserving spread): the maximum possible post-tax net income (report not 
selected for inspection) and the minimum possible post-tax net income (report selected for 
inspection). The range in possible post-tax net income increases as unreported income increases; 
thus, the risk taking in the tax compliance decision increases as unreported income increases. 
Figure 7 presents calculations of the expected value and range of possible post-tax net income 
for the reported income options.  
The computer-based experiment is administered with Qualtrics software in the controlled 
environment of a behavioral laboratory. The experimental procedure consists of six sections: task 
                                                 
29 Expected value is the optimal amount of taxable income to report to a taxing authority as calculated 
mathematically based upon the probability of inspection given a fixed tax rate and penalty rate. Expected value is 
the same for all decision makers. Expected utility incorporates personal risk preferences and risk aversion under 
uncertainty and other items that may be included in a decision maker’s utility function such as ethical values and 
social norms, in addition to expected value. Thus, expected utility theoretically differs among decision makers.   
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instructions, income reporting task, covariate questionnaire, notification of inspection, 
demographic questionnaire, and participant payouts. See Figure 8 for a diagram of the 
experimental procedure. Complete experimental materials are presented in Appendix F.   
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Reported Income  10,000 9,000 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 
            
Calculation of Expected Value:            
Taxes  5,000 4,500 4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 
Penalties 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 10,000 
Income if Inspected  5,000 4,500 4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 
Income if Not Inspected  5,000 5,500 6,000 6,500 7,000 7,500 8,000 8,500 9,000 9,500 10,000 
Expected Value 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 
            
Calculation of Range of 
Possible Net Income:            
Maximum Possible Net Income 5,000 5,500 6,000 6,500 7,000 7,500 8,000 8,500 9,000 9,500 10,000 
Minimum Possible Net Income 5,000 4,500 4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 
Range of Possible Net Income 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 10,000 
 
 
Taxes = Reported Income x Tax Rate; 
Penalties = Unreported Income x Penalty Rate; 
Income if Inspected = Reported Income – Taxes – Penalties; 
Income if Not Inspected = Reported Income – Taxes; 
Expected Value = (Income if Inspected  x Inspection Probability) + (Income if Not Inspected x (1 – Inspection Probability)); 
Maximum Possible Net Income = Income if Not Inspected; 
Minimum Possible Net Income = Income if Inspected; 
Range of Possible Net Income = Maximum Possible Net Income - Minimum Possible Net Income. 
a Participants will be given 10,000 Francs (experimental currency) and the following rates will be use for the experimental task: Tax rate = 50%, Penalty rate (includes tax rate) = 100%, and Audit 
rate = 50%. 
Figure 7: Expected Value and Range of Possible Net Income by Reported Income 
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Figure 8: Diagram of Experimental Procedures  
Task Instructions
Manipulations-
Decision Maker: Individual or Group
Decision Target: Self or Other
Qualtrics - Reporting Task
Dependent Variable: Unreported Income
Envelope 1
Covariate Questionnaire 
Qualtrics - Inspection Notification
Envelope 2
Demographic Questionnaire 
Participant Payouts
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The experiment uses task instructions to convey the parameters of the reporting task. 
Prior to beginning the task, the study administrator read the task instructions aloud to the 
participants. The task instructions inform participants that they will be given Francs (units of 
experimental currency) and will be asked to make a decision about how much of the Francs they 
wish to report on a form. The income reporting task is presented in this intentionally generic 
context to minimize contextual differences between conditions to avoid confounding the 
deliberately manipulated variables (decision maker and decision task) as this study seeks to 
investigate only these two key differences in individual and corporate tax settings. The task 
instructions indicate that after participants have made their reporting decision, they will be 
notified about whether or not their form was selected for inspection. Francs reported on the form 
are subject to a 50 percent fee. Francs not reported on the form are not subject to a fee unless the 
form is selected for inspection. If the form is selected for inspection, the amount of Francs 
reported is compared to the initial amount of Francs provided, and any Francs not reported on the 
form are subject to a 100% fee. Thus, fees will not be assessed on unreported amounts unless the 
report is selected for inspection. The task instructions state that forms have a 50 percent chance 
of being selected for inspection and that inspections are determined completely at random and do 
not depend on the participant’s decisions or the decisions of others. Net Francs remaining after 
the inspection period are calculated at the decision maker level as the initial Francs provided, less 
total fees. The task instructions indicate that Net Francs will be converted into dollars using a 
positive conversion rate and participants will be paid at the conclusion of the task. Additionally, 
participants in the group condition are instructed that payouts will be divided equally between 
group members.  
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The manipulations of decision maker (individual or group) and decision target (self or 
other) occur within the task instructions.30 Decision maker type is manipulated by having 
participants make the reporting decision either individually or in groups of two. Each participant 
in the Individual condition makes the reporting decision alone as the sole decision maker. 
Participants in the Group condition make the reporting decision together within their two-
member group. Decision target is manipulated through who is affected by the reporting decision. 
The instructions indicate the reporting decision affects either the decision maker’s own cash 
payout (i.e., Self) or the payout of others not involved in making that reporting decision (i.e., 
Other).31 The manipulation of decision maker (individual or group) and decision target (self or 
other) results in four versions of the task instructions: Individual-Self, Individual-Other, Group-
Self, and Group-Other. Each participant receives only one version of the task instructions.       
After hearing the task instructions, participants begin the income reporting task. Decision 
makers (as either individuals or groups) are endowed with Francs and asked to decide how much 
they wish to report.32 Decision makers may report an amount from zero Francs up to the total 
amount of endowed Francs. Greater unreported income reflects greater risk taking. 
Individual decision makers are endowed with 10,000 Francs. Each individual decision 
maker is asked to share his or her thought process (via a text box in Qualtrics) when deciding 
how much to report. Decision makers in the Individual condition report any amount from 0 
                                                 
30 Prior studies such as Wallach et al. (1964) and Zaleska and Kogan (1971) have employed a choice shift design; 
however, a choice shift design creates order effects such that decision making first for self and then on behalf of 
others has a stronger shift than other-self, complicating the effects of self-other decision making (McCauley et al. 
1971). Thus, the present study uses a between-participant design. 
31 To prevent reciprocity from influencing decision making in the Other condition, participants are informed that 
assignment is completely random and that they should assume the person (or group) deciding on their behalf is not 
the same person (or group) for whom they are deciding.   
32 Endowing participants with Francs (rather than having participants earn Francs) is an experimental design choice 
made in consideration of the corporate tax environment, which is the primary focus of the present study. 
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Francs to 10,000 Francs in increments of 1,000 Francs. In the Group condition, a two-member 
group of decision makers is endowed with 20,000 Francs.33 Group members are asked to 
communicate electronically (i.e., type back and forth within a text box in Qualtrics) to reach a 
consensus on how much the group wishes to report. Groups are asked not to discuss aloud to 
keep their conversation private. No time limit is placed upon reaching a group consensus. One 
group member is randomly assigned to input the group’s decision. Groups may report any 
amount from 0 Francs to 20,000 Francs in increments of 2,000 Francs. 
After completing the reporting task, participants individually complete a paper-based 
questionnaire measuring potential covariates. After completing the covariate questionnaire, 
participants return to the Qualtrics survey for notification of whether or not their report was 
selected for inspection and learn the amount of Net Francs after inspection. Net Francs are 
calculated as the initial Francs less the total fees. If selected for inspection, total fees are 
calculated as 50 percent of the amount reported on the form, plus 100 percent of the amount not 
reported on the form. If not selected for inspection, total fees are simply 50 percent of the 
amount reported on the form.  
Following the inspection notification, all participants complete a paper-based 
demographics questionnaire. While participants are completing the demographics questionnaire, 
                                                 
33 Upon entering the laboratory, participants are randomly assigned to a group rather than self-selecting. 
Additionally, to increase identification within the group, groups are assigned a group name that is a color. The 
experimental materials include two different paper-based questionnaires per person, enclosed in separate envelopes, 
which are provided to participants at the beginning of the experiment. In the group condition, envelope labels are 
printed using paper that matches the group name color. For example, members of the Blue group receive envelopes 
with labels printed on blue paper.  
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the study administrator converts Net Francs into dollars to determine cash payout amounts.34 The 
experiment concludes with cash payouts to participants.  
Independent Variables 
Decision Maker 
The decision maker is manipulated by structuring the decision to be made by either one 
decision maker (Individual) or by a group of decision makers (Group). Each participant in the 
Individual condition makes the reporting decision alone as the sole decision maker. Participants 
in the Group condition make the decision after reaching a group consensus. 
Decision Target 
The target of the decision is manipulated as whether the decision is made on behalf of the 
decision maker (Self) or on behalf of a different entity (Other). The experimental materials 
inform participants that the reporting decision will result in a net amount of experimental 
currency, which will be converted to dollars and paid to the decision target. In the Self condition, 
the decision maker is the decision target and receives any payout from the decision task. In the 
Other condition, another participant(s) (not the decision maker) is the decision target and 
receives any payout from the decision task. Participants in the Other condition are compensated 
based upon random assignment as targets for other participants in the same condition. 
Assignments avoid reciprocal pairs, and this design feature is communicated to participants so 
that reciprocity concerns do not influence decision making.  
                                                 
34 The cash payouts are calculated using a conversion rate of 800 Francs to 1 US dollar. Cash payouts are rounded 
up to the next $0.25 increment. 
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 Manipulating both Decision Maker and Decision Target creates four conditions:  
Individual-Self, Individual-Other, Group-Self, and Group-Other. In the Individual-Self 
condition, a participant is making a decision individually for oneself. Individual-Self aligns with 
a tax context in which an individual taxpayer is making decisions for his or her own personal tax 
return. In the Individual-Other condition, a participant is making a decision individually for 
another individual. This condition represents a single decision maker such as a sole tax decision 
maker in a corporation making tax decisions on behalf of the corporation.  Participants in the 
Group-Self condition communicate electronically to make a unanimous group decision, the 
outcome of which affects the decision-making group. Group-Self aligns with a group of owners 
making tax decisions for their pass through business entity such as a partnership or S-
corporation. In the Group-Other condition, participants communicate electronically to make a 
unanimous group decision that will affect a group other than the decision-making group. Group-
Other corresponds to a corporate tax context in which a corporate tax department is making tax 
decisions on behalf of the corporation. The alignment of the experimental manipulations with tax 
decision-making contexts is summarized in Figure 9. 
 
 Decision Maker: 
Decision Target: Individual Group 
Self Individual making decision for self  
(An individual taxpayer making tax 
decisions for own personal tax return) 
Group making decision for self  
(A group of owners making tax 
decisions for their pass through 
business entity)  
Other Individual making decision on behalf 
of other  
(A corporation’s sole tax decision 
maker making tax decisions on behalf 
of a corporation) 
Group making decision on behalf of 
other  
(A corporate tax department making 
tax decisions on behalf of a 
corporation) 
Figure 9: Alignment of Experimental Manipulations with Tax Decision-Making Contexts 
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Additional Measures 
Felt Responsibility 
Felt Responsibility is a measure of how personally responsible a decision maker feels for 
possible outcomes of the decision (Hackman and Oldham 1974; Mathes and Kahn 1975). Felt 
Responsibility is assessed before participants discover the outcome of their decision (i.e., 
whether or not they were inspected) to avoid the potential influence of hindsight bias on their 
responses. Following Hackman and Oldham (1974), Felt Responsibility is initially measured 
using a four item scale presented in Appendix G. Each item uses a seven-point Likert-type scale 
with labeled points ranging from 1 “Strongly Disagree” to 7 “Strongly Agree.” Confirmatory 
factor analysis shows the four items do not load on a single factor and Cronbach’s alpha for the 
Felt Responsibility scale is 0.685 when including all four items. Thus, Item 1 was dropped from 
the scale to obtain a single factor with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.743 for the remaining three-item 
measure of Felt Responsibility. 
Diffusion of responsibility theory suggests that decision makers in a group will feel less 
responsible for their decisions than individual decision makers as the presence of the group 
reduces self-attribution of responsibility. As such, the manipulation of Decision Maker is 
expected to influence how personally responsible participants feel for possible outcomes of their 
decisions. The “group” decision maker condition should lead to lower felt responsibility than the 
“individual” decision maker condition. Felt Responsibility is expected to help explain how tax 
compliance riskiness differs in individual versus group decisions; participants in the “group” 
condition should make riskier decisions than those in the “individual” condition. Felt 
Responsibility is thus expected to mediate the effect of Decision Maker on the dependent 
variable, Unreported Income. 
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Relative Perceived Risk 
Relative Perceived Risk is a measure of a decision maker’s self-perceived riskiness 
compared to other individuals and is designed to capture a decision maker’s perception of 
widely-held social values. Participants are asked “Compared to the average person, how risky 
was the decision you just made?” Relative Perceived Risk is measured on a seven-point scale 
ranging from 1 “Much less risky than average” to 7 “Much more risky than average.” Self-rating 
as less risky than others signifies a perception that the socially-valued position is to be less risky. 
Self-rating as more risky than others signifies a perception that the socially-valued position is to 
be more risky. Social values for risk influence decisions on behalf of others more than decisions 
for oneself (Stone and Allgaier 2008); as such, Relative Perceived Risk is expected to help 
explain how tax compliance riskiness differs for self-other decisions based upon whether the 
decision is an individual or group decision.  Thus, Relative Perceived Risk may help explain the 
moderating effect of Decision Maker on the influence of Decision Target on the riskiness of tax 
compliance decisions. 
Fear of Negative Outcome 
Fear of Negative Outcome is a measure of how concerned a decision maker is about the 
possibility of the report being selected for inspection. Participants are asked “When deciding 
how many Francs to report on the form, how concerned were you about the possibility that the 
report would be inspected?” The measure uses a five-point Likert-type scale with labeled points 
ranging from 1 “Not At All Concerned” to 5 “Extremely Concerned.”  Fear of Negative 
Outcome is expected to covary with the dependent variable, Unreported Income, and is measured 
as a possible control variable.  
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Risk Attitude 
Risk Attitude is a four item scale adopted from the Weber et al. (2002) measure of risk 
attitude in the gambling domain, a subscale in the domain-specific risk attitude scale, which is 
presented in Appendix G. Cronbach’s alpha for the Risk Attitude scale is 0.919. Participants 
indicate their likelihood of engaging in different activities or behaviors; each item is measured on 
a seven-point scale ranging from 1 “Very Unlikely” to 7 “Very Likely.” Risk Attitude is 
measured as a potential control variable. 
Dependent Variable 
Participants in the experimental task are provided with experimental currency and then 
asked, “How much of the 10,000 [20,000 for two-member groups] Francs would you like to 
report?” Decision riskiness is operationalized as the amount of experimental currency that a 
decision maker decides to report. Reported income is measured on an 11-point scale; an 
individual decision maker may decide to report amounts from zero to 10,000 Francs in 
increments of 1,000 and a group may decide to report amounts from zero to 20,000 Francs in 
increments of 2,000. Reporting less income reflects greater risk taking. Reported income is 
reverse coded so that greater Unreported Income reflects greater risk taking. 
The expected value is the same for each of the reporting options; however, the range 
between the maximum and minimum possible net income differs for the reporting options. 
Reported income reflects risk taking because a decision to report less income generates a larger 
gap between the possible maximum and minimum outcomes. The range for each option is 
determined by calculating net income if not selected for inspection (i.e., the maximum possible 
net income) and by calculating net income if selected for inspection (i.e., the minimum possible 
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net income). For example in the Individual condition, a participant reporting all 10,000 Francs 
would have the smallest range of possible outcomes, receiving the same net income whether or 
not selected for inspection. Conversely, reporting zero income would generate the largest range 
between the possible maximum and minimum net income outcomes; a participant reporting zero 
net income would have zero net income if selected for inspection but would have all 10,000 
remaining if not inspected. Thus a participant deciding to report zero net income would display 
the greatest risk taking.    
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Decision Maker and Decision Target are manipulated through the structure of the income 
reporting task, which is conveyed to participants through the task instructions. Manipulation 
checks are conducted to measure whether participants were cognizant of task information 
important to the successful manipulation of the variables. To verify the manipulations, 
participants are asked, “Which best describes how your payment is determined for this study?” 
Participants are asked to select one of the following options: “Based on a reporting decision I 
made” (Individual-Self), “Based on a reporting decision that someone else made” (Individual-
Other), “Based on a reporting decision that my group made” (Group-Self), or “Based on a 
reporting decision that another group made” (Group-Other). Participants had to pass the 
manipulation check question to be included in the study.  
A total of 123 participants completed the experimental materials as follows: Individual-
Self = 18 participants, Individual-Other = 21 participants, Group-Self = 21 two-member groups 
(42 participants), and Group-Other = 21 two-member groups (42 participants). Analysis of the 
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manipulation check question suggests that although the Decision Maker manipulation was 
generally successful, the Decision Target manipulation (self-other) was not successful for the 
majority of the participants. Of the 63 participants originally in the Decision Target-Other 
condition, 35 participants failed the manipulation check, a failure rate of 55.6 percent. The 
manipulation check proved to be even more stringent in the group conditions as both members of 
each group were required to pass the manipulation check for the group to be included in the 
study. Due to the high failure rate of the Decision Target-Other manipulation, all 63 participants 
in the Self-Other and Group-Other conditions are excluded from the analysis; thus, H2 cannot be 
tested. 35 Of the 60 remaining participants in the Decision Target-Self condition, 9 participants 
failed the manipulation check as follows: Individual-Self 1 participant and Group-Self 4 two-
member groups (8 participants). Thus, a total of 51 participants are included in the study.   
Descriptive Statistics    
Table 15 presents descriptive statistics by Decision Maker (Individual or Group) for the 
dependent variable Unreported Income, the mediator Felt Responsibility, and the possible 
covariates Relative Perceived Risk, Fear of Negative Outcome, and Risk Attitude. Participants in 
the Group condition report a mean (standard deviation) Unreported Income of 3.71 (2.97), which 
is not statistically different than the Unreported Income of participants in the Individual 
condition mean (standard deviation) of 3.12 (3.52). As expected, Felt Responsibility is 
significantly greater in the Individual condition than in the Group Condition with mean (standard 
deviation) of 15.94 (3.29) and 13.44 (2.94), respectively (p = 0.026). Neither Relative Perceived 
                                                 
35 After removing participants that failed the manipulation check, participants per condition were as follows: 
Individual-Self = 17, Individual-Other = 8, Group-Self = 17 two-member groups, Group-Other = 6 two-member 
groups. As discussed above, the manipulation of Decision Target was unsuccessful in the “Other” conditions, thus 
those participants are excluded from the study.  
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Risk, Fear of Negative Outcome, nor Risk Attitude differs significantly between the Individual 
and Group conditions. 
Tests of Hypotheses 
Correlation coefficients are presented in Table 16. Significant correlations exist between 
Decision Maker and Felt Responsibility, as well as between Felt Responsibility and the 
dependent variable Unreported Income.  Additionally, the dependent variable Unreported 
Income is significantly correlated with the covariates Relative Perceived Risk and Risk Attitude, 
which are also significantly correlated with each other.  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that decision makers will make riskier tax compliance decisions 
when decisions are made in a group than when decisions are made individually. Table 17 reports 
the ANCOVA results with Unreported Income as the dependent variable, Decision Maker as the 
independent variable and Relative Perceived Risk as the covariate. The model is statistically 
significant at p < 0.000, with an adjusted R2 of 0.396. However, the ANCOVA model does not 
find support for H1 as only the covariate Relative Perceived Risk is statistically significant (p < 
0.000).36 Decision Maker is not significant in the model (p = 0.989).37 Although the study 
hypotheses do not include the mediator Felt Responsibility, Felt Responsibility theory suggests 
that decision maker type should affect feelings of personal responsibility, which may influence 
the riskiness of decision maker judgment. Thus, additional analysis incorporates mediation 
analysis of Felt Responsibility into the model.  
                                                 
36 Risk Attitude (measured as a possible control variable) is excluded from the ANCOVA model as the variable is 
not statistically significant when the covariate Relative Perceived Risk is included in the model (p = 0.867).  
37 H2a and H2b cannot be tested because all participants in the Decision Target-Other conditions were excluded. 
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Supplemental Analysis 
The mediation model is tested using the SPSS PROCESS script (Hayes 2013). Variables 
in the model include the dependent variable Unreported Income, a manipulated binary 
independent variable Decision Maker, the mediator Felt Responsibility, and a covariate Relative 
Perceived Risk. The mediation model is presented in Figure 10.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Mediation Model 
Notes: Decision Maker is the causal variable [X], Felt Responsibility is the mediator [M], and 
Unreported Income is the outcome [Y]. a, b, and c’ are the regression coefficients in the 
estimation models of Felt Responsibility and Unreported Income; and eM and eY are errors in the 
estimates of Felt Responsibility and Unreported Income, respectively. The indirect effect of 
Decision Maker on Unreported Income through Felt Responsibility is ab. The direct effect of 
Decision Maker on Unreported Income after considering ab is c’. The figure is modified from 
Hayes (2013, 445) by insertion of variable names into the model.  
Decision 
Maker
Felt 
Responsibility
Unreported 
Income
a
b
c'
Felt 
Responsibility
Decision 
Maker
Unreported 
Income
Covariate: 
Relative 
Perceived 
Risk
eM
eY
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Table 18 shows the results of the mediation analysis. The analysis includes two 
regressions and a test of the indirect effect of the manipulated variable on the dependent variable. 
Panel A presents the first regression, which shows that Decision Maker is significantly related to 
the mediator Felt Responsibility (p = 0.026) with R2 = 0.146. Panel B presents the second 
regression, which shows that Unreported Income is a function of Relative Perceived Risk and is 
significantly related to Felt Responsibility (p = 0.048) with R2 = 0.503. The indirect effect of 
Decision Maker on Unreported Income, presented in Panel C, is significant (p < 0.05) based on a 
95 percent bootstrapped confidence interval using 1,000 iterations.   
Hypothesis 1 predicts that decision makers will make riskier tax compliance decisions 
when decisions are made in a group than when decisions are made individually. Although not 
formally hypothesized, Felt Responsibility may theoretically mediate the effect of Decision 
Maker on the dependent variable, Unreported Income. Felt Responsibility theory suggests that 
Decision Maker should influence Felt Responsibility (i.e., how responsible participants 
personally feel for possible outcomes of their decisions), leading a “group” decision maker to 
feel less responsible for the decision than an “individual” decision maker. As such, participants 
in the “group” condition should make riskier decisions than those in the “individual” condition. 
Decision Maker is an indicator variable equal to 0 in the Individual condition and equal to 1 in 
the Group condition. Table 18 Panel A indicates a significant negative relationship between 
Decision Maker and Felt Responsibility, signifying that Felt Responsibility is significantly lower 
in the Group condition than the Individual condition. Table 18 Panel B shows that Felt 
Responsibility has a significant negative effect on the dependent variable Unreported Income, 
signifying that Unreported Income is significantly greater when Felt Responsibility is lower. As 
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indicated in Panel C of Table 18, the indirect effect of Decision Maker on Unreported Income is 
significant with a positive coefficient, thus providing partial support for H1.38 
Conclusion 
This study examines the effect of decision maker type (whether an individual is the sole 
decision maker or a group is making the decision) on the riskiness of tax compliance decisions. 
The study draws upon diffusion of responsibility theory, which suggests that the presence of the 
group in group decisions diffuses felt responsibility between group members (Dion et al. 1970). 
Decreased felt responsibility in group decisions leads groups to make riskier decisions compared 
to when decisions are made individually (Mathes and Kahn 1975). This study predicts that tax 
compliance decisions made in a group will be riskier than tax compliance decisions made 
individually. Supplemental analysis suggests that although decision maker type does not directly 
influence the riskiness of tax compliance decisions, decision maker type does affect riskiness 
indirectly through feelings of responsibility for possible outcomes of the decision. Group 
members report significantly lower levels of felt responsibility than individual decision makers. 
Furthermore, lower levels of felt responsibility lead to riskier tax compliance. The study’s 
findings suggest that a group of decision makers, such as a tax department, may actually make 
riskier tax compliance decisions together than when compliance decisions are made individually, 
as merely sharing the decision may decrease each group member’s feelings of personal 
responsibility.  
Interpretation of the results is subject to the following limitations. It is possible that the 
abstract nature of the task may limit the ability of the results to generalize to the different tax 
                                                 
38 H2a and H2b cannot be tested because all participants in the Decision Target-Other conditions were excluded. 
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decision-making contexts. However, the study examines one specific factor that differs between 
tax decision-making contexts: decision maker type. As such, a key strength of this study is the 
controlled nature of the experimental design. The experimental procedure is designed to be as 
rigid as possible (e.g., conducted in a behavioral lab using a script, includes detailed task 
instructions with minimal context), differing only for the manipulated variables. My reason for 
avoiding overly contextual tax language in this study (e.g., “placing” participants into a role 
within a tax scenario) is that factors such as the social value placed upon risky tax compliance 
decisions may differ in an individual tax context compared to other tax contexts, namely the 
corporate tax context. Thus, using more contextual tax language could have confounded the 
intended manipulation. Given the vast differences between individual and business tax 
environments, I chose a clean, minimal design to intentionally minimize the differences and 
sought only to determine the effect of the specific contextual factors of interest.  
This study was also intended to examine the combined effect of decision maker type and 
decision target on the riskiness of tax compliance decision, predicting that decision maker type 
will moderate the effect of decision target on riskiness. Individual decision makers are predicted 
to make riskier decisions for themselves than on behalf of others, and groups are predicted to 
make riskier decisions for other groups than for their own group. However, these hypotheses 
could not be tested because all participants in the Decision Target-Other conditions were 
excluded. Future research should examine the influence of decision target on decision riskiness 
as theory suggests this factor may be important to our understanding of decision making in 
different tax contexts.  
The study attempts to make inroads into the emerging area of behavioral corporate tax 
research, furthering our understanding of how tax compliance decisions may differ in the 
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business tax environment compared to individual tax. Due to the complexity and ambiguity of 
the corporate taxation, few corporate tax decisions may be made by only one individual without 
input from others such as in corporate tax departments. As such this study contributes to the 
groundwork for future studies in this area by isolating one of the primary differences between 
individual and corporate tax decision makers: the type of decision maker.  
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The three studies in this dissertation examine corporate tax aggressiveness at the decision 
maker level. The first two studies focus on the individual judgment involved in making decisions 
on behalf of a corporation. Specifically, these two studies examine individual assessments of tax 
positions based upon tax scenario facts and tax authority. The first study examines the influence 
of external tax advisor recommendations on the tax aggressiveness of decisions made by in-
house corporate tax professionals. The second study examines the judgment and decision making 
processes of individuals in a corporate tax environment, investigating how individual traits and 
situational factors interact to affect individual-level tax aggressiveness. The third study extends 
the investigation of situational factors from individual-level decision making to a group-level 
analysis, examining decision making in individual and group tax compliance settings. 
In the first study, I conduct an experiment with corporate tax directors with a great deal 
of experience making decisions for their company. Study 1 uses an experiment to create an 
exchange between two key actors in corporate tax decision making: the in-house corporate 
decision maker (e.g., tax director) and the third-party external tax advisor. This study 
investigates the influence of tax advisors on tax directors’ judgments, specifically whether the 
nature of the advice and the identity of the tax advisor (whether from the company’s audit firm 
or a different firm) affect how tax directors weight the advice. Corporate tax directors review a 
tax scenario, receive a recommendation from the company’s tax advisor, and are subsequently 
asked to provide their assessment of the tax position. Findings suggest that when tax directors are 
provided with conservative tax advice (i.e., advised not to take a client-favorable tax position not 
clearly supported by the tax authority) and they agree with the conservative advice, the identity 
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of the tax advisor influences the weight given to the advice. Tax directors in agreement with 
conservative tax advice weight advice from the audit firm tax advisor (“tax-audit”) more heavily 
than when advice comes from a tax advisor from a different firm (“tax-nonaudit”). As such, tax 
directors that agree with conservative advice indicate a smaller likelihood of taking the position 
when the tax advisor is from the audit firm than when tax advisor is from a different firm. 
Overall, findings suggest that even experienced corporate tax decision makers may be influenced 
by not only by the nature of advice, but also by the identity of the tax advice, a situational factor 
in the decision environment under corporate management’s control. 
The second study continues the examination of individual-level judgment in corporate 
taxation by delving into the processes underlying evidence evaluation. As Study 1 conveys that 
advice may directly influence the judgment of high-level corporate tax decision makers, Study 2 
continues to examine the influence of the tax advisor, a situational factor, on evaluations made 
by less experienced decision makers acting as tax department staff within the experiment’s tax 
scenario. Study 2 also includes an examination of an individual dispositional trait, trait 
regulatory focus. Study 2 finds that “fit” occurs indirectly between the regulatory focus state 
induced by the tax advisor role (i.e., advocate or overseer) and the decision maker’s trait 
regulatory focus, through the decision maker’s perceptions of client advocacy. Thus, perceived 
client advocacy (i.e., the degree to which the decision maker perceives the tax advisor to be a 
client advocate) mediates the influence of tax advisor role on decision maker judgment. Decision 
makers perceive a company’s tax advisor to have significantly stronger client advocacy when 
management views the tax advisor as more of an advocate than when management views the tax 
advisor as an overseer, and perceiving the tax advisor to be more of an advocate (i.e., a stronger 
promotion state) amplifies the influence of regulatory fit for trait promotion-focused decision 
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makers. Compared to individuals with a lower trait promotion focus, tax decision makers with a 
greater trait promotion focus react more strongly to situationally induced promotion focus state.  
In addition to findings from Study 1 that tax advisors and advice influence high-level 
decision makers, Study 2 findings suggest that preliminary evaluations made by staff-level 
decision makers may be influenced by their superior’s view of the tax advisors. Junior staff-level 
decision makers conduct preliminary evaluations of tax positions given to higher-level decision 
makers within the corporation, potentially introducing additional unmeasured risk into the tax 
function. Studies 1 and 2 examine the judgment of decision makers in isolation. Participants in 
the Study 1 and 2 experiments are provided with a detailed tax scenario and are asked to 
immerse themselves into assigned roles in which they either receive a recommendation from 
another person (e.g., Study 1) or prepare to send a preliminary recommendation to another 
person (e.g., Study 2). Decision makers in neither of these two studies are actually interacting 
with other decision makers. Thus Study 3 of this dissertation extends the investigation of 
corporate tax decision making to a group-level analysis. Additionally, corporate tax 
aggressiveness has been primarily examined by archival studies which typically calculate tax 
aggressiveness using corporate level metrics obtained from company financial statements. Thus 
these studies are largely unable to distinguish decision maker intentions from subjective 
professional judgment in measures of corporate tax aggressiveness. Study 3 employs a tax 
reporting task with minimal context and explicitly presented reportable income to examine the 
riskiness of tax decisions. Removing the judgment element (i.e., evaluation of the tax scenario 
and tax authority evidence) allows Study 3 to examine the intentional noncompliance decision 
element of tax aggressiveness.  
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Findings from Study 3 suggest that decision maker type (i.e., individual decision maker 
or group decision maker) affects riskiness indirectly through feelings of responsibility for 
possible outcomes of the decision. Group members report significantly lower levels of felt 
responsibility than individual decision makers. Lower levels of felt responsibility lead to riskier 
tax compliance. Thus, a group of decision makers, such as a tax department, may actually make 
riskier tax compliance decisions together than when compliance decisions are made individually, 
as merely sharing the decision may decrease each group member’s feelings of personal 
responsibility.  
Results reported in this dissertation collectively suggest that both situational factors in the 
corporate tax environment and individual characteristics influence the tax aggressiveness of 
individual-level tax judgment and decision making. Corporate tax decision makers that wish to 
reduce unmeasured risk should consider how components of the decision making environment 
(e.g., situational factors, dispositional characteristics, advice, and advisor characteristics) 
influence interpretation of evidence, potentially impacting objectivity. This dissertation contains 
studies which are some of the first to employ experimental methods to examine why these 
specific components of the decision making environment influence the tax aggressiveness of 
decision maker judgment. Future research should continue to bridge the primarily archival 
corporate tax literature with other literature streams such as psychology-based behavioral 
research to further examine the underlying judgment and decision making processes of 
individuals acting on behalf of the corporation.  
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APPENDIX A: STUDY 1 TABLES  
  
113 
 
Table 1: Demographics 
(n = 119) 
     n    % 
Job Title   
 Vice President, Tax 33 27.7 
 Tax Director 51 42.9 
 Tax Manager 35 29.4 
    
Work Experience in Taxation   
 More than 7 years* 115 96.7 
 5 – 7 Years 1 0.8 
 3 – 5 Years 1 0.8 
 No Response 2 1.7 
    
 *Participants with more than 7 years of experience were asked 
to specify total years of experience. 96 participants responded 
with a mean (standard deviation) of 23.9 years (7.87). 
    
Experience in Public Accounting    
 Yes – Big 4 Public Accounting Firm 77 64.7 
 Yes – Other Public Accounting Firm 11 9.2 
 No 29 24.4 
 No Response 2 1.7 
    
Current Employer Company Type    
 Multinational (US-Based) 95 79.9 
 Multinational (Foreign-Based)  6 5.0 
 Domestic US (Multistate) 18 15.1 
 Domestic US (Single State) 0 0.0 
    
Public Accounting Firm Audits Company’s 
Financial Statements 
  
 Yes 118 99.2 
 No 0 0.0 
 No Response 1 0.8 
    
Company’s Provision of Tax Services   
 Different Firms for Tax and Audit Services 66 55.5 
 Same Firm for Tax and Audit Services 52 43.7 
 No Response 1 0.8 
    
Company’s Percentage of Tax Services 
Outsourced (Not Conducted In-House) 
  
 118 participants responded with a mean 
(standard deviation) of 33.0 percent (22.54). 
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 (n = 119) 
     n    % 
Gender    
 Male 78 65.5 
 Female 37 31.1 
 No Response 4 3.4 
    
Age   
 Less than 35 5 4.2 
 35 – 44 30 25.2 
 45 – 54 38 31.9 
 55 – 64 36 30.3 
 65 and over 4 3.4 
 No Response 6 5.0 
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Table 2: Main Analysis 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics by Nature of Advice and Tax Advisor Identity: Means (Standard Deviation) 
 Conservative Advice Aggressive Advice All Advice 
 Tax-
Nonaudit 
Tax-
Audit Total 
Tax-
Nonaudit 
Tax-
Audit Total 
Tax-
Nonaudit 
Tax-
Audit Total 
N 29 33 62 30 27 57 59 60 119 
Percent Include 51.7% 60.6% 56.5% 93.3% 88.9% 91.2% 72.9% 73.3% 73.1% 
Likelihood  0.503 
(0.310) 
0.500 
(0.354) 
0.502 
(0.331) 
0.807 
(0.212) 
0.770 
(0.254) 
0.789 
(0.231) 
0.658 
(0.304) 
0.622 
(0.339) 
0.639 
(0.321) 
Weight of Advice 0.293 
(0.387) 
0.328 
(0.432) 
0.312 
(0.409) 
0.575 
(0.366) 
0.556 
(0.335) 
0.566 
(0.349) 
0.436 
(0.400) 
0.431 
(0.405) 
0.433 
(0.400) 
IRS Permits  0.386 
(0.212) 
0.409 
(0.220) 
0.398 
(0.215) 
0.567 
(0.167) 
0.489 
(0.217) 
0.530 
(0.195) 
0.478 
(0.209) 
0.445 
(0.220) 
0.461 
(0.215) 
Perceived  
Client Advocacy 
42.17 
(7.06) 
38.58 
(9.31) 
40.26 
(8.46) 
41.27 
(8.33) 
41.63 
(8.50) 
41.44 
(8.34) 
41.71 
(7.68) 
39.95 
(9.01) 
40.82 
(8.39) 
Tax Risk Preference 4.66 
(1.79) 
4.36 
(1.37) 
4.50 
(1.57) 
4.17 
(1.02) 
4.07 
(1.27) 
4.12 
(1.14) 
4.41 
(1.45) 
4.23 
(1.32) 
4.32 
(1.38) 
Agreement  with 
Advice 
0.586 
(0.501) 
0.303 
(0.467) 
0.435 
(0.500) 
0.967 
(0.183) 
0.778 
(0.424) 
0.877 
(0.331) 
0.780 
(0.418) 
0.517 
(0.504) 
0.647 
(0.480) 
 
Panel B: Results of ANOVA: Effect of Tax Advisor Identity on Weight of Advice 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p 
Nature of Advice 1.918 1 1.918 12.987 < 0.000 
Tax Advisor Identity 0.002 1 0.002 0.012 0.912 
Nature of Advice x Tax Advisor Identity 0.022 1 0.022 0.149 0.700 
Error 16.985 115 0.148   
 
Panel C: Simple Effects for Weight of Advice 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p 
Conservative (H1a): Tax-Nonaudit vs. Tax-Audit 0.019 1 0.019 0.129 0.720 
Aggressive (H1b): Tax-Nonaudit vs. Tax-Audit 0.005 1 0.005 0.036 0.849 
Notes: See Table 8 for variable definitions. All p-values are two-tailed.  
116 
 
Table 3: Supplemental Analysis of Weight of Advice when Agreement with Advice is High 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics by Nature of Advice and Tax Advisor Identity: Means (Standard Deviation) 
 Conservative Advice Aggressive Advice All Advice 
 Tax-
Nonaudit 
Tax-
Audit Total 
Tax-
Nonaudit 
Tax-
Audit Total 
Tax-
Nonaudit 
Tax-
Audit Total 
N 17 10 27 29 21 50 46 31 77 
Percent Include 23.5% 0% 14.8% 96.6% 100% 98.0% 69.6% 67.7% 68.8% 
Likelihood  0.353 
(0.285) 
0.120 
(0.162) 
0.267 
(0.269) 
0.817 
(0.207) 
0.848 
(0.112) 
0.830 
(0.173) 
0.646 
(0.327) 
0.613 
(0.369) 
0.632 
(0.342) 
Weight of Advice 0.461 
(0.406) 
0.800 
(0.270) 
0.586 
(0.393) 
0.595 
(0.356) 
0.619 
(0.281) 
0.605 
(0.324) 
0.545 
(0.377) 
0.677 
(0.286) 
0.598 
(0.347) 
IRS Permits  0.300 
(0.226) 
0.230 
(0.170) 
0.274 
(0.207) 
0.579 
(0.154) 
0.552 
(0.181) 
0.568 
(0.165) 
0.476 
(0.227) 
0.448 
(0.232) 
0.465 
(0.228) 
Perceived  
Client Advocacy 
42.24 
(6.63) 
33.30 
(9.76) 
38.93 
(8.91) 
41.76 
(8.02) 
42.81 
(8.78) 
42.20 
(8.28) 
41.93 
(7.46) 
39.74 
(10.02) 
41.05 
(8.59) 
Tax Risk Preference 4.18 
(1.91) 
3.70 
(1.77) 
4.00 
(1.84) 
4.14 
(1.03) 
4.14 
(1.24) 
4.14 
(1.11) 
4.15 
(1.40) 
4.00 
(1.41) 
4.09 
(1.40) 
 
Panel B: Results of ANOVA: Effect of Tax Advisor Identity on Weight of Advice 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p 
Nature of Advice 0.009 1 0.009 0.079 0.779 
Tax Advisor Identity 0.548 1 0.548 4.750 0.033 
Nature of Advice x Tax Advisor Identity 0.412 1 0.412 3.568 0.063 
Error 8.425 73 0.115   
 
Panel C: Simple Effects for Weight of Advice 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p 
Conservative: Tax-Nonaudit vs. Tax-Audit 0.724 1 0.724 6.277 0.014 
Aggressive: Tax-Nonaudit vs. Tax-Audit 0.007 1 0.007 0.062 0.804 
 
Notes:  
See Table 8 for variable definitions. All p-values are two-tailed.   
117 
 
Table 4: Supplemental Analysis of Weight of Advice when Agreement with Advice is Low 
Descriptive Statistics by Nature of Advice and Tax Advisor Identity: Means (Standard Deviation) 
 Conservative Advice Aggressive Advice All Advice 
 Tax-
Nonaudit 
Tax-
Audit Total 
Tax-
Nonaudit 
Tax-
Audit Total 
Tax-
Nonaudit 
Tax-
Audit Total 
N 12 23 35 1 6 7 13 29 42 
Percent Include 91.7% 87.0% 88.6% 0.0% 50.0% 42.9% 84.6% 79.3% 81.0% 
Likelihood  0.717 
(0.204) 
0.665 
(0.277) 
0.683 
(0.253) 
0.500 
(0.000) 
0.500 
(0.415) 
0.500 
(0.379) 
0.700 
(0.204) 
0.631 
(0.309) 
0.652 
(0.280) 
Weight of Advice 0.056 
(0.192) 
0.123 
(0.311) 
0.100 
(0.275) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.333 
(0.438) 
0.286 
(0.419) 
0.051 
(0.185) 
0.167 
(0.343) 
0.131 
(0.305) 
IRS Permits  0.508 
(0.108) 
0.489 
(0.194) 
0.494 
(0.168) 
0.200 
(0.000) 
0.267 
(0.197) 
0.257 
(0.181) 
0.485 
(0.134) 
0.441 
(0.211) 
0.455 
(0.190) 
Perceived  
Client Advocacy 
42.08 
(7.93) 
40.87 
(8.30) 
41.29 
(8.08) 
27.00 
(0.00) 
37.50 
(6.44) 
36.00 
(7.10) 
40.92 
(8.67) 
40.17 
(7.97) 
40.40 
(8.09) 
Tax Risk Preference 5.33 
(1.37) 
4.65 
(1.07) 
4.89 
(1.21) 
5.00 
(0.00) 
3.83 
(1.47) 
4.00 
(1.41) 
5.31 
(1.32) 
4.48 
(1.18) 
4.74 
(1.27) 
 
Notes:  
See Table 8 for variable definitions.  
Participants receiving aggressive advice were more likely to agree with the aggressive advice than disagree. No further analysis conducted for Agreement with Advice = Low due 
to cell size in the Aggressive Advice condition.   
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Table 5: Supplemental Analysis of Likelihood 
Panel A: Likelihood by Nature of Advice and Tax Advisor Identity: Means (Standard Deviation) 
 Conservative Advice Aggressive Advice All Advice 
 Tax-
Nonaudit 
Tax-
Audit Total 
Tax-
Nonaudit 
Tax-
Audit Total 
Tax-
Nonaudit 
Tax-
Audit Total 
N 29 33 62 30 27 57 59 60 119 
Likelihood  0.503 
(0.310) 
0.500 
(0.354) 
0.502 
(0.331) 
0.807 
(0.212) 
0.770 
(0.254) 
0.789 
(0.231) 
0.658 
(0.304) 
0.622 
(0.339) 
0.639 
(0.321) 
 
Panel B: Results of ANOVA: Effect of Tax Advisor Identity on Likelihood 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p 
Nature of Advice 2.434 1 2.434 28.965 < 0.000 
Tax Advisor Identity 0.012 1 0.012 0.139 0.710 
Nature of Advice x Tax Advisor Identity 0.008 1 0.008 0.095 0.758 
Error 9.665 115 0.084   
 
Panel C: Simple Effects for Likelihood 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p 
Conservative: Tax-Nonaudit vs. Tax-Audit 0.000 1 0.000 0.002 0.963 
Aggressive: Tax-Nonaudit vs. Tax-Audit 0.019 1 0.019 0.023 0.638 
 
Notes:  
See Table 8 for variable definitions.  
All p-values are two-tailed.  
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Table 6: Supplemental Analysis of Likelihood when Agreement with Advice is High 
Panel A: Likelihood by Nature of Advice and Tax Advisor Identity: Means (Standard Deviation) 
 Conservative Advice Aggressive Advice All Advice 
 Tax-
Nonaudit 
Tax-
Audit Total 
Tax-
Nonaudit 
Tax-
Audit Total 
Tax-
Nonaudit 
Tax-
Audit Total 
N 17 10 27 29 21 50 46 31 77 
Likelihood  0.353 
(0.285) 
0.120 
(0.162) 
0.267 
(0.269) 
0.817 
(0.207) 
0.848 
(0.112) 
0.830 
(0.173) 
0.646 
(0.327) 
0.613 
(0.369) 
0.632 
(0.342) 
 
Panel B: Results of ANOVA: Effect of Tax Advisor Identity on Likelihood 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p 
Nature of Advice 5.897 1 5.897 143.865 < 0.000 
Tax Advisor Identity 0.170 1 0.170 4.155 0.045 
Nature of Advice x Tax Advisor Identity 0.288 1 0.288 7.021 0.010 
Error 2.992 73 0.041   
 
Panel C: Simple Effects for Likelihood 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p 
Conservative: Tax-Nonaudit vs. Tax-Audit 0.342 1 0.342 8.335 0.005 
Aggressive: Tax-Nonaudit vs. Tax-Audit 0.011 1 0.011 0.274 0.602 
 
Notes:  
See Table 8 for variable definitions.  
All p-values are two-tailed.   
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Table 7: Supplemental Analysis of Likelihood when Agreement with Advice is Low 
Likelihood by Nature of Advice and Tax Advisor Identity: Means (Standard Deviation) 
 Conservative Advice Aggressive Advice All Advice 
 Tax-
Nonaudit 
Tax-
Audit Total 
Tax-
Nonaudit 
Tax-
Audit Total 
Tax-
Nonaudit 
Tax-
Audit Total 
N 12 23 35 1 6 7 13 29 42 
Likelihood  0.717 
(0.204) 
0.665 
(0.277) 
0.683 
(0.253) 
0.500 
(0.000) 
0.500 
(0.415) 
0.500 
(0.379) 
0.700 
(0.204) 
0.631 
(0.309) 
0.652 
(0.280) 
 
Notes:  
See Table 8 for variable definitions.  
Participants receiving aggressive advice were more likely to agree with the aggressive advice than disagree. No further analysis conducted for Agreement with Advice = Low due 
to cell size in the Aggressive Advice condition.   
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Table 8: Variable Definitions 
 
Nature of 
Advice 
Nature of Advice is manipulated as the type of tax position recommended 
by Maylor Corp’s tax advisor. In the Conservative condition, Maylor 
Corp’s tax advisor recommends that the company should not include the 
supplies in the R&D credit calculation. In the Aggressive condition, 
Maylor Corp’s tax advisor recommends that the company should include 
the supplies in the R&D credit calculation.   
Tax Advisor 
Identity 
Tax Advisor Identity is manipulated by describing the corporation’s tax 
advisor as either from the same public accounting firm that audits the 
corporation’s financial statements (Tax-Audit) or from a different public 
accounting firm (Tax-Nonaudit). 
Percent 
Include 
Participants are asked, “What do you think Maylor Corp should do?” 
Percent Include is measured as the percentage of participants that indicate 
that “Maylor Corp should include the UltraX supplies as qualified research 
expenses in the R&D Credit calculation.” 
Likelihood Likelihood is measured by asking, “What is the likelihood that you would 
include the UltraX supplies as qualified research expenses for Maylor 
Corp’s Research & Development Credit?” Likelihood uses an eleven-point 
scale with labeled points ranging from 0% “Not At All Likely” to 100% 
“Extremely Likely.” Greater likelihood of including the expenses 
represents greater tax aggressiveness. 
Weight of 
Advice 
Weight of Advice = |(Likelihood – Initial Anchor)| / |(Recommendation – 
Initial Anchor)|. Initial Anchor is the 60% tax department staff preliminary 
opinion. Recommendation is 100% for aggressive advice and 0% for 
conservative advice. Weight of Advice values for Likelihood assessments 
falling outside the range bounded by the tax advisor’s recommendation 
and the initial anchor are adjusted to zero.   
IRS Permits IRS Permits is measured by asking participants, “If this position was 
examined by the IRS, what is the likelihood that the IRS would permit the 
position that the UltraX supplies are qualified research expenses for 
Maylor Corp’s Research & Development Credit?” IRS Permits uses an 
eleven-point scale with labeled points ranging from 0% “Not At All 
Likely” to 100% “Extremely Likely.” Lower perceived likelihood that the 
IRS would permit the tax position of including the expenses represents 
greater perceived riskiness of the tax position. 
Perceived 
Client 
Advocacy 
Client Advocacy is measured as the sum of a nine item scale adapted from 
the Mason and Levy (2001) measure of client advocacy. Greater Client 
Advocacy scores reflect a stronger belief that the tax advisor in the 
experimental scenario is a client advocate. 
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Tax Risk 
Preference 
Tax Risk Preference is measured by asking “How certain would you want 
to be of your tax position before including the UltraX supplies as qualified 
research expenses for the R&D Credit?” The item uses an eleven-point 
scale with labeled points ranging from 0% “Not At All Certain” to 100% 
“Extremely Certain.” Responses are reverse coded such that a greater 
score reflects a greater risk preference (i.e., a preference for more 
uncertainty).  
Agreement 
with Advice 
Agreement is measured by asking participants, “To what extent do you 
agree or disagree with the recommendation of the external tax 
professionals?” Agreement uses a seven-point Likert-type scale with 
labeled points ranging from 1 “Strongly Disagree” to 7 “Strongly Agree.” 
Responses are dichotomized into High or Low Agreement with Advice.  
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Condition 1: Tax-Nonaudit / Conservative 
[SCREEN 1] 
 
Explanation of Research 
Title of Project: Corporate Tax Decision Makers 
Principal Investigator: Bonnie Brown 
Faculty Supervisor: Vicky Arnold 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research project conducted by Bonnie Brown, Doctoral 
Candidate, and Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor. You will be asked to answer questions 
that will take about 20 minutes of your time. The purpose of this research is to examine 
judgments by corporate tax decision makers. You will be asked to read a tax scenario involving a 
hypothetical corporation. You will then be provided with some tax authority guidance and be 
asked to answer questions about the tax scenario.  
 
Please note that participation in this study is completely voluntary and your responses will be 
completely anonymous. If you decide to participate, you have the right to withdraw your consent 
or discontinue participation at any time. There are no anticipated potential risks associated with 
this study. You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.  
 
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints you may contact: Bonnie Brown, Doctoral 
Candidate, Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 
823-1478 or by email at bonnie.brown@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor, 
Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, at (407) 823-3192 
or by email at vicky.arnold@ucf.edu.  
 
Since this research involves human participants, it has been reviewed and approved by the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Central Florida. For information about the 
rights of people who take part in research, please contact: Institutional Review Board, University 
of Central Florida, Office of Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 
501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at (407) 823-2901. 
 
 
By clicking ">>" you are indicating that you wish to participate in this study. 
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[SCREEN 2] 
 
[Screening Questions] 
 
Before we get started, please answer a few questions about yourself. These questions relate 
to your experiences while employed in-house by a company. Please note these questions are 
not asking about any experience you may have had working for a public accounting firm.  
 
 
Do you have experience making in-house tax decisions for a company?   
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
Have you been responsible for the in-house supervision of a company’s income tax return 
preparation and filing?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
Have you researched income tax matters on behalf of a company for which you worked?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
Have you conducted tax planning on behalf of a company for which you worked?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
Have you prepared or reviewed a company’s tax provision calculations while you were 
employed in-house by that company?  
 Yes 
 No 
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[SCREEN 3] 
 
YOUR TASK 
As a participant in this study, you will be asked to read a hypothetical tax scenario and then 
respond to questions related to the scenario, share your attitudes and opinions in general, and 
provide demographic information. We ask that you place yourself into the role of an in-house 
Tax Director employed by a hypothetical corporation, Maylor Corp. Over the next several 
screens you will read background information about Maylor Corp, your role as Maylor Corp’s 
Tax Director, and a hypothetical tax research project. We anticipate it will take about 10 minutes 
to read through this information. We sincerely appreciate receiving input from individuals with 
your level of expertise, and your responses are very important to us. Thank you in advance for 
your time!  
 
Please note that the first few screens will require reading. The remaining screens will be 
mostly questions. 
 
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen. 
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[SCREEN 4] 
 
MAYLOR CORP & TAX DIRECTOR ROLE 
Maylor Corp is a publicly traded manufacturing company with headquarters in the United States. 
The company has operations in six U.S. states and also in a few other countries; consequently, 
the company files tax returns with numerous taxing authorities. Over the past several years, 
Maylor Corp has averaged annual gross revenue of around $200 million. Maylor Corp 
historically has had taxable income, and it does not have any net operating loss carryforwards. 
The GAAP effective tax rate generally hovers around 30 percent.  
 
Again, please envision yourself in the role of Maylor Corp’s Tax Director. You have worked as 
Maylor Corp’s Tax Director for three years. As Tax Director, you lead tax planning and tax 
compliance for Maylor Corp and manage a team of dedicated staff. You work on matters related 
to the company’s federal, international, and state income tax returns, as well as franchise, use, 
and property taxes. In addition to tax compliance responsibilities, a significant portion of your 
time is spent on tax planning, tax authority audits of federal and state income tax filings, and 
accounting for income taxes for financial statement purposes. You are satisfied with your work 
environment at Maylor Corp and feel that the company provides you with the resources 
necessary to meet your job responsibilities. Further, your opinion appears to be valued within the 
company and you currently have no plans to leave Maylor Corp. 
 
You report to the CFO and work with both the management team within Maylor Corp as well as 
third-party tax professionals external to Maylor Corp. For the last eight years, Maylor Corp’s tax 
returns have been prepared and signed by Firm A, a Big 4 accounting firm. Sizable research 
projects are often conducted in-house by Maylor Corp’s tax department and then reviewed 
by the external tax professionals at Firm A. Maylor Corp’s financial statements are audited 
by Firm B, a different Big 4 accounting firm. 
 
 
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen. 
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[SCREEN 5] 
 
CURRENT PROJECT 
You are presently working on a project to review the methods that have been used in Maylor 
Corp’s Research and Development (R&D) Credit calculations. Maylor Corp currently takes the 
R&D Credit, but the calculation is based upon an analysis conducted several years ago. After 
consultation with the CFO, it was decided that the R&D Credit calculations should be updated. 
In particular, you are considering how Maylor Corp should treat supplies related to a research 
and development project conducted during the current tax year for UltraX, a new prototype 
product. 
 
ULTRAX SUPPLIES 
Maylor Corp has spent $4.2 million on a project to develop a new prototype product, called 
UltraX. Included in this amount is $950,000 of supplies. Maylor Corp had originally purchased 
the supplies for production of the old model product, but later allocated these supplies to the 
UltraX project. Maylor Corp has not capitalized or depreciated the cost of these supplies. The 
supplies were used in the development of UltraX; however, none of the supplies were damaged 
by the development process and thus were available for reuse during subsequent production of 
UltraX. Following successful testing, Maylor Corp manufactured UltraX and is now selling it to 
customers. Including the cost of the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation would 
be advantageous for tax purposes. You need to determine if the UltraX supplies can be 
included as qualified research expenses in the R&D Credit calculation. 
 
You assign the task of gathering relevant tax authority to Maylor Corp’s tax department staff. 
Once you review the preliminary opinion of your tax department staff, you will send this 
information to the tax professionals at Firm A, a Big 4 accounting firm which is not Maylor 
Corp’s audit firm, and they will provide their recommendation on the treatment of UltraX 
supplies for the R&D credit calculation. You will then evaluate the treatment of UltraX 
supplies for the R&D credit calculation and make your decision. 
 
 
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen. 
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[SCREEN 6] 
 
TAX DEPARTMENT STAFF PRELIMINARY OPINION 
The tax department staff has evaluated whether or not the UltraX supplies should be included as 
qualified research expenses for the R&D Credit. After considering the internal revenue code, 
regulations, and other authority, Maylor Corp’s tax department staff concludes that the primary 
uncertainty regarding the treatment of the supplies relates to whether the supplies were “used in 
the conduct of qualified research.” They estimate that, should Maylor take the position that 
the supplies are a qualified research expense, there is a 60% likelihood that the position 
would be successfully upheld. The relevant authority related to whether supplies were “used” or 
not is briefly summarized below: 
 
Internal Revenue Code Section 41 indicates that qualified research expenses can include in-
house research expenses, including any amount paid or incurred for supplies used in the conduct 
of qualified research. Regulation §1.41-2(b) says that supplies are used in the conduct of 
qualified research if they are used in the performance of qualified services by an employee of the 
taxpayer; however, expenditures for supplies that are indirect research expenditures or general 
and administrative expenses do not qualify. The rules do not define indirect research 
expenditures. The IRS has adopted the position that “used” means consumed, though nowhere in 
the tax rules is used defined as consumed. The courts have thus far largely remained silent on the 
definition of “used.” Instead, courts have focused on identifying the specific business component 
for which the company is conducting qualified research, and then determining if supplies are 
used in that specific business component or a different business component. 
 
After receiving this information from your tax department, you next confer with your external 
tax advisor, Firm A. Please click below to continue to the next screen to receive Firm A’s 
recommendation. 
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[SCREEN 7] 
 
RECOMMENDATION FROM EXTERNAL TAX PROFESSIONALS 
Thank you for asking us for advice regarding your R&D Credit. We always appreciate the 
opportunity to provide tax services to Maylor Corp. We have read through the information that 
your tax department staff compiled regarding the UltraX supplies and the calculation of Maylor 
Corp’s R&D Credit. In evaluating the possibility of including the UltraX supplies as qualified 
research expenses for the R&D Credit, it may be helpful to consider the potential disclosure 
requirements both for tax and financial statement purposes. Generally, disclosure is required in 
the tax return if a tax position has a reasonable basis but not substantial authority; however, in 
this case disclosure (on Schedule UTP) would be required if a reserve is recorded in the financial 
statements for taking the new tax position. Essentially, the disclosure threshold for including the 
UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit would be the more-likely-than-not threshold for both tax and 
financial statement purposes.     
 
There is a great deal of ambiguity in the tax rules on the topic of supplies as qualified research 
expenses for the Research and Development Credit, thus the decision regarding the UltraX 
supplies should depend in part upon your interpretation of the risk involved and your comfort 
level. Given the facts that you provided, it appears that the inclusion of the UltraX supplies as 
qualified expenses for the R&D Credit will hinge on whether these supplies were “used” in 
qualified research. The Courts have not sufficiently defined the term “used” as it pertains to 
supplies and the R&D Credit. The Courts have not addressed whether reused supplies qualify, 
nor is it clear whether supplies that were not consumed qualify as “used” during research and 
development activities. Given the inconclusive authority, our recommendation is that 
Maylor Corp SHOULD NOT include the UltraX supplies in the R&D credit calculation. 
You may however conclude that you are comfortable with including them in the calculation.  
 
 
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next page. 
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[SCREEN 8] 
 
RESPONSE SECTION I: Please respond to the following questions as if you are Maylor 
Corp’s Tax Director. 
 
 
What is the likelihood that you would include the UltraX supplies as qualified research expenses 
for Maylor Corp’s Research & Development Credit? 
 
Not 
At All 
Likely 
          
Extremely 
Likely 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
 
 
Continuing to envision yourself as Maylor Corp’s Tax Director, what do you think Maylor Corp 
should do? 
 Maylor Corp should include the UltraX supplies as qualified research expenses in the 
R&D Credit calculation.  
 Maylor Corp should not include the UltraX supplies qualified research expenses in the 
R&D Credit calculation. 
 
 
If this position was examined by the IRS, what is the likelihood that the IRS would permit the 
position that the UltraX supplies are qualified research expenses for Maylor Corp’s Research & 
Development Credit? 
 
Not 
At All 
Likely 
          
Extremely 
Likely 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The advice from Firm A 
is what I was expecting. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
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[SCREEN 9] 
 
Please continue to respond to the following questions as if you are Maylor Corp’s Tax 
Director. 
 
 
How certain would you want to be of your tax position before including the UltraX supplies as 
qualified research expenses for the R&D Credit? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
 
 
 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the recommendation of the external tax 
professionals? 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
How confident are you in the advice provided by the external tax professionals at Firm A? 
 Extremely Confident 
 Moderately Confident 
 Somewhat Confident 
 Slightly Confident 
 Not At All Confident 
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[SCREEN 10] 
 
RESPONSE SECTION II: In this study, Maylor Corp engages external tax professionals at 
Firm A, which is not Maylor Corp’s audit firm, to assist with the tax work. Please answer the 
following items as you think a corporation’s external tax professionals would respond in 
arrangements such as this when the corporation’s external tax professionals are not from the 
audit firm.]   
 
 [Client Advocacy] 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
In an instance where no judicial 
authority exists with respect to an 
issue and where the Code and 
Regulations are ambiguous, tax 
professionals should believe that the 
taxpayer is entitled to take the most 
favorable tax treatment. 
       
Generally speaking, tax professionals' 
loyalties should be first to the tax 
system, then to the taxpayer. 
       
Tax professionals should apply 
ambiguous tax law to the taxpayer's 
benefit. 
       
When examining a tax return, tax 
professionals should point out to 
taxpayers reasonable positions they 
could have taken which would have 
contributed to minimizing their tax 
liability. 
       
Tax professionals should believe it is 
important to encourage the taxpayer 
to pay the least amount of taxes 
payable. 
       
Tax professionals should always 
interpret unclear/ambiguous laws in 
favor of the taxpayer. 
       
Tax professionals should use trends 
in the law by trying to establish a 
pattern of more favorable treatment 
for the taxpayer and then extending 
the pattern to the taxpayer's position. 
       
Where no judicial authority exists 
with respect to an issue, tax 
professionals should feel that the 
taxpayer is entitled to take the most 
favorable tax treatment.  
       
Tax professionals should structure 
transactions in ways that yield the 
best tax result, even if the law is 
unclear in an area.  
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[SCREEN 11] 
 
[Manipulation Check Questions] 
 
Regarding your role as Maylor Corp’s Tax Director, which best describes the external tax 
professionals that provided advice about the UltraX supplies?  
 Tax professionals at Firm A, which is also Maylor Corp’s audit firm 
 Tax professionals at Firm A, which is not Maylor Corp’s audit firm 
 
 
 
Which of the following is more accurate based upon the tax scenario? 
 You were advised by the tax professionals at Firm A that Maylor Corp SHOULD include 
the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation. 
 You were advised by the tax professionals at Firm A that Maylor Corp SHOULD NOT 
include the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation. 
 
 
 
The tax professionals at Firm A advised you about whether or not the UltraX supplies should be 
included in the R&D Credit calculation. Please evaluate the recommendation of the tax 
professionals at Firm A.  
 Very Aggressive 
 Aggressive 
 Somewhat Aggressive 
 Neither Aggressive nor Conservative 
 Somewhat Conservative 
 Conservative 
 Very Conservative 
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[SCREEN 12] 
 
[Demographic Questions] 
 
To help us categorize your responses, can you please answer a few final questions about 
yourself. All responses will be completely anonymous.  
 
 
 
Please indicate your present job title within the company. 
 Chief Financial Officer 
 Vice President, Tax 
 Tax Director 
 Tax Controller 
 Tax Manager 
 Other (please specify)___________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Which best describes the company for which you currently work?  
 Domestic US only; Operations in one state    
 Domestic US only; Operations in multiple states 
 Multinational based in the US   
 Multinational based outside of the US 
 Other (please specify)___________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Regarding the company for which you currently work, which best describes the company’s 
general attitude towards Federal income taxation?  
 Very Aggressive 
 Aggressive 
 Somewhat Aggressive 
 Neither Aggressive nor Conservative 
 Somewhat Conservative 
 Conservative 
 Very Conservative 
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Regarding your company’s approach to US income tax reporting, how important is minimizing 
the company’s risk of controversy with the IRS?  
 Extremely Important 
 Moderately Important 
 Somewhat Important 
 Slightly Important 
 Not At All Important 
 
 
 
Does your company produce financial statements that are audited by a public accounting firm?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
 
[Show this item if the response to the previous item is “Yes”] 
Does the same public accounting firm engaged to audit your company’s financial statements also 
provide your company with tax services?  
 Yes   
 No 
 
 
 
How much of your company’s tax planning and compliance work is handled by third-party tax 
professionals (rather than in-house)?  
 
None 
          
All 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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[Show this item if the response to the previous item is not “0%”] 
How important are each of the following factors in the selection of your company’s current tax 
service provider? 
 Not at all 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Moderately 
Important 
Extremely 
Important 
 
Expertise in your company’s industry 
 
     
 
History of established relationship with your company 
 
     
 
Fees for total accounting and tax services 
 
     
 
Independence from the audit firm 
 
     
 
 
 
[Show this item if the response to the previous item is “0%”] 
If your company were to hire a third-party tax service provider, how important would each of the 
following factors be in the selection of a tax service provider? 
 Not at all 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Moderately 
Important 
Extremely 
Important 
 
Expertise in your company’s industry 
 
     
 
History of established relationship with your company 
 
     
 
Fees for total accounting and tax services 
 
     
 
Independence from the audit firm 
 
     
 
 
Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the Research and Development 
Credit?     
 Extremely Familiar 
 Moderately Familiar 
 Somewhat Familiar 
 Slightly Familiar 
 Not At All Familiar 
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Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the tax authority relating to 
supplies as qualified research expenses for the Research and Development Credit? 
 Extremely Familiar 
 Moderately Familiar 
 Somewhat Familiar 
 Slightly Familiar 
 Not At All Familiar 
 
 
 
Are you a Certified Public Accountant? 
 Yes   
 No 
 
 
 
How much total work experience have you had in the area of taxation?     
 No tax experience 
 Less than 3 years 
 3 to less than 5 years 
 5 to less than 7 years 
 7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______ 
 
 
 
Have you worked in public accounting? 
 Yes   
 No 
 
 
 
[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”] 
What size public accounting firm did you work for? Check all that apply. 
 Big 4 
 International/National 
 Regional/Local 
 Sole Proprietorship 
 Other (please specify)___________________________________________ 
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[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”] 
How much public accounting work experience have you had in taxation?     
 No work experience in tax 
 Less than 3 years 
 3 to less than 5 years 
 5 to less than 7 years 
 7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______ 
 
 
 
[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”] 
How much public accounting work experience have you had in auditing?     
 No work experience in auditing 
 Less than 3 years 
 3 to less than 5 years 
 5 to less than 7 years 
 7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______ 
 
 
 
If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return, how certain would 
you want to be of your tax position before taking a deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return and engaged a paid 
tax preparer for assistance, how certain would you want your paid preparer to be of your tax 
position before taking a deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
 
 
 
What is your gender?     
 Male 
 Female 
 
 
 
What is your age? 
 Less than 35 
 35 - 44 
 45 - 54 
 55 - 64 
 65 and over 
 I would prefer not to answer 
 
 
 
What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
 High School 
 Bachelor’s or other undergraduate-level degree 
 Master’s or other graduate-level degree 
 Doctoral degree or other advanced graduate work 
 I would prefer not to answer 
 
 
Please make any comments that you think would be helpful in understanding your responses. 
 
 
 
Thank you so much for your participation! 
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Condition 2: Tax-Nonaudit / Aggressive 
[SCREEN 1] 
 
Explanation of Research 
Title of Project: Corporate Tax Decision Makers 
Principal Investigator: Bonnie Brown 
Faculty Supervisor: Vicky Arnold 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research project conducted by Bonnie Brown, Doctoral 
Candidate, and Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor. You will be asked to answer questions 
that will take about 20 minutes of your time. The purpose of this research is to examine 
judgments by corporate tax decision makers. You will be asked to read a tax scenario involving a 
hypothetical corporation. You will then be provided with some tax authority guidance and be 
asked to answer questions about the tax scenario.  
 
Please note that participation in this study is completely voluntary and your responses will be 
completely anonymous. If you decide to participate, you have the right to withdraw your consent 
or discontinue participation at any time. There are no anticipated potential risks associated with 
this study. You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.  
 
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints you may contact: Bonnie Brown, Doctoral 
Candidate, Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 
823-1478 or by email at bonnie.brown@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor, 
Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, at (407) 823-3192 
or by email at vicky.arnold@ucf.edu.  
 
Since this research involves human participants, it has been reviewed and approved by the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Central Florida. For information about the 
rights of people who take part in research, please contact: Institutional Review Board, University 
of Central Florida, Office of Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 
501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at (407) 823-2901. 
 
 
By clicking ">>" you are indicating that you wish to participate in this study. 
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[SCREEN 2] 
 
[Screening Questions] 
 
Before we get started, please answer a few questions about yourself. These questions relate 
to your experiences while employed in-house by a company. Please note these questions are 
not asking about any experience you may have had working for a public accounting firm.  
 
 
Do you have experience making in-house tax decisions for a company?   
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
Have you been responsible for the in-house supervision of a company’s income tax return 
preparation and filing?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
Have you researched income tax matters on behalf of a company for which you worked?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
Have you conducted tax planning on behalf of a company for which you worked?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
Have you prepared or reviewed a company’s tax provision calculations while you were 
employed in-house by that company?  
 Yes 
 No 
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[SCREEN 3] 
 
YOUR TASK 
As a participant in this study, you will be asked to read a hypothetical tax scenario and then 
respond to questions related to the scenario, share your attitudes and opinions in general, and 
provide demographic information. We ask that you place yourself into the role of an in-house 
Tax Director employed by a hypothetical corporation, Maylor Corp. Over the next several 
screens you will read background information about Maylor Corp, your role as Maylor Corp’s 
Tax Director, and a hypothetical tax research project. We anticipate it will take about 10 minutes 
to read through this information. We sincerely appreciate receiving input from individuals with 
your level of expertise, and your responses are very important to us. Thank you in advance for 
your time!  
 
Please note that the first few screens will require reading. The remaining screens will be 
mostly questions. 
 
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen. 
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[SCREEN 4] 
 
MAYLOR CORP & TAX DIRECTOR ROLE 
Maylor Corp is a publicly traded manufacturing company with headquarters in the United States. 
The company has operations in six U.S. states and also in a few other countries; consequently, 
the company files tax returns with numerous taxing authorities. Over the past several years, 
Maylor Corp has averaged annual gross revenue of around $200 million. Maylor Corp 
historically has had taxable income, and it does not have any net operating loss carryforwards. 
The GAAP effective tax rate generally hovers around 30 percent.  
 
Again, please envision yourself in the role of Maylor Corp’s Tax Director. You have worked as 
Maylor Corp’s Tax Director for three years. As Tax Director, you lead tax planning and tax 
compliance for Maylor Corp and manage a team of dedicated staff. You work on matters related 
to the company’s federal, international, and state income tax returns, as well as franchise, use, 
and property taxes. In addition to tax compliance responsibilities, a significant portion of your 
time is spent on tax planning, tax authority audits of federal and state income tax filings, and 
accounting for income taxes for financial statement purposes. You are satisfied with your work 
environment at Maylor Corp and feel that the company provides you with the resources 
necessary to meet your job responsibilities. Further, your opinion appears to be valued within the 
company and you currently have no plans to leave Maylor Corp. 
 
You report to the CFO and work with both the management team within Maylor Corp as well as 
third-party tax professionals external to Maylor Corp. For the last eight years, Maylor Corp’s tax 
returns have been prepared and signed by Firm A, a Big 4 accounting firm. Sizable research 
projects are often conducted in-house by Maylor Corp’s tax department and then reviewed 
by the external tax professionals at Firm A. Maylor Corp’s financial statements are audited 
by Firm B, a different Big 4 accounting firm. 
 
 
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen. 
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[SCREEN 5] 
 
CURRENT PROJECT 
You are presently working on a project to review the methods that have been used in Maylor 
Corp’s Research and Development (R&D) Credit calculations. Maylor Corp currently takes the 
R&D Credit, but the calculation is based upon an analysis conducted several years ago. After 
consultation with the CFO, it was decided that the R&D Credit calculations should be updated. 
In particular, you are considering how Maylor Corp should treat supplies related to a research 
and development project conducted during the current tax year for UltraX, a new prototype 
product. 
 
ULTRAX SUPPLIES 
Maylor Corp has spent $4.2 million on a project to develop a new prototype product, called 
UltraX. Included in this amount is $950,000 of supplies. Maylor Corp had originally purchased 
the supplies for production of the old model product, but later allocated these supplies to the 
UltraX project. Maylor Corp has not capitalized or depreciated the cost of these supplies. The 
supplies were used in the development of UltraX; however, none of the supplies were damaged 
by the development process and thus were available for reuse during subsequent production of 
UltraX. Following successful testing, Maylor Corp manufactured UltraX and is now selling it to 
customers. Including the cost of the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation would 
be advantageous for tax purposes. You need to determine if the UltraX supplies can be 
included as qualified research expenses in the R&D Credit calculation. 
 
You assign the task of gathering relevant tax authority to Maylor Corp’s tax department staff. 
Once you review the preliminary opinion of your tax department staff, you will send this 
information to the tax professionals at Firm A, a Big 4 accounting firm which is not Maylor 
Corp’s audit firm, and they will provide their recommendation on the treatment of UltraX 
supplies for the R&D credit calculation. You will then evaluate the treatment of UltraX 
supplies for the R&D credit calculation and make your decision. 
 
 
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen. 
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[SCREEN 6] 
 
TAX DEPARTMENT STAFF PRELIMINARY OPINION 
The tax department staff has evaluated whether or not the UltraX supplies should be included as 
qualified research expenses for the R&D Credit. After considering the internal revenue code, 
regulations, and other authority, Maylor Corp’s tax department staff concludes that the primary 
uncertainty regarding the treatment of the supplies relates to whether the supplies were “used in 
the conduct of qualified research.” They estimate that, should Maylor take the position that 
the supplies are a qualified research expense, there is a 60% likelihood that the position 
would be successfully upheld. The relevant authority related to whether supplies were “used” or 
not is briefly summarized below: 
 
Internal Revenue Code Section 41 indicates that qualified research expenses can include in-
house research expenses, including any amount paid or incurred for supplies used in the conduct 
of qualified research. Regulation §1.41-2(b) says that supplies are used in the conduct of 
qualified research if they are used in the performance of qualified services by an employee of the 
taxpayer; however, expenditures for supplies that are indirect research expenditures or general 
and administrative expenses do not qualify. The rules do not define indirect research 
expenditures. The IRS has adopted the position that “used” means consumed, though nowhere in 
the tax rules is used defined as consumed. The courts have thus far largely remained silent on the 
definition of “used.” Instead, courts have focused on identifying the specific business component 
for which the company is conducting qualified research, and then determining if supplies are 
used in that specific business component or a different business component. 
 
After receiving this information from your tax department, you next confer with your external 
tax advisor, Firm A. Please click below to continue to the next screen to receive Firm A’s 
recommendation. 
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[SCREEN 7] 
 
RECOMMENDATION FROM EXTERNAL TAX PROFESSIONALS 
Thank you for asking us for advice regarding your R&D Credit. We always appreciate the 
opportunity to provide tax services to Maylor Corp. We have read through the information that 
your tax department staff compiled regarding the UltraX supplies and the calculation of Maylor 
Corp’s R&D Credit. In evaluating the possibility of including the UltraX supplies as qualified 
research expenses for the R&D Credit, it may be helpful to consider the potential disclosure 
requirements both for tax and financial statement purposes. Generally, disclosure is required in 
the tax return if a tax position has a reasonable basis but not substantial authority; however, in 
this case disclosure (on Schedule UTP) would be required if a reserve is recorded in the financial 
statements for taking the new tax position. Essentially, the disclosure threshold for including the 
UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit would be the more-likely-than-not threshold for both tax and 
financial statement purposes.     
 
There is a great deal of ambiguity in the tax rules on the topic of supplies as qualified research 
expenses for the Research and Development Credit, thus the decision regarding the UltraX 
supplies should depend in part upon your interpretation of the risk involved and your comfort 
level. Given the facts that you provided, it appears that the inclusion of the UltraX supplies as 
qualified expenses for the R&D Credit will hinge on whether these supplies were “used” in 
qualified research. The Courts have not sufficiently defined the term “used” as it pertains to 
supplies and the R&D Credit. The Courts have not indicated that reused supplies do not qualify, 
nor is it clear that supplies must be consumed to qualify as “used” during research and 
development activities.  Given the inconclusive authority, our recommendation is that 
Maylor Corp SHOULD include the UltraX supplies in the R&D credit calculation. You 
may however conclude that you are not comfortable with including them in the calculation. 
 
 
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next page. 
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[SCREEN 8] 
 
RESPONSE SECTION I: Please respond to the following questions as if you are Maylor 
Corp’s Tax Director. 
 
 
What is the likelihood that you would include the UltraX supplies as qualified research expenses 
for Maylor Corp’s Research & Development Credit? 
 
Not 
At All 
Likely 
          
Extremely 
Likely 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
 
 
Continuing to envision yourself as Maylor Corp’s Tax Director, what do you think Maylor Corp 
should do? 
 Maylor Corp should include the UltraX supplies as qualified research expenses in the 
R&D Credit calculation.  
 Maylor Corp should not include the UltraX supplies qualified research expenses in the 
R&D Credit calculation. 
 
 
If this position was examined by the IRS, what is the likelihood that the IRS would permit the 
position that the UltraX supplies are qualified research expenses for Maylor Corp’s Research & 
Development Credit? 
 
Not 
At All 
Likely 
          
Extremely 
Likely 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The advice from Firm A 
is what I was expecting. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
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[SCREEN 9] 
 
Please continue to respond to the following questions as if you are Maylor Corp’s Tax 
Director. 
 
 
How certain would you want to be of your tax position before including the UltraX supplies as 
qualified research expenses for the R&D Credit? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
 
 
 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the recommendation of the external tax 
professionals? 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
How confident are you in the advice provided by the external tax professionals at Firm A? 
 Extremely Confident 
 Moderately Confident 
 Somewhat Confident 
 Slightly Confident 
 Not At All Confident 
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[SCREEN 10] 
 
RESPONSE SECTION II: In this study, Maylor Corp engages external tax professionals at 
Firm A, which is not Maylor Corp’s audit firm, to assist with the tax work. Please answer the 
following items as you think a corporation’s external tax professionals would respond in 
arrangements such as this when the corporation’s external tax professionals are not from the 
audit firm.]   
 
 [Client Advocacy] 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
In an instance where no judicial 
authority exists with respect to an 
issue and where the Code and 
Regulations are ambiguous, tax 
professionals should believe that the 
taxpayer is entitled to take the most 
favorable tax treatment. 
       
Generally speaking, tax professionals' 
loyalties should be first to the tax 
system, then to the taxpayer. 
       
Tax professionals should apply 
ambiguous tax law to the taxpayer's 
benefit. 
       
When examining a tax return, tax 
professionals should point out to 
taxpayers reasonable positions they 
could have taken which would have 
contributed to minimizing their tax 
liability. 
       
Tax professionals should believe it is 
important to encourage the taxpayer 
to pay the least amount of taxes 
payable. 
       
Tax professionals should always 
interpret unclear/ambiguous laws in 
favor of the taxpayer. 
       
Tax professionals should use trends 
in the law by trying to establish a 
pattern of more favorable treatment 
for the taxpayer and then extending 
the pattern to the taxpayer's position. 
       
Where no judicial authority exists 
with respect to an issue, tax 
professionals should feel that the 
taxpayer is entitled to take the most 
favorable tax treatment.  
       
Tax professionals should structure 
transactions in ways that yield the 
best tax result, even if the law is 
unclear in an area.  
       
153 
 
[SCREEN 11] 
 
[Manipulation Check Questions] 
 
Regarding your role as Maylor Corp’s Tax Director, which best describes the external tax 
professionals that provided advice about the UltraX supplies?  
 Tax professionals at Firm A, which is also Maylor Corp’s audit firm 
 Tax professionals at Firm A, which is not Maylor Corp’s audit firm 
 
 
 
Which of the following is more accurate based upon the tax scenario? 
 You were advised by the tax professionals at Firm A that Maylor Corp SHOULD include 
the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation. 
 You were advised by the tax professionals at Firm A that Maylor Corp SHOULD NOT 
include the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation. 
 
 
 
The tax professionals at Firm A advised you about whether or not the UltraX supplies should be 
included in the R&D Credit calculation. Please evaluate the recommendation of the tax 
professionals at Firm A.  
 Very Aggressive 
 Aggressive 
 Somewhat Aggressive 
 Neither Aggressive nor Conservative 
 Somewhat Conservative 
 Conservative 
 Very Conservative 
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[SCREEN 12] 
 
[Demographic Questions] 
 
To help us categorize your responses, can you please answer a few final questions about 
yourself. All responses will be completely anonymous.  
 
 
 
Please indicate your present job title within the company. 
 Chief Financial Officer 
 Vice President, Tax 
 Tax Director 
 Tax Controller 
 Tax Manager 
 Other (please specify)___________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Which best describes the company for which you currently work?  
 Domestic US only; Operations in one state    
 Domestic US only; Operations in multiple states 
 Multinational based in the US   
 Multinational based outside of the US 
 Other (please specify)___________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Regarding the company for which you currently work, which best describes the company’s 
general attitude towards Federal income taxation?  
 Very Aggressive 
 Aggressive 
 Somewhat Aggressive 
 Neither Aggressive nor Conservative 
 Somewhat Conservative 
 Conservative 
 Very Conservative 
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Regarding your company’s approach to US income tax reporting, how important is minimizing 
the company’s risk of controversy with the IRS?  
 Extremely Important 
 Moderately Important 
 Somewhat Important 
 Slightly Important 
 Not At All Important 
 
 
 
Does your company produce financial statements that are audited by a public accounting firm?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
 
[Show this item if the response to the previous item is “Yes”] 
Does the same public accounting firm engaged to audit your company’s financial statements also 
provide your company with tax services?  
 Yes   
 No 
 
 
 
How much of your company’s tax planning and compliance work is handled by third-party tax 
professionals (rather than in-house)?  
 
None 
          
All 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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[Show this item if the response to the previous item is not “0%”] 
How important are each of the following factors in the selection of your company’s current tax 
service provider? 
 Not at all 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Moderately 
Important 
Extremely 
Important 
 
Expertise in your company’s industry 
 
     
 
History of established relationship with your company 
 
     
 
Fees for total accounting and tax services 
 
     
 
Independence from the audit firm 
 
     
 
 
 
[Show this item if the response to the previous item is “0%”] 
If your company were to hire a third-party tax service provider, how important would each of the 
following factors be in the selection of a tax service provider? 
 Not at all 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Moderately 
Important 
Extremely 
Important 
 
Expertise in your company’s industry 
 
     
 
History of established relationship with your company 
 
     
 
Fees for total accounting and tax services 
 
     
 
Independence from the audit firm 
 
     
 
 
Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the Research and Development 
Credit?     
 Extremely Familiar 
 Moderately Familiar 
 Somewhat Familiar 
 Slightly Familiar 
 Not At All Familiar 
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Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the tax authority relating to 
supplies as qualified research expenses for the Research and Development Credit? 
 Extremely Familiar 
 Moderately Familiar 
 Somewhat Familiar 
 Slightly Familiar 
 Not At All Familiar 
 
 
 
Are you a Certified Public Accountant? 
 Yes   
 No 
 
 
 
How much total work experience have you had in the area of taxation?     
 No tax experience 
 Less than 3 years 
 3 to less than 5 years 
 5 to less than 7 years 
 7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______ 
 
 
 
Have you worked in public accounting? 
 Yes   
 No 
 
 
 
[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”] 
What size public accounting firm did you work for? Check all that apply. 
 Big 4 
 International/National 
 Regional/Local 
 Sole Proprietorship 
 Other (please specify)___________________________________________ 
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[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”] 
How much public accounting work experience have you had in taxation?     
 No work experience in tax 
 Less than 3 years 
 3 to less than 5 years 
 5 to less than 7 years 
 7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______ 
 
 
 
[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”] 
How much public accounting work experience have you had in auditing?     
 No work experience in auditing 
 Less than 3 years 
 3 to less than 5 years 
 5 to less than 7 years 
 7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______ 
 
 
 
If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return, how certain would 
you want to be of your tax position before taking a deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return and engaged a paid 
tax preparer for assistance, how certain would you want your paid preparer to be of your tax 
position before taking a deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
 
 
 
What is your gender?     
 Male 
 Female 
 
 
 
What is your age? 
 Less than 35 
 35 - 44 
 45 - 54 
 55 - 64 
 65 and over 
 I would prefer not to answer 
 
 
 
What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
 High School 
 Bachelor’s or other undergraduate-level degree 
 Master’s or other graduate-level degree 
 Doctoral degree or other advanced graduate work 
 I would prefer not to answer 
 
 
Please make any comments that you think would be helpful in understanding your responses. 
 
 
 
Thank you so much for your participation! 
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Condition 3: Tax-Audit / Conservative 
[SCREEN 1] 
 
Explanation of Research 
Title of Project: Corporate Tax Decision Makers 
Principal Investigator: Bonnie Brown 
Faculty Supervisor: Vicky Arnold 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research project conducted by Bonnie Brown, Doctoral 
Candidate, and Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor. You will be asked to answer questions 
that will take about 20 minutes of your time. The purpose of this research is to examine 
judgments by corporate tax decision makers. You will be asked to read a tax scenario involving a 
hypothetical corporation. You will then be provided with some tax authority guidance and be 
asked to answer questions about the tax scenario.  
 
Please note that participation in this study is completely voluntary and your responses will be 
completely anonymous. If you decide to participate, you have the right to withdraw your consent 
or discontinue participation at any time. There are no anticipated potential risks associated with 
this study. You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.  
 
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints you may contact: Bonnie Brown, Doctoral 
Candidate, Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 
823-1478 or by email at bonnie.brown@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor, 
Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, at (407) 823-3192 
or by email at vicky.arnold@ucf.edu.  
 
Since this research involves human participants, it has been reviewed and approved by the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Central Florida. For information about the 
rights of people who take part in research, please contact: Institutional Review Board, University 
of Central Florida, Office of Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 
501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at (407) 823-2901. 
 
 
By clicking ">>" you are indicating that you wish to participate in this study. 
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[SCREEN 2] 
 
[Screening Questions] 
 
Before we get started, please answer a few questions about yourself. These questions relate 
to your experiences while employed in-house by a company. Please note these questions are 
not asking about any experience you may have had working for a public accounting firm.  
 
 
Do you have experience making in-house tax decisions for a company?   
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
Have you been responsible for the in-house supervision of a company’s income tax return 
preparation and filing?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
Have you researched income tax matters on behalf of a company for which you worked?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
Have you conducted tax planning on behalf of a company for which you worked?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
Have you prepared or reviewed a company’s tax provision calculations while you were 
employed in-house by that company?  
 Yes 
 No 
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[SCREEN 3] 
 
YOUR TASK 
As a participant in this study, you will be asked to read a hypothetical tax scenario and then 
respond to questions related to the scenario, share your attitudes and opinions in general, and 
provide demographic information. We ask that you place yourself into the role of an in-house 
Tax Director employed by a hypothetical corporation, Maylor Corp. Over the next several 
screens you will read background information about Maylor Corp, your role as Maylor Corp’s 
Tax Director, and a hypothetical tax research project. We anticipate it will take about 10 minutes 
to read through this information. We sincerely appreciate receiving input from individuals with 
your level of expertise, and your responses are very important to us. Thank you in advance for 
your time!  
 
Please note that the first few screens will require reading. The remaining screens will be 
mostly questions. 
 
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen. 
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[SCREEN 4] 
 
MAYLOR CORP & TAX DIRECTOR ROLE 
Maylor Corp is a publicly traded manufacturing company with headquarters in the United States. 
The company has operations in six U.S. states and also in a few other countries; consequently, 
the company files tax returns with numerous taxing authorities. Over the past several years, 
Maylor Corp has averaged annual gross revenue of around $200 million. Maylor Corp 
historically has had taxable income, and it does not have any net operating loss carryforwards. 
The GAAP effective tax rate generally hovers around 30 percent.  
 
Again, please envision yourself in the role of Maylor Corp’s Tax Director. You have worked as 
Maylor Corp’s Tax Director for three years. As Tax Director, you lead tax planning and tax 
compliance for Maylor Corp and manage a team of dedicated staff. You work on matters related 
to the company’s federal, international, and state income tax returns, as well as franchise, use, 
and property taxes. In addition to tax compliance responsibilities, a significant portion of your 
time is spent on tax planning, tax authority audits of federal and state income tax filings, and 
accounting for income taxes for financial statement purposes. You are satisfied with your work 
environment at Maylor Corp and feel that the company provides you with the resources 
necessary to meet your job responsibilities. Further, your opinion appears to be valued within the 
company and you currently have no plans to leave Maylor Corp. 
 
You report to the CFO and work with both the management team within Maylor Corp as well as 
third-party tax professionals external to Maylor Corp. For the last eight years, Maylor Corp’s tax 
returns have been prepared and signed by Firm A, a Big 4 accounting firm. Sizable research 
projects are often conducted in-house by Maylor Corp’s tax department and then reviewed 
by the external tax professionals at Firm A. Maylor Corp’s financial statements are audited 
by Firm A, the same Big 4 accounting firm. 
 
 
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen. 
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[SCREEN 5] 
 
CURRENT PROJECT 
You are presently working on a project to review the methods that have been used in Maylor 
Corp’s Research and Development (R&D) Credit calculations. Maylor Corp currently takes the 
R&D Credit, but the calculation is based upon an analysis conducted several years ago. After 
consultation with the CFO, it was decided that the R&D Credit calculations should be updated. 
In particular, you are considering how Maylor Corp should treat supplies related to a research 
and development project conducted during the current tax year for UltraX, a new prototype 
product. 
 
ULTRAX SUPPLIES 
Maylor Corp has spent $4.2 million on a project to develop a new prototype product, called 
UltraX. Included in this amount is $950,000 of supplies. Maylor Corp had originally purchased 
the supplies for production of the old model product, but later allocated these supplies to the 
UltraX project. Maylor Corp has not capitalized or depreciated the cost of these supplies. The 
supplies were used in the development of UltraX; however, none of the supplies were damaged 
by the development process and thus were available for reuse during subsequent production of 
UltraX. Following successful testing, Maylor Corp manufactured UltraX and is now selling it to 
customers. Including the cost of the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation would 
be advantageous for tax purposes. You need to determine if the UltraX supplies can be 
included as qualified research expenses in the R&D Credit calculation. 
 
You assign the task of gathering relevant tax authority to Maylor Corp’s tax department staff. 
Once you review the preliminary opinion of your tax department staff, you will send this 
information to the tax professionals at Firm A, a Big 4 accounting firm which is also 
Maylor Corp’s audit firm, and they will provide their recommendation on the treatment of 
UltraX supplies for the R&D credit calculation. You will then evaluate the treatment of 
UltraX supplies for the R&D credit calculation and make your decision. 
 
 
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen. 
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[SCREEN 6] 
 
TAX DEPARTMENT STAFF PRELIMINARY OPINION 
The tax department staff has evaluated whether or not the UltraX supplies should be included as 
qualified research expenses for the R&D Credit. After considering the internal revenue code, 
regulations, and other authority, Maylor Corp’s tax department staff concludes that the primary 
uncertainty regarding the treatment of the supplies relates to whether the supplies were “used in 
the conduct of qualified research.” They estimate that, should Maylor take the position that 
the supplies are a qualified research expense, there is a 60% likelihood that the position 
would be successfully upheld. The relevant authority related to whether supplies were “used” or 
not is briefly summarized below: 
 
Internal Revenue Code Section 41 indicates that qualified research expenses can include in-
house research expenses, including any amount paid or incurred for supplies used in the conduct 
of qualified research. Regulation §1.41-2(b) says that supplies are used in the conduct of 
qualified research if they are used in the performance of qualified services by an employee of the 
taxpayer; however, expenditures for supplies that are indirect research expenditures or general 
and administrative expenses do not qualify. The rules do not define indirect research 
expenditures. The IRS has adopted the position that “used” means consumed, though nowhere in 
the tax rules is used defined as consumed. The courts have thus far largely remained silent on the 
definition of “used.” Instead, courts have focused on identifying the specific business component 
for which the company is conducting qualified research, and then determining if supplies are 
used in that specific business component or a different business component. 
 
After receiving this information from your tax department, you next confer with your external 
tax advisor, Firm A. Please click below to continue to the next screen to receive Firm A’s 
recommendation. 
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[SCREEN 7] 
 
RECOMMENDATION FROM EXTERNAL TAX PROFESSIONALS 
Thank you for asking us for advice regarding your R&D Credit. We always appreciate the 
opportunity to provide tax and audit services to Maylor Corp. We have read through the 
information that your tax department staff compiled regarding the UltraX supplies and the 
calculation of Maylor Corp’s R&D Credit. In evaluating the possibility of including the UltraX 
supplies as qualified research expenses for the R&D Credit, it may be helpful to consider the 
potential disclosure requirements both for tax and financial statement purposes. Generally, 
disclosure is required in the tax return if a tax position has a reasonable basis but not substantial 
authority; however, in this case disclosure (on Schedule UTP) would be required if a reserve is 
recorded in the financial statements for taking the new tax position. Essentially, the disclosure 
threshold for including the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit would be the more-likely-than-not 
threshold for both tax and financial statement purposes.     
 
There is a great deal of ambiguity in the tax rules on the topic of supplies as qualified research 
expenses for the Research and Development Credit, thus the decision regarding the UltraX 
supplies should depend in part upon your interpretation of the risk involved and your comfort 
level. Given the facts that you provided, it appears that the inclusion of the UltraX supplies as 
qualified expenses for the R&D Credit will hinge on whether these supplies were “used” in 
qualified research. The Courts have not sufficiently defined the term “used” as it pertains to 
supplies and the R&D Credit. The Courts have not addressed whether reused supplies qualify, 
nor is it clear whether supplies that were not consumed qualify as “used” during research and 
development activities. Given the inconclusive authority, our recommendation is that 
Maylor Corp SHOULD NOT include the UltraX supplies in the R&D credit calculation. 
You may however conclude that you are comfortable with including them in the calculation.  
 
 
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next page. 
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[SCREEN 8] 
 
RESPONSE SECTION I: Please respond to the following questions as if you are Maylor 
Corp’s Tax Director. 
 
 
What is the likelihood that you would include the UltraX supplies as qualified research expenses 
for Maylor Corp’s Research & Development Credit? 
 
Not 
At All 
Likely 
          
Extremely 
Likely 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
 
 
Continuing to envision yourself as Maylor Corp’s Tax Director, what do you think Maylor Corp 
should do? 
 Maylor Corp should include the UltraX supplies as qualified research expenses in the 
R&D Credit calculation.  
 Maylor Corp should not include the UltraX supplies qualified research expenses in the 
R&D Credit calculation. 
 
 
If this position was examined by the IRS, what is the likelihood that the IRS would permit the 
position that the UltraX supplies are qualified research expenses for Maylor Corp’s Research & 
Development Credit? 
 
Not 
At All 
Likely 
          
Extremely 
Likely 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
 
 
  
168 
 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The advice from Firm A 
is what I was expecting. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
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[SCREEN 9] 
 
Please continue to respond to the following questions as if you are Maylor Corp’s Tax 
Director. 
 
 
How certain would you want to be of your tax position before including the UltraX supplies as 
qualified research expenses for the R&D Credit? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
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To what extent do you agree or disagree with the recommendation of the external tax 
professionals? 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
How confident are you in the advice provided by the external tax professionals at Firm A? 
 Extremely Confident 
 Moderately Confident 
 Somewhat Confident 
 Slightly Confident 
 Not At All Confident 
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[SCREEN 10] 
 
RESPONSE SECTION II: In this study, Maylor Corp engages external tax professionals at 
Firm A, which is also Maylor Corp’s audit firm, to assist with the tax work. Please answer the 
following items as you think a corporation’s external tax professionals would respond in 
arrangements such as this when the corporation’s external tax professionals are from the audit 
firm.  
 
 [Client Advocacy] 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
In an instance where no judicial 
authority exists with respect to an 
issue and where the Code and 
Regulations are ambiguous, tax 
professionals should believe that the 
taxpayer is entitled to take the most 
favorable tax treatment. 
       
Generally speaking, tax professionals' 
loyalties should be first to the tax 
system, then to the taxpayer. 
       
Tax professionals should apply 
ambiguous tax law to the taxpayer's 
benefit. 
       
When examining a tax return, tax 
professionals should point out to 
taxpayers reasonable positions they 
could have taken which would have 
contributed to minimizing their tax 
liability. 
       
Tax professionals should believe it is 
important to encourage the taxpayer 
to pay the least amount of taxes 
payable. 
       
Tax professionals should always 
interpret unclear/ambiguous laws in 
favor of the taxpayer. 
       
Tax professionals should use trends 
in the law by trying to establish a 
pattern of more favorable treatment 
for the taxpayer and then extending 
the pattern to the taxpayer's position. 
       
Where no judicial authority exists 
with respect to an issue, tax 
professionals should feel that the 
taxpayer is entitled to take the most 
favorable tax treatment.  
       
Tax professionals should structure 
transactions in ways that yield the 
best tax result, even if the law is 
unclear in an area.  
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[SCREEN 11] 
 
[Manipulation Check Questions] 
 
Regarding your role as Maylor Corp’s Tax Director, which best describes the external tax 
professionals that provided advice about the UltraX supplies?  
 Tax professionals at Firm A, which is also Maylor Corp’s audit firm 
 Tax professionals at Firm A, which is not Maylor Corp’s audit firm 
 
 
 
Which of the following is more accurate based upon the tax scenario? 
 You were advised by the tax professionals at Firm A that Maylor Corp SHOULD include 
the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation. 
 You were advised by the tax professionals at Firm A that Maylor Corp SHOULD NOT 
include the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation. 
 
 
 
The tax professionals at Firm A advised you about whether or not the UltraX supplies should be 
included in the R&D Credit calculation. Please evaluate the recommendation of the tax 
professionals at Firm A.  
 Very Aggressive 
 Aggressive 
 Somewhat Aggressive 
 Neither Aggressive nor Conservative 
 Somewhat Conservative 
 Conservative 
 Very Conservative 
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[SCREEN 12] 
 
[Demographic Questions] 
 
To help us categorize your responses, can you please answer a few final questions about 
yourself. All responses will be completely anonymous.  
 
 
 
Please indicate your present job title within the company. 
 Chief Financial Officer 
 Vice President, Tax 
 Tax Director 
 Tax Controller 
 Tax Manager 
 Other (please specify)___________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Which best describes the company for which you currently work?  
 Domestic US only; Operations in one state    
 Domestic US only; Operations in multiple states 
 Multinational based in the US   
 Multinational based outside of the US 
 Other (please specify)___________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Regarding the company for which you currently work, which best describes the company’s 
general attitude towards Federal income taxation?  
 Very Aggressive 
 Aggressive 
 Somewhat Aggressive 
 Neither Aggressive nor Conservative 
 Somewhat Conservative 
 Conservative 
 Very Conservative 
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Regarding your company’s approach to US income tax reporting, how important is minimizing 
the company’s risk of controversy with the IRS?  
 Extremely Important 
 Moderately Important 
 Somewhat Important 
 Slightly Important 
 Not At All Important 
 
 
 
Does your company produce financial statements that are audited by a public accounting firm?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
 
[Show this item if the response to the previous item is “Yes”] 
Does the same public accounting firm engaged to audit your company’s financial statements also 
provide your company with tax services?  
 Yes   
 No 
 
 
 
How much of your company’s tax planning and compliance work is handled by third-party tax 
professionals (rather than in-house)?  
 
None 
          
All 
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[Show this item if the response to the previous item is not “0%”] 
How important are each of the following factors in the selection of your company’s current tax 
service provider? 
 Not at all 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Moderately 
Important 
Extremely 
Important 
 
Expertise in your company’s industry 
 
     
 
History of established relationship with your company 
 
     
 
Fees for total accounting and tax services 
 
     
 
Independence from the audit firm 
 
     
 
 
 
 [Show this item if the response to the previous item is “0%”] 
If your company were to hire a third-party tax service provider, how important would each of the 
following factors be in the selection of a tax service provider? 
 Not at all 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Moderately 
Important 
Extremely 
Important 
 
Expertise in your company’s industry 
 
     
 
History of established relationship with your company 
 
     
 
Fees for total accounting and tax services 
 
     
 
Independence from the audit firm 
 
     
 
 
Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the Research and Development 
Credit?     
 Extremely Familiar 
 Moderately Familiar 
 Somewhat Familiar 
 Slightly Familiar 
 Not At All Familiar 
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Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the tax authority relating to 
supplies as qualified research expenses for the Research and Development Credit? 
 Extremely Familiar 
 Moderately Familiar 
 Somewhat Familiar 
 Slightly Familiar 
 Not At All Familiar 
 
 
 
Are you a Certified Public Accountant? 
 Yes   
 No 
 
 
 
How much total work experience have you had in the area of taxation?     
 No tax experience 
 Less than 3 years 
 3 to less than 5 years 
 5 to less than 7 years 
 7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______ 
 
 
 
Have you worked in public accounting? 
 Yes   
 No 
 
 
 
[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”] 
What size public accounting firm did you work for? Check all that apply. 
 Big 4 
 International/National 
 Regional/Local 
 Sole Proprietorship 
 Other (please specify)___________________________________________ 
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[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”] 
How much public accounting work experience have you had in taxation?     
 No work experience in tax 
 Less than 3 years 
 3 to less than 5 years 
 5 to less than 7 years 
 7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______ 
 
 
 
[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”] 
How much public accounting work experience have you had in auditing?     
 No work experience in auditing 
 Less than 3 years 
 3 to less than 5 years 
 5 to less than 7 years 
 7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______ 
 
 
 
If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return, how certain would 
you want to be of your tax position before taking a deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
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If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return and engaged a paid 
tax preparer for assistance, how certain would you want your paid preparer to be of your tax 
position before taking a deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
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What is your gender?     
 Male 
 Female 
 
 
 
What is your age? 
 Less than 35 
 35 - 44 
 45 - 54 
 55 - 64 
 65 and over 
 I would prefer not to answer 
 
 
 
What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
 High School 
 Bachelor’s or other undergraduate-level degree 
 Master’s or other graduate-level degree 
 Doctoral degree or other advanced graduate work 
 I would prefer not to answer 
 
 
Please make any comments that you think would be helpful in understanding your responses. 
 
 
 
Thank you so much for your participation! 
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Condition 4: Tax-Audit / Aggressive 
[SCREEN 1] 
 
Explanation of Research 
Title of Project: Corporate Tax Decision Makers 
Principal Investigator: Bonnie Brown 
Faculty Supervisor: Vicky Arnold 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research project conducted by Bonnie Brown, Doctoral 
Candidate, and Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor. You will be asked to answer questions 
that will take about 20 minutes of your time. The purpose of this research is to examine 
judgments by corporate tax decision makers. You will be asked to read a tax scenario involving a 
hypothetical corporation. You will then be provided with some tax authority guidance and be 
asked to answer questions about the tax scenario.  
 
Please note that participation in this study is completely voluntary and your responses will be 
completely anonymous. If you decide to participate, you have the right to withdraw your consent 
or discontinue participation at any time. There are no anticipated potential risks associated with 
this study. You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.  
 
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints you may contact: Bonnie Brown, Doctoral 
Candidate, Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 
823-1478 or by email at bonnie.brown@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor, 
Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, at (407) 823-3192 
or by email at vicky.arnold@ucf.edu.  
 
Since this research involves human participants, it has been reviewed and approved by the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Central Florida. For information about the 
rights of people who take part in research, please contact: Institutional Review Board, University 
of Central Florida, Office of Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 
501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at (407) 823-2901. 
 
 
By clicking ">>" you are indicating that you wish to participate in this study. 
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[SCREEN 2] 
 
[Screening Questions] 
 
Before we get started, please answer a few questions about yourself. These questions relate 
to your experiences while employed in-house by a company. Please note these questions are 
not asking about any experience you may have had working for a public accounting firm.  
 
 
Do you have experience making in-house tax decisions for a company?   
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
Have you been responsible for the in-house supervision of a company’s income tax return 
preparation and filing?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
Have you researched income tax matters on behalf of a company for which you worked?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
Have you conducted tax planning on behalf of a company for which you worked?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
Have you prepared or reviewed a company’s tax provision calculations while you were 
employed in-house by that company?  
 Yes 
 No 
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[SCREEN 3] 
 
YOUR TASK 
As a participant in this study, you will be asked to read a hypothetical tax scenario and then 
respond to questions related to the scenario, share your attitudes and opinions in general, and 
provide demographic information. We ask that you place yourself into the role of an in-house 
Tax Director employed by a hypothetical corporation, Maylor Corp. Over the next several 
screens you will read background information about Maylor Corp, your role as Maylor Corp’s 
Tax Director, and a hypothetical tax research project. We anticipate it will take about 10 minutes 
to read through this information. We sincerely appreciate receiving input from individuals with 
your level of expertise, and your responses are very important to us. Thank you in advance for 
your time!  
 
Please note that the first few screens will require reading. The remaining screens will be 
mostly questions. 
 
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen. 
  
181 
 
[SCREEN 4] 
 
MAYLOR CORP & TAX DIRECTOR ROLE 
Maylor Corp is a publicly traded manufacturing company with headquarters in the United States. 
The company has operations in six U.S. states and also in a few other countries; consequently, 
the company files tax returns with numerous taxing authorities. Over the past several years, 
Maylor Corp has averaged annual gross revenue of around $200 million. Maylor Corp 
historically has had taxable income, and it does not have any net operating loss carryforwards. 
The GAAP effective tax rate generally hovers around 30 percent.  
 
Again, please envision yourself in the role of Maylor Corp’s Tax Director. You have worked as 
Maylor Corp’s Tax Director for three years. As Tax Director, you lead tax planning and tax 
compliance for Maylor Corp and manage a team of dedicated staff. You work on matters related 
to the company’s federal, international, and state income tax returns, as well as franchise, use, 
and property taxes. In addition to tax compliance responsibilities, a significant portion of your 
time is spent on tax planning, tax authority audits of federal and state income tax filings, and 
accounting for income taxes for financial statement purposes. You are satisfied with your work 
environment at Maylor Corp and feel that the company provides you with the resources 
necessary to meet your job responsibilities. Further, your opinion appears to be valued within the 
company and you currently have no plans to leave Maylor Corp. 
 
You report to the CFO and work with both the management team within Maylor Corp as well as 
third-party tax professionals external to Maylor Corp. For the last eight years, Maylor Corp’s tax 
returns have been prepared and signed by Firm A, a Big 4 accounting firm. Sizable research 
projects are often conducted in-house by Maylor Corp’s tax department and then reviewed 
by the external tax professionals at Firm A. Maylor Corp’s financial statements are audited 
by Firm A, the same Big 4 accounting firm. 
 
 
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen. 
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[SCREEN 5] 
 
CURRENT PROJECT 
You are presently working on a project to review the methods that have been used in Maylor 
Corp’s Research and Development (R&D) Credit calculations. Maylor Corp currently takes the 
R&D Credit, but the calculation is based upon an analysis conducted several years ago. After 
consultation with the CFO, it was decided that the R&D Credit calculations should be updated. 
In particular, you are considering how Maylor Corp should treat supplies related to a research 
and development project conducted during the current tax year for UltraX, a new prototype 
product. 
 
ULTRAX SUPPLIES 
Maylor Corp has spent $4.2 million on a project to develop a new prototype product, called 
UltraX. Included in this amount is $950,000 of supplies. Maylor Corp had originally purchased 
the supplies for production of the old model product, but later allocated these supplies to the 
UltraX project. Maylor Corp has not capitalized or depreciated the cost of these supplies. The 
supplies were used in the development of UltraX; however, none of the supplies were damaged 
by the development process and thus were available for reuse during subsequent production of 
UltraX. Following successful testing, Maylor Corp manufactured UltraX and is now selling it to 
customers. Including the cost of the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation would 
be advantageous for tax purposes. You need to determine if the UltraX supplies can be 
included as qualified research expenses in the R&D Credit calculation. 
 
You assign the task of gathering relevant tax authority to Maylor Corp’s tax department staff. 
Once you review the preliminary opinion of your tax department staff, you will send this 
information to the tax professionals at Firm A, a Big 4 accounting firm which is also 
Maylor Corp’s audit firm, and they will provide their recommendation on the treatment of 
UltraX supplies for the R&D credit calculation. You will then evaluate the treatment of 
UltraX supplies for the R&D credit calculation and make your decision. 
 
 
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen. 
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[SCREEN 6] 
 
TAX DEPARTMENT STAFF PRELIMINARY OPINION 
The tax department staff has evaluated whether or not the UltraX supplies should be included as 
qualified research expenses for the R&D Credit. After considering the internal revenue code, 
regulations, and other authority, Maylor Corp’s tax department staff concludes that the primary 
uncertainty regarding the treatment of the supplies relates to whether the supplies were “used in 
the conduct of qualified research.” They estimate that, should Maylor take the position that 
the supplies are a qualified research expense, there is a 60% likelihood that the position 
would be successfully upheld. The relevant authority related to whether supplies were “used” or 
not is briefly summarized below: 
 
Internal Revenue Code Section 41 indicates that qualified research expenses can include in-
house research expenses, including any amount paid or incurred for supplies used in the conduct 
of qualified research. Regulation §1.41-2(b) says that supplies are used in the conduct of 
qualified research if they are used in the performance of qualified services by an employee of the 
taxpayer; however, expenditures for supplies that are indirect research expenditures or general 
and administrative expenses do not qualify. The rules do not define indirect research 
expenditures. The IRS has adopted the position that “used” means consumed, though nowhere in 
the tax rules is used defined as consumed. The courts have thus far largely remained silent on the 
definition of “used.” Instead, courts have focused on identifying the specific business component 
for which the company is conducting qualified research, and then determining if supplies are 
used in that specific business component or a different business component. 
 
After receiving this information from your tax department, you next confer with your external 
tax advisor, Firm A. Please click below to continue to the next screen to receive Firm A’s 
recommendation. 
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[SCREEN 7] 
 
RECOMMENDATION FROM EXTERNAL TAX PROFESSIONALS 
Thank you for asking us for advice regarding your R&D Credit. We always appreciate the 
opportunity to provide tax and audit services to Maylor Corp. We have read through the 
information that your tax department staff compiled regarding the UltraX supplies and the 
calculation of Maylor Corp’s R&D Credit. In evaluating the possibility of including the UltraX 
supplies as qualified research expenses for the R&D Credit, it may be helpful to consider the 
potential disclosure requirements both for tax and financial statement purposes. Generally, 
disclosure is required in the tax return if a tax position has a reasonable basis but not substantial 
authority; however, in this case disclosure (on Schedule UTP) would be required if a reserve is 
recorded in the financial statements for taking the new tax position. Essentially, the disclosure 
threshold for including the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit would be the more-likely-than-not 
threshold for both tax and financial statement purposes.     
 
There is a great deal of ambiguity in the tax rules on the topic of supplies as qualified research 
expenses for the Research and Development Credit, thus the decision regarding the UltraX 
supplies should depend in part upon your interpretation of the risk involved and your comfort 
level. Given the facts that you provided, it appears that the inclusion of the UltraX supplies as 
qualified expenses for the R&D Credit will hinge on whether these supplies were “used” in 
qualified research. The Courts have not sufficiently defined the term “used” as it pertains to 
supplies and the R&D Credit. The Courts have not indicated that reused supplies do not qualify, 
nor is it clear that supplies must be consumed to qualify as “used” during research and 
development activities.  Given the inconclusive authority, our recommendation is that 
Maylor Corp SHOULD include the UltraX supplies in the R&D credit calculation. You 
may however conclude that you are not comfortable with including them in the calculation. 
 
 
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next page. 
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[SCREEN 8] 
 
RESPONSE SECTION I: Please respond to the following questions as if you are Maylor 
Corp’s Tax Director. 
 
 
What is the likelihood that you would include the UltraX supplies as qualified research expenses 
for Maylor Corp’s Research & Development Credit? 
 
Not 
At All 
Likely 
          
Extremely 
Likely 
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Continuing to envision yourself as Maylor Corp’s Tax Director, what do you think Maylor Corp 
should do? 
 Maylor Corp should include the UltraX supplies as qualified research expenses in the 
R&D Credit calculation.  
 Maylor Corp should not include the UltraX supplies qualified research expenses in the 
R&D Credit calculation. 
 
 
If this position was examined by the IRS, what is the likelihood that the IRS would permit the 
position that the UltraX supplies are qualified research expenses for Maylor Corp’s Research & 
Development Credit? 
 
Not 
At All 
Likely 
          
Extremely 
Likely 
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To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The advice from Firm A 
is what I was expecting. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
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[SCREEN 9] 
 
Please continue to respond to the following questions as if you are Maylor Corp’s Tax 
Director. 
 
 
How certain would you want to be of your tax position before including the UltraX supplies as 
qualified research expenses for the R&D Credit? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
 
 
 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the recommendation of the external tax 
professionals? 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Somewhat Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Somewhat Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
How confident are you in the advice provided by the external tax professionals at Firm A? 
 Extremely Confident 
 Moderately Confident 
 Somewhat Confident 
 Slightly Confident 
 Not At All Confident 
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[SCREEN 10] 
 
RESPONSE SECTION II: In this study, Maylor Corp engages external tax professionals at 
Firm A, which is also Maylor Corp’s audit firm, to assist with the tax work. Please answer the 
following items as you think a corporation’s external tax professionals would respond in 
arrangements such as this when the corporation’s external tax professionals are from the audit 
firm.  
 
 [Client Advocacy] 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
In an instance where no judicial 
authority exists with respect to an 
issue and where the Code and 
Regulations are ambiguous, tax 
professionals should believe that the 
taxpayer is entitled to take the most 
favorable tax treatment. 
       
Generally speaking, tax professionals' 
loyalties should be first to the tax 
system, then to the taxpayer. 
       
Tax professionals should apply 
ambiguous tax law to the taxpayer's 
benefit. 
       
When examining a tax return, tax 
professionals should point out to 
taxpayers reasonable positions they 
could have taken which would have 
contributed to minimizing their tax 
liability. 
       
Tax professionals should believe it is 
important to encourage the taxpayer 
to pay the least amount of taxes 
payable. 
       
Tax professionals should always 
interpret unclear/ambiguous laws in 
favor of the taxpayer. 
       
Tax professionals should use trends 
in the law by trying to establish a 
pattern of more favorable treatment 
for the taxpayer and then extending 
the pattern to the taxpayer's position. 
       
Where no judicial authority exists 
with respect to an issue, tax 
professionals should feel that the 
taxpayer is entitled to take the most 
favorable tax treatment.  
       
Tax professionals should structure 
transactions in ways that yield the 
best tax result, even if the law is 
unclear in an area.  
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[SCREEN 11] 
 
[Manipulation Check Questions] 
 
Regarding your role as Maylor Corp’s Tax Director, which best describes the external tax 
professionals that provided advice about the UltraX supplies?  
 Tax professionals at Firm A, which is also Maylor Corp’s audit firm 
 Tax professionals at Firm A, which is not Maylor Corp’s audit firm 
 
 
 
Which of the following is more accurate based upon the tax scenario? 
 You were advised by the tax professionals at Firm A that Maylor Corp SHOULD include 
the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation. 
 You were advised by the tax professionals at Firm A that Maylor Corp SHOULD NOT 
include the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation. 
 
 
 
The tax professionals at Firm A advised you about whether or not the UltraX supplies should be 
included in the R&D Credit calculation. Please evaluate the recommendation of the tax 
professionals at Firm A.  
 Very Aggressive 
 Aggressive 
 Somewhat Aggressive 
 Neither Aggressive nor Conservative 
 Somewhat Conservative 
 Conservative 
 Very Conservative 
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[SCREEN 12] 
 
[Demographic Questions] 
 
To help us categorize your responses, can you please answer a few final questions about 
yourself. All responses will be completely anonymous.  
 
 
 
Please indicate your present job title within the company. 
 Chief Financial Officer 
 Vice President, Tax 
 Tax Director 
 Tax Controller 
 Tax Manager 
 Other (please specify)___________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Which best describes the company for which you currently work?  
 Domestic US only; Operations in one state    
 Domestic US only; Operations in multiple states 
 Multinational based in the US   
 Multinational based outside of the US 
 Other (please specify)___________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Regarding the company for which you currently work, which best describes the company’s 
general attitude towards Federal income taxation?  
 Very Aggressive 
 Aggressive 
 Somewhat Aggressive 
 Neither Aggressive nor Conservative 
 Somewhat Conservative 
 Conservative 
 Very Conservative 
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Regarding your company’s approach to US income tax reporting, how important is minimizing 
the company’s risk of controversy with the IRS?  
 Extremely Important 
 Moderately Important 
 Somewhat Important 
 Slightly Important 
 Not At All Important 
 
 
 
Does your company produce financial statements that are audited by a public accounting firm?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
 
[Show this item if the response to the previous item is “Yes”] 
Does the same public accounting firm engaged to audit your company’s financial statements also 
provide your company with tax services?  
 Yes   
 No 
 
 
 
How much of your company’s tax planning and compliance work is handled by third-party tax 
professionals (rather than in-house)?  
 
None 
          
All 
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192 
 
[Show this item if the response to the previous item is not “0%”] 
How important are each of the following factors in the selection of your company’s current tax 
service provider? 
 Not at all 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Moderately 
Important 
Extremely 
Important 
 
Expertise in your company’s industry 
 
     
 
History of established relationship with your company 
 
     
 
Fees for total accounting and tax services 
 
     
 
Independence from the audit firm 
 
     
 
 
 
 [Show this item if the response to the previous item is “0%”] 
If your company were to hire a third-party tax service provider, how important would each of the 
following factors be in the selection of a tax service provider? 
 Not at all 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Moderately 
Important 
Extremely 
Important 
 
Expertise in your company’s industry 
 
     
 
History of established relationship with your company 
 
     
 
Fees for total accounting and tax services 
 
     
 
Independence from the audit firm 
 
     
 
 
Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the Research and Development 
Credit?     
 Extremely Familiar 
 Moderately Familiar 
 Somewhat Familiar 
 Slightly Familiar 
 Not At All Familiar 
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Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the tax authority relating to 
supplies as qualified research expenses for the Research and Development Credit? 
 Extremely Familiar 
 Moderately Familiar 
 Somewhat Familiar 
 Slightly Familiar 
 Not At All Familiar 
 
 
 
Are you a Certified Public Accountant? 
 Yes   
 No 
 
 
 
How much total work experience have you had in the area of taxation?     
 No tax experience 
 Less than 3 years 
 3 to less than 5 years 
 5 to less than 7 years 
 7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______ 
 
 
 
Have you worked in public accounting? 
 Yes   
 No 
 
 
 
[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”] 
What size public accounting firm did you work for? Check all that apply. 
 Big 4 
 International/National 
 Regional/Local 
 Sole Proprietorship 
 Other (please specify)___________________________________________ 
   
 
 
  
194 
 
[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”] 
How much public accounting work experience have you had in taxation?     
 No work experience in tax 
 Less than 3 years 
 3 to less than 5 years 
 5 to less than 7 years 
 7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______ 
 
 
 
[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”] 
How much public accounting work experience have you had in auditing?     
 No work experience in auditing 
 Less than 3 years 
 3 to less than 5 years 
 5 to less than 7 years 
 7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______ 
 
 
 
If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return, how certain would 
you want to be of your tax position before taking a deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
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195 
 
If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return and engaged a paid 
tax preparer for assistance, how certain would you want your paid preparer to be of your tax 
position before taking a deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
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What is your gender?     
 Male 
 Female 
 
 
 
What is your age? 
 Less than 35 
 35 - 44 
 45 - 54 
 55 - 64 
 65 and over 
 I would prefer not to answer 
 
 
 
What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
 High School 
 Bachelor’s or other undergraduate-level degree 
 Master’s or other graduate-level degree 
 Doctoral degree or other advanced graduate work 
 I would prefer not to answer 
 
 
Please make any comments that you think would be helpful in understanding your responses. 
 
 
 
Thank you so much for your participation!  
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APPENDIX C: STUDY 2 TABLES  
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Table 9: Demographics 
(n = 58) 
     n    % 
Age   
 21-25 37 63.8 
 26-30 14 24.1 
 31-35 4 6.9 
 Over 35 3 5.2 
    
Gender    
 Male 33 56.9 
 Female 25 43.1 
    
Work Experience in Public Accounting - All   
 No public accounting experience 24 41.4 
 Less than 6 months 21 36.2 
 6 months – 12 months 7 12.1 
 Greater than 1 year 6 10.3 
    
Work Experience in Public Accounting - Tax   
 No public accounting experience in tax 38 65.5 
 Less than 6 months 12 20.7 
 6 months – 12 months 4 6.9 
 Greater than 1 year 4 6.9 
    
Preparation of Most Recent Personal Tax Return   
 Prepared own return 37 63.8 
 Hired a paid preparer 12 20.7 
 Friend or relative prepared 7 12.1 
 Did not need to file  2 3.4 
    
Number of Tax Classes Taken   
 1-2  39 67.2 
 3-4  8 13.8 
 5+  11 19.0 
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics by Tax Advisor Role: Means (Standard Deviation) 
 
 Advocate Overseer Total 
Number of Observations 32 26 58 
Likelihood 57.81% (31.90) 50.77% (31.74) 54.66% (31.75) 
Trait Regulatory Focus 14.28 (11.63) 17.00 (9.59) 15.50 (10.76) 
Perceived Client Advocacy 43.13* (8.79) 37.73 (5.69) 40.71 (7.97) 
IRS Permits  29.38% (25.39) 31.15% (29.03) 30.17% (26.85) 
Tax Risk Preference 25.63% (18.48) 25.38% (22.67) 25.51% (20.28) 
 
* Mean of Perceived Client Advocacy in the advocate condition is significantly greater than overseer condition (p < 0.01, two-
tailed) 
  
Variable Definitions: 
Tax Advisor Role is manipulated by characterizing Sullivan-Reed Corp’s external tax advisor as either an “advocate” or an 
“overseer” to induce a regulatory focus state. In the Advocate condition (promotion focus state), participants are informed that 
the company’s CFO states “the primary objective of hiring the external tax professionals at Firm A is to help Sullivan-Reed Corp 
find the most advantageous tax opportunities in achieving our 30 percent target effective tax rate. In fact, we have continued to 
employ Firm A’s tax services primarily due to the Firm’s eagerness and resourcefulness in seeking optimal tax outcomes.” In the 
Overseer condition (prevention focus state), participants are informed that the company’s CFO states “the primary objective of 
hiring the external tax professionals at Firm A is to make sure Sullivan-Reed Corp follows the tax rules in achieving our 30 
percent target effective tax rate. In fact, we have continued to employ Firm A’s tax services primarily due to the Firm’s vigilance 
and attention to detail in maintaining tax compliance.” 
 
Likelihood is measured by asking, “What is the likelihood that you would recommend that Sullivan-Reed Corp include the hot 
cocoa set product line in the Domestic Production Activities Deduction?” Likelihood uses an eleven-point scale with labeled 
points ranging from 0% “Not At All Likely” to 100% “Extremely Likely.” Likelihood is presented as a percentage. Greater 
likelihood of including the expenses indicates greater tax aggressiveness. 
 
Trait Regulatory Focus is measured using an eighteen item scale (Lockwood et al 2002). Nine of the items measure promotion 
focus and the other nine items measure prevention focus. Each of the items use a seven-point Likert-type scale with labeled 
points ranging from 1 “Strongly Disagree” to 7 “Strongly Agree.” Trait Regulatory Focus is the sum of the promotion focus 
items, less the sum of the prevention focus items and could theoretically range from -56 to 56.    
 
Perceived Client Advocacy is measured as the sum of a nine item scale adapted from the Mason and Levy (2001) measure of 
client advocacy. Each of the items use a seven-point Likert-type scale with labeled points ranging from 1 “Strongly Disagree” to 
7 “Strongly Agree.” Greater Client Advocacy scores reflect a stronger belief that the tax advisor in the experimental scenario is a 
client advocate. 
 
IRS Permits is measured by asking participants, “In your opinion, if this position was examined by the IRS, what is the likelihood 
that the IRS would uphold the position that Sullivan Reed Corp’s hot cocoa set product line qualifies for the Domestic Production 
Activities Deduction?” IRS Permits uses an eleven-point scale with labeled points ranging from 0% “Not At All Likely” to 100% 
“Extremely Likely.” Lower perceived likelihood that the IRS would permit the tax position represents greater perceived riskiness 
of the tax position. 
 
Tax Risk Preference is measured by asking “As Sullivan-Reed’s tax department staff, how certain would you want to be of your 
tax position before including the hot cocoa set product line in the Domestic Production Activities Deduction?” The item uses an 
eleven-point scale with labeled points ranging from 0% “Not At All Certain” to 100% “Extremely Certain.” Responses are 
reverse coded such that a greater score reflects a greater risk preference (i.e., a preference for more uncertainty).  
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Table 11: Correlation Coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1. Likelihood 1 0.180 0.111 0.196 0.426 0.123 
2. Trait Regulatory Focus 0.179 1 -0.120 0.072 -0.035 -0.021 
3. Tax Advisor Role 0.111 -0.127 1 0.326 -0.007 0.039 
4. Perceived Client Advocacy 0.109 0.048 0.340 1 -0.091 0.189 
5. IRS Permits  0.489 -0.128 -0.033 -0.131 1 0.104 
6. Tax Risk Preference  0.139 -0.031 0.006 0.137 0.098 1 
 
Notes:  
Table values are Spearman’s Rho above the diagonal and Pearson Correlation Coefficients below the diagonal. 
Bold correlations are significant at p < 0.05 (two-tailed). 
See Table 10 for variable definitions.  
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Table 12: Regression Results: Dependent Variable – Likelihood 
 Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-statistic p-value 
Constant 0.220 0.116 1.901 0.063 
Trait Regulatory Focus 0.005 0.006 0.933 0.355 
Tax Advisor Role 0.037 0.134 0.276 0.784 
Trait Regulatory Focus x Tax Advisor Role 0.004 0.007 0.583 0.563 
IRS Permits  0.638 0.136 4.683   < 0.000  
     
Adjusted R2 0.278    
F Statistic 6.484    
n 58    
 
Notes:  
All p-values are two-tailed. 
See Table 10 for variable definitions.  
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Table 13: Supplemental Analysis: Mediation Analysis Using PROCESS Procedure 
Panel A: Regression of Perceived Client Advocacy on Tax Advisor Role  
 Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-statistic p-value 
Constant 37.731 1.483 25.440    < 0.000  
Tax Advisor Role 5.394 1.997 2.702 0.009 
     
R2 0.115    
F Statistic 7.299    
n 58    
 
Panel B: Regression of Likelihood on Perceived Client Advocacy, Tax Advisor Role,  
Trait Regulatory Focus, Perceived Client Advocacy x Trait Regulatory Focus, and  
IRS Permits   
 Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-statistic p-value 
Constant 0.548 0.291 1.882 0.066 
Perceived Client Advocacy -0.008 0.007 -1.166 0.249 
Tax Advisor Role 0.063 0.073 0.871 0.388 
Trait Regulatory Focus -0.039 0.019 -2.117 0.039 
Perceived Client Advocacy x  
Trait Regulatory Focus 0.001 0.001 2.564 0.013 
IRS Permits 0.549 0.133 4.137    < 0.000  
     
R2 0.413    
F Statistic 7.302    
n 58    
 
Panel C: Conditional Indirect Effect of Tax Advisor Role on Likelihood at Values of  
Trait Regulatory Focus* 
 
 
 
Bootstrapped 95% Confidence 
Interval (1000 iterations) 
Trait Regulatory Focus Indirect Effect Boot SE Lower Limit Upper Limit 
4.7407 -0.0135 0.0323 -0.0899 0.0283 
15.5000 0.0533 0.0352 0.0025 0.1474 
26.2593 0.1200 0.0687 0.0189 0.2991 
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Panel D: Index of Moderated Mediation   
  
Bootstrapped 95% Confidence 
Interval (1000 iterations) 
Indirect Effect Boot SE Lower Limit Upper Limit 
0.0062 0.0038 0.0007 0.0154 
 
Notes:  
*Values for the mediator, Trait Regulatory Focus, are the mean and plus/minus one SD from mean. 
Mediation Analysis uses PROCESS procedure (Hayes 2013). 
All p-values are two-tailed. 
See Table 10 for variable definitions.  
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APPENDIX D: STUDY 2 EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS  
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Condition 1: Advocate 
[SCREEN 1] 
 
Explanation of Research 
Title of Project: Corporate Tax and Individual Decision Making 
Principal Investigator: Bonnie Brown 
Faculty Supervisor: Vicky Arnold 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research project conducted by Bonnie Brown, Doctoral 
Candidate, and Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor. You will be asked to answer questions 
that will take about 20 minutes of your time. The purpose of this research is to examine 
judgments related to corporate taxation. You will be asked to read a tax scenario involving a 
hypothetical corporation. You will then be provided with some tax authority guidance and be 
asked to answer questions about the tax scenario.  
 
Please note that participation in this study is completely voluntary and your responses will be 
completely anonymous. If you decide to participate, you have the right to withdraw your consent 
or discontinue participation at any time. There are no anticipated potential risks associated with 
this study. You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.  
 
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints you may contact: Bonnie Brown, Doctoral 
Candidate, Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 
823-1478 or by email at bonnie.brown@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor, 
Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, at (407) 823-3192 
or by email at vicky.arnold@ucf.edu.  
 
Since this research involves human participants, it has been reviewed and approved by the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Central Florida. For information about the 
rights of people who take part in research, please contact: Institutional Review Board, University 
of Central Florida, Office of Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 
501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at (407) 823-2901. 
 
 
By clicking ">>" you are indicating that you wish to participate in this study. 
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[SCREEN 2] 
 
YOUR TASK 
As a participant in this study, you will be asked to read a hypothetical scenario and then respond 
to questions related to the scenario, share your attitudes and opinions in general, and provide 
demographic information. 
  
We ask that you place yourself into the role of a tax professional employed by a hypothetical 
corporation, Sullivan-Reed Corp. Over the next several screens you will read background 
information about Sullivan-Reed Corp, your role within Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax department, 
and a hypothetical tax research project. So that we do not take up too much of your time, we 
have not included all of the information you would typically have when making similar 
decisions. However, the information provided should be sufficient to make an informed 
judgment. We sincerely appreciate receiving your input, and your responses are very important 
to us. Thank you in advance for your time! 
 
Please note that the first few screens will require reading that should take about 10 to 15 
minutes. The remaining screens will be mostly questions. 
 
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen. 
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[SCREEN 3] 
 
SULLIVAN-REED CORP & TAX DEPARTMENT 
Sullivan-Reed Corp is a publicly traded manufacturing company with headquarters in the United 
States. The company has operations in six U.S. states and also in a few other countries; 
consequently, the company files tax returns with numerous taxing authorities. Over the past 
several years, Sullivan-Reed Corp has averaged annual gross receipts of around $200 million. 
Sullivan-Reed Corp historically has had taxable income, and it does not have any net operating 
loss carryforwards. The GAAP effective tax rate generally hovers around 30 percent. Sullivan-
Reed Corp’s in-house tax department coordinates the company’s tax function, outsourcing some 
of the work to third-party tax professionals. Within the company, the Tax Director leads tax 
planning and compliance and is supported by a dedicated team of tax department staff. In 
addition to income tax compliance responsibilities, the tax department is also responsible for tax 
planning, tax authority audits of federal and state income tax filings, and accounting for income 
taxes for financial statement purposes.  
 
You have served as an in-house tax department staff member for a year and a half. You primarily 
assist with matters related to the company’s income tax returns - federal, state/local, and 
international filings. You report to the Tax Director, who reports to the CFO and works with both 
the management team within Sullivan-Reed Corp as well as third-party tax professionals external 
to Sullivan-Reed Corp. For the last eight years, Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax returns have been 
prepared and signed by Firm A, a Big 4 accounting firm. Sullivan-Reed Corp’s financial 
statements are audited by a different Big 4 accounting firm. Research projects are often 
conducted in-house by Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax department and then reviewed by the external 
tax professionals at Firm A.  
 
In a recent staff meeting, the CFO of Sullivan-Reed Corp stated that “the primary objective of 
hiring the external tax professionals at Firm A is to help Sullivan-Reed Corp find the most 
advantageous tax opportunities in achieving our 30 percent target effective tax rate. In fact, we 
have continued to employ Firm A’s tax services primarily due to the Firm’s eagerness and 
resourcefulness in seeking optimal tax outcomes.”  
 
 
Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above. 
 I have read the information  
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[SCREEN 4] 
 
CURRENT PROJECT 
You are presently working on a project related to a new product line that Sullivan-Reed Corp 
introduced during the current tax year. The new product line consists of hot cocoa sets containing 
gourmet melting chocolate (dark and milk chocolate) on stir sticks, handcrafted marshmallows, 
and mix-ins such as peppermint sugar sprinkles, cinnamon candies, hot fudge, and caramel 
sauce. The company conducts market research to predict successful item combinations for the 
hot cocoa sets. Sullivan-Reed Corp does not manufacture any of the hot cocoa set components; 
rather the company purchases all of the prepackaged items (chocolate, marshmallows, and mix-
ins) as well as oversized deluxe mugs and filler packaging from various vendors. The company 
has no input into the design of any hot cocoa set items, filler, or packaging. Further, they 
purchase these items in bulk “off the shelf” from vendors. Sullivan-Reed Corp developed design 
templates to standardize the assembly of the hot cocoa sets. Company employees arrange the 
individually packaged items in the mugs according to the design templates to create the hot 
cocoa sets.       
 
You have been assigned the task of determining if the activities associated with assembling 
the hot cocoa set product line are eligible for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction. 
Sullivan-Reed Corp has previously taken the Domestic Production Activities Deduction for other 
products; however, prior to the new hot cocoa set product line, the company had only 
manufactured products onsite. The production process for the hot cocoa sets (purchase premade 
components and assemble onsite) differs substantially from actually manufacturing products 
onsite. Including the hot cocoa set in the Domestic Production Activities Deduction would be 
advantageous for tax purposes.   
 
After doing some initial research, you have identified five particularly relevant items. Summaries 
and excerpts of these authorities are displayed on the next screens.  
 
 
Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above. 
 I have read the information 
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[SCREEN 5] 
 
RELEVANT TAX AUTHORITY 
Summaries and excerpts from the relevant authorities you have found (listed below) are provided 
on the next several screens. Please read these authorities to make your recommendation about 
whether Sullivan-Reed Corp should take the Domestic Production Activities Deduction for the 
hot cocoa set product line. Please note there is no back button; however, you will have an 
opportunity later to review the tax authority and information about the hot cocoa product line 
again before making your recommendation.  
 
A. Internal Revenue Code Section 199 (Effective January 1, 2005) 
B. Regulation §1.199-3(e) (Effective June 1, 2006) 
C. United States v. Dean (May 7, 2013) 
D. Proposed Amendment to Regulation §1.199-3 (August 27, 2015) 
E. Precision Dose, Inc. v. United States (September 24, 2015) 
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[SCREEN 6] 
 
A.   Internal Revenue Code Section 199 
 
How is the Domestic Production Activities Deduction calculated? 
There shall be allowed as a deduction an amount equal to 9 percent of the lesser of the qualified 
production activities income of the taxpayer for the taxable year, or taxable income (determined 
without regard to this section) for the taxable year (Sec. 199(a)). The amount of the deduction 
allowable under subsection (a) for any taxable year shall not exceed 50 percent of the W-2 wages 
of the taxpayer for the taxable year (Sec. 199(b)(1)). 
 
What activities qualify for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction?  
…any lease, rental, license, sale, exchange, or other disposition of qualifying production 
property which was manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted by the taxpayer in whole or 
in significant part within the United States… (Sec. 199(c)(4)). 
 
How is “manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted” (MPGE) defined? What activities 
qualify as MPGE activities? 
The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out the purposes of this 
section… (Sec. 199(d)(10)). 
 
 
Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above. 
 I have read the information  
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[SCREEN 7] 
 
B.   Regulation §1.199-3(e): Definition of manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted 
 
(1) In general.—…the term MPGE includes manufacturing, producing, growing, extracting, 
installing, developing, improving, and creating QPP [qualified production property]; making 
QPP out of scrap, salvage, or junk material as well as from new or raw material by processing, 
manipulating, refining, or changing the form of an article, or by combining or assembling two or 
more articles…  
 
(2) Packaging, repackaging, labeling, or minor assembly.— If a taxpayer packages, 
repackages, labels, or performs minor assembly of QPP [qualified production property] and the 
taxpayer engages in no other MPGE activity with respect to that QPP, the taxpayer's packaging, 
repackaging, labeling, or minor assembly does not qualify as MPGE with respect to that QPP. 
 
 
Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above. 
 I have read the information  
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[SCREEN 8] 
 
C.   United States v. Dean, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (U.S. District Court, C.D. Cal. May 7, 2013) 
 
Summary of United States v. Dean:  
Houdini, Inc., a company engaged in the design, assembly, and sale of gift baskets and gift 
towers, claimed deductions for domestic production activities. Houdini, Inc. argued that they 
manufactured or produced gift baskets and gift towers. The government argued that Houdini, 
Inc. was merely packaging and repackaging products, activities which would not qualify as 
MPGE (“manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted”). The Court rejected the government’s 
argument. The court stated that “the final products, gift baskets and towers, are distinct in form 
and purpose from the individual items inside.” The Court reasoned that Houdini, Inc.’s 
production process changed the form of the product in accordance with the definition of MPGE 
within Treasury Regulation §1.199-3.  
 
Excerpts from United States v. Dean:  
In 1989, Dean and O'Brien incorporated their business as Houdini, Inc. (“Houdini”). Houdini 
describes its business as the design, assembly, and sale of gift baskets and gift towers through 
both wholesale and retail channels. A “gift tower” is a set of decorative boxes into which 
different food items are placed. During the holiday season, Houdini can complete up to 80,000 
baskets in a day.  
… 
Designing a Houdini gift basket involves, among other things, selecting the basket and the items 
to be placed inside, as well as the “void fill” that holds everything together. Houdini orders its 
baskets from suppliers in China. When it orders baskets, Houdini reviews samples and then 
provides the manufacturer with exact specifications for them. Houdini also purchases containers 
from suppliers in the United States. The void fill in a Houdini gift basket is a cardboard form or  
Styrofoam base that is placed inside the basket; the other items are in turn placed inside. Houdini 
generally designs the cardboard forms, indicating where the cuts and folds should be made; it 
then hires another company to make the cardboard forms.  
… 
Houdini purchases the items that are placed inside the baskets from other companies.  
… 
Houdini's assembly line consists of workers who place the individual food items into baskets in 
accordance with detailed work instructions prepared by Houdini. In preparing a finished gift 
basket, employees at several different stations on the line put different items into the basket. 
After the items have been placed inside the basket, a plastic wrapping is heated to shrink around 
the basket. Once the plastic wrapping is completed, a bow is placed on the basket, if called for in 
the design of the basket. For a gift tower, the food-safe packages are placed directly into 
decorative boxes. The boxes in the gift tower are then connected either through cardboard tabs or 
through sticky-dot adhesives.  
… 
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Defendants argue that Houdini's production process “chang[es] the form of an article” within the 
meaning of Treasury Regulation §1.199-3(e)(1). The Court agrees. Houdini first selects various 
items—chocolates, cookies, candy, cheeses, crackers, wine or alcohol, packaging materials, and 
a basket or boxes—for its final products. Next, the individual items are assembled in a gift basket 
or gift tower based on one of many detailed plans. This complex production process relies on 
both assembly line workers and machines. The final products, gift baskets and gift towers, are 
distinct in form and purpose from the individual items inside. The individual items would 
typically be purchased by consumers as ordinary groceries. But after Houdini's production 
process, they are transformed into a gift that is usually given during the holiday season.  
 
 
Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above. 
 I have read the information  
213 
 
[SCREEN 9] 
 
D.   Proposed Amendment to Regulation §1.199-3, August 27, 2015  
(Proposed Regulations do not have the force of the law and carry little weight in the litigation 
process until they are finalized, however they do reflect the IRS’s position on an issue.) 
 
Section 1.199-3(e)(2) provides that if a taxpayer packages, repackages, labels, or performs minor 
assembly of QPP [qualified production property] and the taxpayer engages in no other MPGE 
activities with respect to that QPP, the taxpayer's packaging, repackaging, labeling, or minor 
assembly does not qualify as MPGE with respect to that QPP. This rule has been the subject of 
recent litigation. See United States v. Dean, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (concluding 
that the taxpayer's activity of preparing gift baskets was a manufacturing activity and not solely 
packaging or repackaging for purposes of section 199). The Treasury Department and the IRS 
disagree with the interpretation of §1.199-3(e)(2) adopted by the court in United States v. Dean, 
and the proposed regulations add an example (Example 9) that illustrates the appropriate 
application of this rule in a situation in which the taxpayer is engaged in no other MPGE 
activities with respect to the QPP other than those described in §1.199-3(e)(2). 
… 
Example 9. X is in the business of selling gift baskets containing various products that are 
packaged together. X purchases the baskets and the products included within the baskets from 
unrelated third parties. X plans where and how the products should be arranged into the baskets. 
On an assembly line in a gift basket production facility, X arranges the products into the baskets 
according to that plan, sometimes relabeling the products before placing them into the baskets. X 
engages in no other activity besides packaging, repackaging, labeling, or minor assembly with 
respect to the gift baskets. Therefore, X is not considered to have engaged in the MPGE of 
QPP under paragraph (e)(2) of this section. 
 
 
Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above. 
 I have read the information  
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[SCREEN 10] 
 
E.   Precision Dose, Inc. v. United States, No. 3:12-cv-50180 (U.S. District Court, N.D. Ill. 
September 24, 2015) 
 
Summary of Precision Dose, Inc. v. United States:  
Precision Dose, Inc. purchased certain drugs in bulk and then sold them as unit doses (drugs in 
single-dose containers). The company had a complex production process involving extensive 
research about demand for medications, appropriate materials for containers, and drug storage. 
The company worked with vendors to produce containers according to precise specifications and 
dedicated significant resources to dose standardization and process documentation. As in United 
States v. Dean, the government argued that the company was merely packaging and repackaging 
products, activities which would not qualify as MPGE (“manufactured, produced, grown, or 
extracted”). The Court determined that Precision Dose, Inc. engaged in a “complex production 
process” that resulted in a “distinct final product” and permitted the domestic production activity 
deduction. 
 
Excerpts from Precision Dose, Inc. v. United States:  
The facts show plaintiff looks for drugs it believes it can successfully process into and sell as unit 
doses. Drug manufacturers do not seek bids from companies to repackage their drugs into small 
packages. Plaintiff engages in market research to determine which drugs to buy to turn into unit 
doses. Plaintiff works with potential customers to identify needs for new unit dose products. 
Plaintiff acquires sample drugs and tests them for suitability to be processed into unit doses. 
Plaintiff prepares specifications and works with vendors to develop cups and syringes that are 
suitable to use for unit doses for each drug that it buys. Sometimes existing cups or syringes are 
used and sometimes new ones are created through the joint efforts of plaintiff's personnel and 
vendor personnel. Plaintiff conducts mixing studies to determine the best mixing procedures to 
use to obtain the proper suspension of the active ingredient in each unit dose and whether the 
drug can be mixed in such a way that the proper suspension can be obtained at all. It tests plastics 
to determine compatibility with specific drugs for use in the cups or syringes. The cups, lidding, 
trays and product inserts are produced by vendors using plaintiff's proprietary design. For cups 
for which plaintiff owns the designs vendors use molds owned by plaintiff to produce the cups, 
for trays, which are designed by plaintiff, vendors use molds owned by plaintiff. For lidding 
which is designed by plaintiff, the vendors use cutting dies owned by plaintiff. 
… 
This brief recitation of portions of plaintiff's activities in producing the unit doses show, that like 
in Dean, plaintiff engages in a “complex production process that results in a distinct final 
product.” The government argues Dean is wrongly decided. It contends the Dean court failed to 
understand that all Houdini's activities were just part of the repackaging process and thus did not 
take those activities outside the (e)(2) exception. However, the court disagrees. Dean correctly 
determined that Houdini was creating an entirely new product – a gift basket or gift tower – 
which was not simply a method of repackaging the components included in the baskets or 
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towers. A gift basket is not simply a container of stuff – like a grocery cart in which the items 
had been dropped when pulled from the shelf. It is a unique product itself. Likewise, a unit dose 
is a unique product. Plaintiff is entitled to the Section 199 deduction. 
 
 
Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above. 
 I have read the information  
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[SCREEN 11] 
 
Now that you have reviewed these authorities, you will be asked to evaluate whether the hot 
cocoa set product line is eligible for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction and make 
your recommendation to the Tax Director. After receiving your recommendation, the Tax 
Director will likely consult the company’s external tax professionals at Firm A who were hired 
to help the company find the most advantageous tax opportunities.  
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[SCREEN 12] 
 
RESPONSE SECTION I: Please respond to the following questions as if you are a member 
of Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax department staff. 
 
 
For your reference, the relevant tax authority is provided again below. Clicking "Review Tax 
Authority" will allow you to open a PDF document in a separate window. 
 
Review Tax Authority 
 
 
 
Information about your current project, the hot cocoa set product line, is provided again below. 
Clicking "Review Current Project Facts" will allow you to open a PDF document in a separate 
window. 
 
Review Current Project Facts 
 
 
 
What is the likelihood that you would recommend that Sullivan-Reed Corp include the hot cocoa 
set product line in the Domestic Production Activities Deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Likely 
          
Extremely 
Likely 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
 
 
 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The hot cocoa set product 
line is eligible for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
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In your opinion, if this position was examined by the IRS, what is the likelihood that the IRS 
would uphold the position that Sullivan Reed Corp’s hot cocoa set product line qualifies for the 
Domestic Production Activities Deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Likely 
          
Extremely 
Likely 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
 
 
 
In your opinion, if this position was examined in court, what is the likelihood that the Court 
would uphold the position that Sullivan Reed Corp’s hot cocoa set product line qualifies for the 
Domestic Production Activities Deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Likely 
          
Extremely 
Likely 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
 
 
 
As Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax department staff, how certain would you want to be of your tax 
position before including the hot cocoa set product line in the Domestic Production Activities 
Deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
219 
 
[SCREEN 13] 
 
How important were each of the following authorities in your evaluation of whether the hot 
cocoa set product line is eligible for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction? 
 
 Not at all 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Moderately 
Important 
Extremely 
Important 
Internal Revenue Code Section 199       
Regulation §1.199-3(e)       
United States v. Dean (Gift baskets)      
Proposed Amendment to Regulation §1.199-3      
Precision Dose, Inc. v. United States (Unit doses)      
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[SCREEN 14] 
 
These statements relate to your job at Sullivan-Reed Corp. Continuing to envision yourself as a 
member of Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax department staff, please rate how often you could imagine 
yourself focusing on these thoughts and activities while you are working.   
  
[Regulatory Focus State: Regulatory Focus at Work Scale (RWS)] 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Constantly 
I focus on…      
Following rules and regulations at work       
Completing work tasks correctly       
Doing my duty at work       
My work responsibilities       
Fulfilling my work obligations       
The details of my work       
Accomplishing a lot at work       
Getting my work done no matter what       
Getting a lot of work finished in a short amount of 
time      
Work activities that allow me to get ahead at work      
My work accomplishments       
How many job tasks I can complete       
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[SCREEN 15] 
 
In this study, Sullivan-Reed Corp engages external tax professionals at Firm A to assist with the 
tax work. Please answer the following items as you think Sullivan-Reed Corp’s external tax 
professionals at Firm A would respond.   
 
 [Client Advocacy] 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
In an instance where no judicial 
authority exists with respect to 
an issue and where the Code and 
Regulations are ambiguous, tax 
professionals should believe that 
the taxpayer is entitled to take 
the most favorable tax treatment. 
       
Generally speaking, tax 
professionals' loyalties should be 
first to the tax system, then to 
the taxpayer. 
       
Tax professionals should apply 
ambiguous tax law to the 
taxpayer's benefit. 
       
When examining a tax return, 
tax professionals should point 
out to taxpayers reasonable 
positions they could have taken 
which would have contributed to 
minimizing their tax liability. 
       
Tax professionals should believe 
it is important to encourage the 
taxpayer to pay the least amount 
of taxes payable. 
       
Tax professionals should always 
interpret unclear/ambiguous 
laws in favor of the taxpayer. 
       
Tax professionals should use 
trends in the law by trying to 
establish a pattern of more 
favorable treatment for the 
taxpayer and then extending the 
pattern to the taxpayer's position. 
       
Where no judicial authority 
exists with respect to an issue, 
tax professionals should feel that 
the taxpayer is entitled to take 
the most favorable tax treatment.  
       
Tax professionals should 
structure transactions in ways 
that yield the best tax result, 
even if the law is unclear in an 
area.  
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[SCREEN 16] 
 
[Manipulation Check Question] 
 
Based upon the tax scenario, which of the following more accurately describes the primary 
function of Sullivan-Reed Corp’s external tax professionals at Firm A?  
 
The primary function of the tax professionals at Firm A is to… 
 find the most advantageous tax opportunities for Sullivan-Reed Corp 
 make sure Sullivan-Reed Corp follows the tax rules 
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[SCREEN 17] 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS: Now moving away from the scenario, please provide the 
following information. All responses to this survey are anonymous and confidential.  
 
How many tax classes have you taken? Include the current semester. 
 0 
 1 - 2 
 3 - 4 
 5 or more 
 
 
 
Please select your graduate degree program. 
 MACC, Tax Track 
 MACC, BMA Track 
 MSA  
 Other (Please specify)_________ 
 
 
 
Do you plan to work in taxation?     
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
 
How much total work experience have you had in public accounting? 
 No experience in public accounting 
 Less than 6 months 
 6 – 12 months 
 More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________ 
 
 
 
How much work experience have you had in public accounting, specifically in tax? 
 No tax experience in public accounting 
 Less than 6 months 
 6 – 12 months 
 More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________ 
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What size public accounting firm did you work for? Check all that apply. 
 No experience in public accounting 
 Big 4 
 International/National 
 Regional/Local 
 Sole Proprietorship 
 Other (Please specify)_________ 
 
 
 
Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the Domestic Production 
Activities Deduction?     
 Very Familiar 
 Familiar 
 Neither Familiar nor Unfamiliar 
 Unfamiliar 
 Very Unfamiliar 
 
 
 
Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the tax authority relating to 
activities that qualify for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction? 
 Very Familiar 
 Familiar 
 Neither Familiar nor Unfamiliar 
 Unfamiliar 
 Very Unfamiliar 
 
 
 
If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return, how certain would 
you want to be of your tax position before taking a deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return and engaged a paid 
tax preparer for assistance, how certain would you want your paid preparer to be of your tax 
position before taking a deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
 
 
 
Who prepared your most recent individual income tax return? 
 I prepared my own tax return 
 I hired a paid preparer 
 A friend or relative prepared my tax return 
 I do not file a tax return 
 Other (Please specify)_________ 
 
 
 
What is your age? 
 18 - 20 
 21 - 25 
 26 - 30 
 31 - 35 
 36 and over 
 
 
 
What is your gender?     
 Male 
 Female 
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FINAL RESPONSE SECTION: Please use the scale to indicate your response to each of the 
items below. There are no right or wrong answers. Therefore, please respond as honestly and 
accurately as possible.   
  
[Trait Regulatory Focus: General Regulatory Focus Measure (GRFM)] 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
In general, I am focused on 
preventing negative events in my 
life. 
       
I am anxious that I will fall short 
of my responsibilities and 
obligations. 
       
I frequently imagine how I will 
achieve my hopes and 
aspirations. 
       
I often think about the person I 
am afraid I might become in the 
future. 
       
I often think about the person I 
would ideally like to be in the 
future. 
       
I typically focus on the success I 
hope to achieve in the future.        
I often worry that I will fail to 
accomplish my academic goals.        
I often think about how I will 
achieve academic success.        
I often imagine myself 
experiencing bad things that I 
fear might happen to me. 
       
I frequently think about how I 
can prevent failures in my life.        
I am more oriented toward 
preventing losses than I am 
toward achieving gains. 
       
My major goal in school right 
now is to achieve my academic 
ambitions. 
       
My major goal in school right 
now is to avoid becoming an 
academic failure. 
       
I see myself as someone who is 
primarily striving to reach my 
“ideal self”—to fulfill my hopes, 
wishes, and aspirations. 
       
 
  
227 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
I see myself as someone who is 
primarily striving to become the 
self I “ought” to be—to fulfill 
my duties, responsibilities, and 
obligations. 
       
In general, I am focused on 
achieving positive outcomes in 
my life. 
       
I often imagine myself 
experiencing good things that I 
hope will happen to me. 
       
Overall, I am more oriented 
toward achieving success than 
preventing failure. 
       
 
 
 
Please make any comments you think would be helpful in understanding your responses. 
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Condition 2: Overseer 
[SCREEN 1] 
 
Explanation of Research 
Title of Project: Corporate Tax and Individual Decision Making 
Principal Investigator: Bonnie Brown 
Faculty Supervisor: Vicky Arnold 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research project conducted by Bonnie Brown, Doctoral 
Candidate, and Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor. You will be asked to answer questions 
that will take about 20 minutes of your time. The purpose of this research is to examine 
judgments related to corporate taxation. You will be asked to read a tax scenario involving a 
hypothetical corporation. You will then be provided with some tax authority guidance and be 
asked to answer questions about the tax scenario.  
 
Please note that participation in this study is completely voluntary and your responses will be 
completely anonymous. If you decide to participate, you have the right to withdraw your consent 
or discontinue participation at any time. There are no anticipated potential risks associated with 
this study. You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.  
 
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints you may contact: Bonnie Brown, Doctoral 
Candidate, Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 
823-1478 or by email at bonnie.brown@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor, 
Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, at (407) 823-3192 
or by email at vicky.arnold@ucf.edu.  
 
Since this research involves human participants, it has been reviewed and approved by the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Central Florida. For information about the 
rights of people who take part in research, please contact: Institutional Review Board, University 
of Central Florida, Office of Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 
501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at (407) 823-2901. 
 
 
By clicking ">>" you are indicating that you wish to participate in this study. 
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[SCREEN 2] 
 
YOUR TASK 
As a participant in this study, you will be asked to read a hypothetical scenario and then respond 
to questions related to the scenario, share your attitudes and opinions in general, and provide 
demographic information. 
  
We ask that you place yourself into the role of a tax professional employed by a hypothetical 
corporation, Sullivan-Reed Corp. Over the next several screens you will read background 
information about Sullivan-Reed Corp, your role within Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax department, 
and a hypothetical tax research project. So that we do not take up too much of your time, we 
have not included all of the information you would typically have when making similar 
decisions. However, the information provided should be sufficient to make an informed 
judgment. We sincerely appreciate receiving your input, and your responses are very important 
to us. Thank you in advance for your time! 
 
Please note that the first few screens will require reading that should take about 10 to 15 
minutes. The remaining screens will be mostly questions. 
 
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen. 
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[SCREEN 3] 
 
SULLIVAN-REED CORP & TAX DEPARTMENT 
Sullivan-Reed Corp is a publicly traded manufacturing company with headquarters in the United 
States. The company has operations in six U.S. states and also in a few other countries; 
consequently, the company files tax returns with numerous taxing authorities. Over the past 
several years, Sullivan-Reed Corp has averaged annual gross receipts of around $200 million. 
Sullivan-Reed Corp historically has had taxable income, and it does not have any net operating 
loss carryforwards. The GAAP effective tax rate generally hovers around 30 percent. Sullivan-
Reed Corp’s in-house tax department coordinates the company’s tax function, outsourcing some 
of the work to third-party tax professionals. Within the company, the Tax Director leads tax 
planning and compliance and is supported by a dedicated team of tax department staff. In 
addition to income tax compliance responsibilities, the tax department is also responsible for tax 
planning, tax authority audits of federal and state income tax filings, and accounting for income 
taxes for financial statement purposes.  
 
You have served as an in-house tax department staff member for a year and a half. You primarily 
assist with matters related to the company’s income tax returns - federal, state/local, and 
international filings. You report to the Tax Director, who reports to the CFO and works with both 
the management team within Sullivan-Reed Corp as well as third-party tax professionals external 
to Sullivan-Reed Corp. For the last eight years, Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax returns have been 
prepared and signed by Firm A, a Big 4 accounting firm. Sullivan-Reed Corp’s financial 
statements are audited by a different Big 4 accounting firm. Research projects are often 
conducted in-house by Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax department and then reviewed by the external 
tax professionals at Firm A.  
 
In a recent staff meeting, the CFO of Sullivan-Reed Corp stated that “the primary objective of 
hiring the external tax professionals at Firm A is to make sure Sullivan-Reed Corp follows the 
tax rules in achieving our 30 percent target effective tax rate. In fact, we have continued to 
employ Firm A’s tax services primarily due to the Firm’s vigilance and attention to detail in 
maintaining tax compliance.” 
 
 
Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above. 
 I have read the information  
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[SCREEN 4] 
 
CURRENT PROJECT 
You are presently working on a project related to a new product line that Sullivan-Reed Corp 
introduced during the current tax year. The new product line consists of hot cocoa sets containing 
gourmet melting chocolate (dark and milk chocolate) on stir sticks, handcrafted marshmallows, 
and mix-ins such as peppermint sugar sprinkles, cinnamon candies, hot fudge, and caramel 
sauce. The company conducts market research to predict successful item combinations for the 
hot cocoa sets. Sullivan-Reed Corp does not manufacture any of the hot cocoa set components; 
rather the company purchases all of the prepackaged items (chocolate, marshmallows, and mix-
ins) as well as oversized deluxe mugs and filler packaging from various vendors. The company 
has no input into the design of any hot cocoa set items, filler, or packaging. Further, they 
purchase these items in bulk “off the shelf” from vendors. Sullivan-Reed Corp developed design 
templates to standardize the assembly of the hot cocoa sets. Company employees arrange the 
individually packaged items in the mugs according to the design templates to create the hot 
cocoa sets.       
 
You have been assigned the task of determining if the activities associated with assembling 
the hot cocoa set product line are eligible for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction. 
Sullivan-Reed Corp has previously taken the Domestic Production Activities Deduction for other 
products; however, prior to the new hot cocoa set product line, the company had only 
manufactured products onsite. The production process for the hot cocoa sets (purchase premade 
components and assemble onsite) differs substantially from actually manufacturing products 
onsite. Including the hot cocoa set in the Domestic Production Activities Deduction would be 
advantageous for tax purposes.   
 
After doing some initial research, you have identified five particularly relevant items. Summaries 
and excerpts of these authorities are displayed on the next screens.  
 
 
Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above. 
 I have read the information 
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[SCREEN 5] 
 
RELEVANT TAX AUTHORITY 
Summaries and excerpts from the relevant authorities you have found (listed below) are provided 
on the next several screens. Please read these authorities to make your recommendation about 
whether Sullivan-Reed Corp should take the Domestic Production Activities Deduction for the 
hot cocoa set product line. Please note there is no back button; however, you will have an 
opportunity later to review the tax authority and information about the hot cocoa product line 
again before making your recommendation.  
 
F. Internal Revenue Code Section 199 (Effective January 1, 2005) 
G. Regulation §1.199-3(e) (Effective June 1, 2006) 
H. United States v. Dean (May 7, 2013) 
I. Proposed Amendment to Regulation §1.199-3 (August 27, 2015) 
J. Precision Dose, Inc. v. United States (September 24, 2015) 
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[SCREEN 6] 
 
A.   Internal Revenue Code Section 199 
 
How is the Domestic Production Activities Deduction calculated? 
There shall be allowed as a deduction an amount equal to 9 percent of the lesser of the qualified 
production activities income of the taxpayer for the taxable year, or taxable income (determined 
without regard to this section) for the taxable year (Sec. 199(a)). The amount of the deduction 
allowable under subsection (a) for any taxable year shall not exceed 50 percent of the W-2 wages 
of the taxpayer for the taxable year (Sec. 199(b)(1)). 
 
What activities qualify for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction?  
…any lease, rental, license, sale, exchange, or other disposition of qualifying production 
property which was manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted by the taxpayer in whole or 
in significant part within the United States… (Sec. 199(c)(4)). 
 
How is “manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted” (MPGE) defined? What activities 
qualify as MPGE activities? 
The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out the purposes of this 
section… (Sec. 199(d)(10)). 
 
 
Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above. 
 I have read the information  
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[SCREEN 7] 
 
B.   Regulation §1.199-3(e): Definition of manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted 
 
(1) In general.—…the term MPGE includes manufacturing, producing, growing, extracting, 
installing, developing, improving, and creating QPP [qualified production property]; making 
QPP out of scrap, salvage, or junk material as well as from new or raw material by processing, 
manipulating, refining, or changing the form of an article, or by combining or assembling two or 
more articles…  
 
(2) Packaging, repackaging, labeling, or minor assembly.— If a taxpayer packages, 
repackages, labels, or performs minor assembly of QPP [qualified production property] and the 
taxpayer engages in no other MPGE activity with respect to that QPP, the taxpayer's packaging, 
repackaging, labeling, or minor assembly does not qualify as MPGE with respect to that QPP. 
 
 
Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above. 
 I have read the information  
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[SCREEN 8] 
 
C.   United States v. Dean, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (U.S. District Court, C.D. Cal. May 7, 2013) 
 
Summary of United States v. Dean:  
Houdini, Inc., a company engaged in the design, assembly, and sale of gift baskets and gift 
towers, claimed deductions for domestic production activities. Houdini, Inc. argued that they 
manufactured or produced gift baskets and gift towers. The government argued that Houdini, 
Inc. was merely packaging and repackaging products, activities which would not qualify as 
MPGE (“manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted”). The Court rejected the government’s 
argument. The court stated that “the final products, gift baskets and towers, are distinct in form 
and purpose from the individual items inside.” The Court reasoned that Houdini, Inc.’s 
production process changed the form of the product in accordance with the definition of MPGE 
within Treasury Regulation §1.199-3.  
 
Excerpts from United States v. Dean:  
In 1989, Dean and O'Brien incorporated their business as Houdini, Inc. (“Houdini”). Houdini 
describes its business as the design, assembly, and sale of gift baskets and gift towers through 
both wholesale and retail channels. A “gift tower” is a set of decorative boxes into which 
different food items are placed. During the holiday season, Houdini can complete up to 80,000 
baskets in a day.  
… 
Designing a Houdini gift basket involves, among other things, selecting the basket and the items 
to be placed inside, as well as the “void fill” that holds everything together. Houdini orders its 
baskets from suppliers in China. When it orders baskets, Houdini reviews samples and then 
provides the manufacturer with exact specifications for them. Houdini also purchases containers 
from suppliers in the United States. The void fill in a Houdini gift basket is a cardboard form or  
Styrofoam base that is placed inside the basket; the other items are in turn placed inside. Houdini 
generally designs the cardboard forms, indicating where the cuts and folds should be made; it 
then hires another company to make the cardboard forms.  
… 
Houdini purchases the items that are placed inside the baskets from other companies.  
… 
Houdini's assembly line consists of workers who place the individual food items into baskets in 
accordance with detailed work instructions prepared by Houdini. In preparing a finished gift 
basket, employees at several different stations on the line put different items into the basket. 
After the items have been placed inside the basket, a plastic wrapping is heated to shrink around 
the basket. Once the plastic wrapping is completed, a bow is placed on the basket, if called for in 
the design of the basket. For a gift tower, the food-safe packages are placed directly into 
decorative boxes. The boxes in the gift tower are then connected either through cardboard tabs or 
through sticky-dot adhesives.  
… 
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Defendants argue that Houdini's production process “chang[es] the form of an article” within the 
meaning of Treasury Regulation §1.199-3(e)(1). The Court agrees. Houdini first selects various 
items—chocolates, cookies, candy, cheeses, crackers, wine or alcohol, packaging materials, and 
a basket or boxes—for its final products. Next, the individual items are assembled in a gift basket 
or gift tower based on one of many detailed plans. This complex production process relies on 
both assembly line workers and machines. The final products, gift baskets and gift towers, are 
distinct in form and purpose from the individual items inside. The individual items would 
typically be purchased by consumers as ordinary groceries. But after Houdini's production 
process, they are transformed into a gift that is usually given during the holiday season.  
 
 
Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above. 
 I have read the information  
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[SCREEN 9] 
 
D.   Proposed Amendment to Regulation §1.199-3, August 27, 2015  
(Proposed Regulations do not have the force of the law and carry little weight in the litigation 
process until they are finalized, however they do reflect the IRS’s position on an issue.) 
 
Section 1.199-3(e)(2) provides that if a taxpayer packages, repackages, labels, or performs minor 
assembly of QPP [qualified production property] and the taxpayer engages in no other MPGE 
activities with respect to that QPP, the taxpayer's packaging, repackaging, labeling, or minor 
assembly does not qualify as MPGE with respect to that QPP. This rule has been the subject of 
recent litigation. See United States v. Dean, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (concluding 
that the taxpayer's activity of preparing gift baskets was a manufacturing activity and not solely 
packaging or repackaging for purposes of section 199). The Treasury Department and the IRS 
disagree with the interpretation of §1.199-3(e)(2) adopted by the court in United States v. Dean, 
and the proposed regulations add an example (Example 9) that illustrates the appropriate 
application of this rule in a situation in which the taxpayer is engaged in no other MPGE 
activities with respect to the QPP other than those described in §1.199-3(e)(2). 
… 
Example 9. X is in the business of selling gift baskets containing various products that are 
packaged together. X purchases the baskets and the products included within the baskets from 
unrelated third parties. X plans where and how the products should be arranged into the baskets. 
On an assembly line in a gift basket production facility, X arranges the products into the baskets 
according to that plan, sometimes relabeling the products before placing them into the baskets. X 
engages in no other activity besides packaging, repackaging, labeling, or minor assembly with 
respect to the gift baskets. Therefore, X is not considered to have engaged in the MPGE of 
QPP under paragraph (e)(2) of this section. 
 
 
Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above. 
 I have read the information  
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[SCREEN 10] 
 
E.   Precision Dose, Inc. v. United States, No. 3:12-cv-50180 (U.S. District Court, N.D. Ill. 
September 24, 2015) 
 
Summary of Precision Dose, Inc. v. United States:  
Precision Dose, Inc. purchased certain drugs in bulk and then sold them as unit doses (drugs in 
single-dose containers). The company had a complex production process involving extensive 
research about demand for medications, appropriate materials for containers, and drug storage. 
The company worked with vendors to produce containers according to precise specifications and 
dedicated significant resources to dose standardization and process documentation. As in United 
States v. Dean, the government argued that the company was merely packaging and repackaging 
products, activities which would not qualify as MPGE (“manufactured, produced, grown, or 
extracted”). The Court determined that Precision Dose, Inc. engaged in a “complex production 
process” that resulted in a “distinct final product” and permitted the domestic production activity 
deduction. 
 
Excerpts from Precision Dose, Inc. v. United States:  
The facts show plaintiff looks for drugs it believes it can successfully process into and sell as unit 
doses. Drug manufacturers do not seek bids from companies to repackage their drugs into small 
packages. Plaintiff engages in market research to determine which drugs to buy to turn into unit 
doses. Plaintiff works with potential customers to identify needs for new unit dose products. 
Plaintiff acquires sample drugs and tests them for suitability to be processed into unit doses. 
Plaintiff prepares specifications and works with vendors to develop cups and syringes that are 
suitable to use for unit doses for each drug that it buys. Sometimes existing cups or syringes are 
used and sometimes new ones are created through the joint efforts of plaintiff's personnel and 
vendor personnel. Plaintiff conducts mixing studies to determine the best mixing procedures to 
use to obtain the proper suspension of the active ingredient in each unit dose and whether the 
drug can be mixed in such a way that the proper suspension can be obtained at all. It tests plastics 
to determine compatibility with specific drugs for use in the cups or syringes. The cups, lidding, 
trays and product inserts are produced by vendors using plaintiff's proprietary design. For cups 
for which plaintiff owns the designs vendors use molds owned by plaintiff to produce the cups, 
for trays, which are designed by plaintiff, vendors use molds owned by plaintiff. For lidding 
which is designed by plaintiff, the vendors use cutting dies owned by plaintiff. 
… 
This brief recitation of portions of plaintiff's activities in producing the unit doses show, that like 
in Dean, plaintiff engages in a “complex production process that results in a distinct final 
product.” The government argues Dean is wrongly decided. It contends the Dean court failed to 
understand that all Houdini's activities were just part of the repackaging process and thus did not 
take those activities outside the (e)(2) exception. However, the court disagrees. Dean correctly 
determined that Houdini was creating an entirely new product – a gift basket or gift tower – 
which was not simply a method of repackaging the components included in the baskets or 
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towers. A gift basket is not simply a container of stuff – like a grocery cart in which the items 
had been dropped when pulled from the shelf. It is a unique product itself. Likewise, a unit dose 
is a unique product. Plaintiff is entitled to the Section 199 deduction. 
 
 
Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above. 
 I have read the information  
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[SCREEN 11] 
 
Now that you have reviewed these authorities, you will be asked to evaluate whether the hot 
cocoa set product line is eligible for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction and make 
your recommendation to the Tax Director. After receiving your recommendation, the Tax 
Director will likely consult the company’s external tax professionals at Firm A who were hired 
to make sure the company follows the tax rules. 
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[SCREEN 12] 
 
RESPONSE SECTION I: Please respond to the following questions as if you are a member 
of Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax department staff. 
 
 
For your reference, the relevant tax authority is provided again below. Clicking "Review Tax 
Authority" will allow you to open a PDF document in a separate window. 
 
Review Tax Authority 
 
 
 
Information about your current project, the hot cocoa set product line, is provided again below. 
Clicking "Review Current Project Facts" will allow you to open a PDF document in a separate 
window. 
 
Review Current Project Facts 
 
 
 
What is the likelihood that you would recommend that Sullivan-Reed Corp include the hot cocoa 
set product line in the Domestic Production Activities Deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Likely 
          
Extremely 
Likely 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
 
 
 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The hot cocoa set product 
line is eligible for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
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In your opinion, if this position was examined by the IRS, what is the likelihood that the IRS 
would uphold the position that Sullivan Reed Corp’s hot cocoa set product line qualifies for the 
Domestic Production Activities Deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Likely 
          
Extremely 
Likely 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
 
 
 
In your opinion, if this position was examined in court, what is the likelihood that the Court 
would uphold the position that Sullivan Reed Corp’s hot cocoa set product line qualifies for the 
Domestic Production Activities Deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Likely 
          
Extremely 
Likely 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
 
 
 
As Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax department staff, how certain would you want to be of your tax 
position before including the hot cocoa set product line in the Domestic Production Activities 
Deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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[SCREEN 13] 
 
How important were each of the following authorities in your evaluation of whether the hot 
cocoa set product line is eligible for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction? 
 
 Not at all 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Moderately 
Important 
Extremely 
Important 
Internal Revenue Code Section 199       
Regulation §1.199-3(e)       
United States v. Dean (Gift baskets)      
Proposed Amendment to Regulation §1.199-3      
Precision Dose, Inc. v. United States (Unit doses)      
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These statements relate to your job at Sullivan-Reed Corp. Continuing to envision yourself as a 
member of Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax department staff, please rate how often you could imagine 
yourself focusing on these thoughts and activities while you are working.   
  
[Regulatory Focus State: Regulatory Focus at Work Scale (RWS)] 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Constantly 
I focus on…      
Following rules and regulations at work       
Completing work tasks correctly       
Doing my duty at work       
My work responsibilities       
Fulfilling my work obligations       
The details of my work       
Accomplishing a lot at work       
Getting my work done no matter what       
Getting a lot of work finished in a short amount of 
time      
Work activities that allow me to get ahead at work      
My work accomplishments       
How many job tasks I can complete       
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In this study, Sullivan-Reed Corp engages external tax professionals at Firm A to assist with the 
tax work. Please answer the following items as you think Sullivan-Reed Corp’s external tax 
professionals at Firm A would respond.   
 
 [Client Advocacy] 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
In an instance where no judicial 
authority exists with respect to 
an issue and where the Code and 
Regulations are ambiguous, tax 
professionals should believe that 
the taxpayer is entitled to take 
the most favorable tax treatment. 
       
Generally speaking, tax 
professionals' loyalties should be 
first to the tax system, then to 
the taxpayer. 
       
Tax professionals should apply 
ambiguous tax law to the 
taxpayer's benefit. 
       
When examining a tax return, 
tax professionals should point 
out to taxpayers reasonable 
positions they could have taken 
which would have contributed to 
minimizing their tax liability. 
       
Tax professionals should believe 
it is important to encourage the 
taxpayer to pay the least amount 
of taxes payable. 
       
Tax professionals should always 
interpret unclear/ambiguous 
laws in favor of the taxpayer. 
       
Tax professionals should use 
trends in the law by trying to 
establish a pattern of more 
favorable treatment for the 
taxpayer and then extending the 
pattern to the taxpayer's position. 
       
Where no judicial authority 
exists with respect to an issue, 
tax professionals should feel that 
the taxpayer is entitled to take 
the most favorable tax treatment.  
       
Tax professionals should 
structure transactions in ways 
that yield the best tax result, 
even if the law is unclear in an 
area.  
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[SCREEN 16] 
 
[Manipulation Check Question] 
 
Based upon the tax scenario, which of the following more accurately describes the primary 
function of Sullivan-Reed Corp’s external tax professionals at Firm A?  
 
The primary function of the tax professionals at Firm A is to… 
 find the most advantageous tax opportunities for Sullivan-Reed Corp 
 make sure Sullivan-Reed Corp follows the tax rules 
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[SCREEN 17] 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS: Now moving away from the scenario, please provide the 
following information. All responses to this survey are anonymous and confidential.  
 
How many tax classes have you taken? Include the current semester. 
 0 
 1 - 2 
 3 - 4 
 5 or more 
 
 
 
Please select your graduate degree program. 
 MACC, Tax Track 
 MACC, BMA Track 
 MSA  
 Other (Please specify)_________ 
 
 
 
Do you plan to work in taxation?     
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
 
How much total work experience have you had in public accounting? 
 No experience in public accounting 
 Less than 6 months 
 6 – 12 months 
 More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________ 
 
 
 
How much work experience have you had in public accounting, specifically in tax? 
 No tax experience in public accounting 
 Less than 6 months 
 6 – 12 months 
 More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________ 
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What size public accounting firm did you work for? Check all that apply. 
 No experience in public accounting 
 Big 4 
 International/National 
 Regional/Local 
 Sole Proprietorship 
 Other (Please specify)_________ 
 
 
 
Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the Domestic Production 
Activities Deduction?     
 Very Familiar 
 Familiar 
 Neither Familiar nor Unfamiliar 
 Unfamiliar 
 Very Unfamiliar 
 
 
 
Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the tax authority relating to 
activities that qualify for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction? 
 Very Familiar 
 Familiar 
 Neither Familiar nor Unfamiliar 
 Unfamiliar 
 Very Unfamiliar 
 
 
 
If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return, how certain would 
you want to be of your tax position before taking a deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return and engaged a paid 
tax preparer for assistance, how certain would you want your paid preparer to be of your tax 
position before taking a deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
 
 
 
Who prepared your most recent individual income tax return? 
 I prepared my own tax return 
 I hired a paid preparer 
 A friend or relative prepared my tax return 
 I do not file a tax return 
 Other (Please specify)_________ 
 
 
 
What is your age? 
 18 - 20 
 21 - 25 
 26 - 30 
 31 - 35 
 36 and over 
 
 
 
What is your gender?     
 Male 
 Female 
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[SCREEN 18] 
 
FINAL RESPONSE SECTION: Please use the scale to indicate your response to each of the 
items below. There are no right or wrong answers. Therefore, please respond as honestly and 
accurately as possible.   
  
[Trait Regulatory Focus: General Regulatory Focus Measure (GRFM)] 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
In general, I am focused on 
preventing negative events in my 
life. 
       
I am anxious that I will fall short 
of my responsibilities and 
obligations. 
       
I frequently imagine how I will 
achieve my hopes and 
aspirations. 
       
I often think about the person I 
am afraid I might become in the 
future. 
       
I often think about the person I 
would ideally like to be in the 
future. 
       
I typically focus on the success I 
hope to achieve in the future.        
I often worry that I will fail to 
accomplish my academic goals.        
I often think about how I will 
achieve academic success.        
I often imagine myself 
experiencing bad things that I 
fear might happen to me. 
       
I frequently think about how I 
can prevent failures in my life.        
I am more oriented toward 
preventing losses than I am 
toward achieving gains. 
       
My major goal in school right 
now is to achieve my academic 
ambitions. 
       
My major goal in school right 
now is to avoid becoming an 
academic failure. 
       
I see myself as someone who is 
primarily striving to reach my 
“ideal self”—to fulfill my hopes, 
wishes, and aspirations. 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
I see myself as someone who is 
primarily striving to become the 
self I “ought” to be—to fulfill 
my duties, responsibilities, and 
obligations. 
       
In general, I am focused on 
achieving positive outcomes in 
my life. 
       
I often imagine myself 
experiencing good things that I 
hope will happen to me. 
       
Overall, I am more oriented 
toward achieving success than 
preventing failure. 
       
 
 
 
Please make any comments you think would be helpful in understanding your responses. 
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APPENDIX E: STUDY 3 TABLES  
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Table 14: Demographics 
(n = 51)* 
     n    % 
Age   
 18-20 7 13.7 
 21-25 33 64.7 
 26-30 5 9.8 
 31-35 2 3.9 
 Over 35 3 5.9 
 Prefer not to answer 1 2.0 
    
Gender    
 Male 22 43.1 
 Female 29 56.9 
    
Work Experience in Public Accounting - All   
 No public accounting experience 44 86.3 
 Less than 6 months 4 7.8 
 6 months – 12 months 3 5.9 
    
Work Experience in Public Accounting - Tax   
 No public accounting experience in tax 44 86.3 
 Less than 6 months 6 11.7 
 6 months – 12 months 1 2.0 
    
Preparation of Most Recent Personal Tax 
Return 
  
 Prepared own return 26 51.0 
 Hired a paid preparer 12 23.6 
 Friend or relative prepared 6 11.7 
 Did not need to file  7 13.7 
    
Number of Tax Classes Taken   
 1-2  50 98.0 
 None 1 2.0 
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     n    % 
CPA Intentions   
 Plan to take the CPA exam in the future 45 88.2 
 Do not plan to be a CPA 6 11.8 
 
 
Notes: * n = 51 includes 17 participants in the individual decision maker condition and 34 
participants in the group decision maker condition (forming 17 two-member groups). 
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Table 15: Descriptive Statistics by Decision Maker: Means (Standard Deviation) 
 Individual Group Total 
Number of Observations 17 17 34 
Unreported Income 3.12 (3.52) 3.71 (2.97) 3.41 (3.22) 
Felt Responsibility 15.94* (3.29) 13.44 (2.94) 14.69 (3.32) 
Relative Perceived Risk 3.24 (2.36) 3.79 (1.51) 3.52 (1.97) 
Fear of Negative Outcome 3.71 (1.21) 3.62 (0.70) 3.66 (0.97) 
Risk Attitude  1.74 (1.39) 1.83 (1.00) 1.78 (1.19) 
 
Notes:  
* Mean of Felt Responsibility is significantly greater for the Individual condition than the Group condition (p = 0.026, two-tailed) 
  
Variable Definitions: 
Decision Maker is manipulated by structuring the decision to be made by either one decision maker (Individual) or by a group of 
decision makers (Group). Each participant in the Individual condition makes the reporting decision alone as the sole decision 
maker. Participants in the Group condition make the decision together as a group after reaching a group consensus. 
 
Unreported Income is measured as follows: Participants in the experimental task are provided with experimental currency and 
then asked, “How much of the 10,000 Francs [20,000 Francs for the Group condition] would you like to report?” Reported 
income is measured on an 11-point scale; an individual decision maker may decide to report amounts from zero to 10,000 Francs 
in increments of 1,000 and a group may decide to report amounts from zero to 20,000 Francs in increments of 2,000. Reporting 
less income reflects greater risk taking. Reported income is reverse coded so that greater Unreported Income reflects greater risk 
taking. 
 
Felt Responsibility is the sum of a three item scale adapted from Hackman and Oldham (1974) to measure how personally 
responsible a decision maker feels for possible outcomes of the decision. Each of the items uses a seven-point Likert-type scale 
with labeled points ranging from 1 “Strongly Disagree” to 7 “Strongly Agree.” Greater Felt Responsibility scores reflect stronger 
feelings of personal responsibility. Felt Responsibility is expected to mediate the effect of Decision Maker on Unreported 
Income. 
 
Relative Perceived Risk is a measure of a decision maker’s self-perceived riskiness compared to other individuals and is designed 
to capture a decision maker’s perception of widely-held social values. Participants are asked “Compared to the average person, 
how risky was the decision you just made?” Relative Perceived Risk is measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 “Much 
less risky than average” to 7 “Much more risky than average.” Self-rating as less risky than others signifies a perception that the 
socially-valued position is to be less risky. Self-rating as more risky than others signifies a perception that the socially-valued 
position is to be more risky. 
 
Fear of Negative Outcome is measured by asking, “When deciding how many Francs to report on the form, how concerned were 
you about the possibility that the report would be inspected?” Fear of negative outcome is measured on a five-point Likert-type 
scale with labeled points ranging from 1 “Not At All Concerned” to 5 “Extremely Concerned.”   
 
Risk Attitude is a four item measure adopted from the Weber et al. (2002) measure of risk attitude in the gambling domain, a 
subscale in the domain-specific risk attitude scale. Participants are asked to indicate their likelihood of engaging in different 
activities or behaviors; each item is measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 “Very Unlikely” to 7 “Very Likely.” Risk 
Attitude is measured as a potential control variable. 
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Table 16: Correlation Coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1. Unreported Income 1 0.173 -0.427 0.628 -0.441 0.433 
2. Decision Maker 0.093 1 -0.400 0.185 -0.175 0.194 
3. Felt Responsibility -0.451 -0.382 1 -0.351 0.314 -0.396 
4. Relative Perceived Risk 0.658 0.144 -0.330 1 -0.247 0.533 
5. Fear of Negative Outcome  -0.268 -0.046 0.130 -0.084 1 -0.216 
6. Risk Attitude 0.360 0.041 -0.269 0.576 -0.080 1 
 
Notes:  
Table values are Spearman’s Rho above the diagonal and Pearson Correlation Coefficients below the diagonal. 
Bold correlations are significant at p < 0.05 (two-tailed). 
See Table 15 for variable definitions.  
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Table 17: Results of ANOVA: Effect of Decision Maker on Unreported Income 
Source of Variation Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p 
Decision Maker 0.001 1 0.001 0.000 0.989 
Relative Perceived Risk 145.117 1 145.117 23.168 < 0.000 
Error 16.985 115 0.148   
 
Notes:  
All p-values are two-tailed.  
See Table 15 for variable definitions. 
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Table 18: Supplemental Analysis: Mediation Analysis Using PROCESS Procedure 
Panel A: Regression of Felt Responsibility on Decision Maker  
 Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-statistic p-value 
Constant 15.941 0.757 21.070    < 0.000  
Decision Maker -2.500 1.070 -2.337 0.026 
     
R2 0.146    
F Statistic 5.460    
n 34    
 
Panel B: Regression of Unreported Income on Felt Responsibility and Decision Maker with 
Relative Perceived Risk   
 Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-statistic p-value 
Constant 4.745 2.630 1.805 0.081 
Felt Responsibility -0.292 0.141 -2.066 0.048 
Decision Maker -0.666 0.884 -0.753 0.457 
Relative Perceived Risk 0.937 0.223 4.205    < 0.000  
     
R2 0.503    
F Statistic 10.132    
n 34    
 
Panel C: Indirect Effect of Decision Maker on Unreported Income   
  
Bootstrapped 95% Confidence 
Interval (1000 iterations) 
Indirect Effect Boot SE Lower Limit Upper Limit 
0.7304 0.4682 0.0892 2.1021 
 
Notes:  
Mediation Analysis uses PROCESS procedure (Hayes 2013). 
All p-values are two-tailed. 
See Table 15 for variable definitions.  
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APPENDIX F: STUDY 3 EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS  
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Condition 1: Individual / Self 
[Paper format] 
Explanation of Research  
 
Title of Project: Decision Making and Reporting  
Principal Investigator: Bonnie Brown 
Faculty Supervisor: Vicky Arnold 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Whether you take part is up to you. Your 
professor has agreed to award you extra credit for your participation. If you wish to earn extra 
credit in your class, but do not wish to participate in the research study or are under 18 years of 
age, your professor will provide you with an alternate assignment of comparable time and effort. 
If you have decided to participate in this project, please understand that your participation is 
voluntary and that you have the right to withdraw your consent or discontinue participation at 
any time without penalty. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to 
which you are otherwise entitled. The purpose of this research is to examine individual decision 
making and reporting. You will be asked to read instructions for a decision involving reporting. 
You will then be asked to make your decision and answer some questions about your opinions 
and demographic questions. This research study will be conducted in a behavioral lab. The 
estimated time to complete this study is approximately 30 minutes.     
 
You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study. 
 
Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints: Bonnie Brown, Doctoral Candidate, Kenneth G. Dixon School of 
Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 823-1478 or by email at 
bonnie.brown@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor, Kenneth G. Dixon School of 
Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 823-3192 or by email at 
vicky.arnold@ucf.edu. 
 
IRB contact about your rights in the study or to report a complaint:   Research at the University 
of Central Florida involving human participants is carried out under the oversight of the 
Institutional Review Board (UCF IRB). This research has been reviewed and approved by the 
IRB. For information about the rights of people who take part in research, please contact: 
Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of Research & 
Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by 
telephone at (407) 823-2901. 
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TASK INSTRUCTIONS [Paper format] 
 
You will be participating in a task in which you are provided with Francs and then are asked to 
make a reporting decision. Note that Francs are the experimental currency, and there are no right 
or wrong answers.  
 
The Francs will belong to you, and you will make the reporting decision for yourself. At the 
conclusion of the task, Francs will be converted into dollars using a positive conversion rate and 
you will be paid based upon the net Francs from your decision. In other words, your decision 
affects the payout that you will receive. 
 
After being provided with Francs, you will decide how much of the Francs to report on a form, 
ranging from zero Francs to all of the Francs. Francs reported on the form are subject to a 50% 
fee. Francs that you decide not to report on the form are not subject to a fee unless the form is 
selected for inspection. If the form is selected for inspection, the amount of Francs reported is 
compared to the initial amount of Francs provided, and any Francs not reported on the form are 
subject to a 100% fee. The form has a 50% chance of being selected for inspection. Inspections 
are determined completely at random and do not depend on your decisions or the decisions of 
others.  
 
After you have decided the amount of Francs to report and have submitted your form, you will 
be notified whether or not the form was selected for inspection. After the inspection period, net 
Francs will be calculated as the initial Francs provided, less total fees (Net Francs = Initial 
Francs - Total Fees). Thus, any fees assessed reduce your payout at the end of the task. Total 
Fees depend upon both the amount you decide to report on the form and whether the form is 
selected for inspection: 
 
If selected for inspection, Total Fees equals 50% of the Francs reported on the form, plus 
100% of the Francs not reported on the form. 
 
If not selected for inspection, Total Fees equals 50% of the amount reported on the form.  
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PRACTICE REPORTING DECISION 
Just for practice, imagine you are provided with 2,000 Francs and are asked to decide what 
amount to report on a form, ranging from 0 Francs to 2,000 Francs (in 200 Franc increments). 
The 2,000 Francs will belong to you, and you will make the reporting decision for yourself.  
 
The following chart has been provided to help you decide how much of the 2,000 Francs you 
want to report. The chart presents examples of both the maximum and minimum Net Francs that 
may be possible outcomes, given the Francs you decide to report.  
 
Francs You Could 
Choose to Report 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000 
Maximum Possible 
Net Francs 2,000 1,900 1,800 1,700 1,600 1,500 1,400 1,300 1,200 1,100 1,000 
Minimum Possible 
Net Francs 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1,000 
 
Several amounts are shown on the top row of the chart as “Francs you could choose to report.” 
For each reporting option, the chart presents both the maximum (no inspection) and minimum 
(inspection) possible net Francs if you choose to report that particular amount.  
 
EXAMPLE 1: Note (towards the top right of the chart) if you decide to report all 2,000 Francs, 
net Francs would be 1,000 Francs regardless of whether the form is selected for inspection.  
 
EXAMPLE 2: On the other end of the chart, note that if you decide to report 0 Francs, net Francs 
depend upon whether the form is selected for inspection.  
 
If the form is selected for inspection and you have decided to report 0 Francs, net Francs would 
be 0 Francs, calculated as follows:  
 
Total fees equal 50% of the 0 Francs reported on the form, plus 100% of the 2,000 Francs not 
reported on the form, so Total Fees equal 2,000. Net Francs are calculated as the 2,000 Initial 
Francs, less 2,000 Total Fees, so Net Francs equal 0. 
 
If the form is not selected for inspection and you have decided to report 0 Francs, net Francs 
would be 2,000 Francs, calculated as follows:  
 
Total fees equal 50% of the 0 Francs reported on the form, so Total Fees equal 0. Net Francs 
are calculated as the 2,000 Initial Francs, less 0 Total Fees, so Net Francs equal 2,000. 
 
As shown in the chart, the other reporting options fall between these two examples. Please take a 
few minutes to review this chart.  
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[End of Task Instructions – Blank page intentional spacer]  
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[QUALTRICS PORTION; SCREEN 1] 
 
Your participant number is displayed on the outside of the envelopes you were given. Do 
not open the envelopes. 
  
Please locate your PARTICIPANT NUMBER and enter it in the space provided below. 
 
________________ 
 
 
 
  
265 
 
[SCREEN 2] 
 
YOU HAVE NOW BEEN PROVIDED WITH 10,000 FRANCS 
 
Your task is to decide how much of the 10,000 Francs you would like to report.  
The 10,000 Francs will belong to you, and you will make the reporting decision for yourself. 
Please feel free to refer back to your paper hardcopy of the Task Instructions. 
 
The following chart has been provided to help you decide how much of the 10,000 Francs you 
want to report. The chart presents examples of both the maximum and minimum Net Francs that 
may be possible, given the Francs you decide to report.  
 
Possible Net Francs 
Francs You  
Could Choose  
to Report 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 10,000 
Maximum  
Possible Net  
Francs 10,000 9,500 9,000 8,500 8,000 7,500 7,000 6,500 6,000 5,500 5,000 
Minimum  
Possible Net  
Francs 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 4,500 5,000 
 
 
Please type in the textbox provided below to share your thought process as you decide how much 
of the 10,000 Francs to report.  
 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
 
 
 
How much of the 10,000 Francs would you like to report? 
 
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 10,000 
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[SCREEN 3] 
 
Please open Envelope 1 and complete the contents individually on your own. Only open 
“Envelope 1” at this time. Once complete, place materials back inside the envelope and 
wait for further instruction.   
 
 
WAIT Do not click on the computer until the person administering the study tells you to proceed 
in the computer survey.  
 
 
Please remain quiet. After everyone is ready, you will be instructed to continue. 
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[SCREEN 4] 
 
INSPECTION PERIOD 
 
Reports will now be randomly selected for inspection. On the next screen, you will be 
notified whether or not your report was selected for inspection. 
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[SCREEN 5] 
 
Your report was selected for inspection.  
[Your report was not selected for inspection.] 
 
Net Francs = [Insert Net Francs]  
 
 
Please click “>>” below to proceed.  
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[SCREEN 6 – Custom Final Qualtrics Screen] 
 
Please WAIT here for further instruction.  
 
As a reminder, please remain quiet while you are waiting.  
After everyone is ready, you will be instructed how to proceed. 
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[End of Qualtrics Study – Blank page intentional spacer]  
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ENVELOPE 1  
[Contains Covariate Questionnaire]  
 
[Envelope 1 Outside Label]  
IMPORTANT – Do not open this envelope until instructed to do so. 
 
 
YOUR PARTICIPANT NUMBER IS: 000000 
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[Covariate Questionnaire]  
 
Please enter your PARTICIPANT NUMBER in the space provided below. 
PARTICIPANT NUMBER: __________ 
 
 
 
ADDITIONAL RESPONSE QUESTIONS: Please respond to the following questions. 
There are no right or wrong answers. Therefore, please respond as honestly and accurately 
as possible.  
 
Regarding the reporting decision that you just made, please indicate your agreement or 
disagreement with the following statements:  
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
It was hard for me to care very much 
about whether or not a good reporting 
decision was made. 
       
I felt a very high degree of personal 
responsibility for the decision about 
how much to report. 
       
I feel I should personally take the credit 
or blame for the results of the reporting 
decision. 
       
Whether or not a good reporting 
decision was made is clearly my 
responsibility. 
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When deciding how many Francs to report on the form, how concerned were you about the 
possibility that the report would be inspected? 
 Extremely Concerned 
 Moderately Concerned 
 Somewhat Concerned 
 Slightly Concerned 
 Not at all Concerned 
 
 
 
Compared to the average person, how risky was the decision you just made?  
 Much more risky than average 
 More risky than average 
 Somewhat more risky than average 
 Neither more or less risky than average 
 Somewhat less risky than average 
 Less risky than average 
 Much less risky than average 
 
 
 
Which best describes how your payment is determined for this study? 
 Based on a reporting decision I made 
 Based on a reporting decision that someone else made 
 Based on a reporting decision that my group made 
 Based on a reporting decision that another group made 
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 [End of Envelope 1 Covariate Questionnaire– Blank page intentional spacer]  
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ENVELOPE 2  
[Contains Demographics Questionnaire]  
 
[Envelope 2 Outside Label]  
IMPORTANT – Do not open this envelope until instructed to do so. 
 
 
YOUR PARTICIPANT IS: 000000 
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[Demographics Questionnaire]  
Please enter your PARTICIPANT NUMBER in the space provided below. 
PARTICIPANT NUMBER: __________ 
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DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS: Please tell us a little about yourself to help categorize 
your responses. All responses to this survey are anonymous and confidential.  
 
 
What is your age? 
 18 - 20 
 21 - 25 
 26 - 30 
 31 - 35 
 36 and over 
 I would prefer not to answer 
 
 
What is your gender?     
 Male 
 Female 
 
 
How many tax classes have you taken? Include the current semester. 
 0 
 1 - 2 
 3 - 4 
 5 or more 
 
 
How much total work experience have you had in public accounting? 
 No experience in public accounting 
 Less than 6 months 
 6 – 12 months 
 More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________ 
 
 
How much work experience have you had in public accounting, specifically in tax? 
 No tax experience in public accounting 
 Less than 6 months 
 6 – 12 months 
 More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________ 
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What size public accounting firm did you work for? Check all that apply. 
 Big 4 
 International/National (does not include Big 4) 
 Regional/Local 
 Sole Proprietorship 
 Other (Please specify)_________ 
 No experience in public accounting 
 
 
 
What is your status regarding becoming a Certified Public Accountant (CPA)? 
 Currently a licensed CPA 
 Passed the CPA exam but not yet licensed 
 Plan to take CPA exam in the future 
 Do not plan to be a CPA 
 
 
 
If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your personal tax return, how certain would 
you want to be of your tax position before taking a deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
 
 
 
 
If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your personal tax return and engaged a paid 
tax preparer for assistance, how certain would you want your paid preparer to be of your tax 
position before taking a deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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Who prepared your most recent individual income tax return? 
 I prepared my own tax return 
 I hired a paid preparer 
 A friend or relative prepared my tax return 
 I do not file a tax return 
 Other (Please specify)_________ 
 
 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging in each activity 
or behavior.  
 
 Very 
Unlikely 
Unlikely Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Neither 
Likely 
nor 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Likely Very 
Likely 
Admitting that your tastes are 
different from those of your friends.         
Betting a day’s income at the horse 
races.         
Investing 10% of your annual income 
in a moderate growth mutual fund.         
Disagreeing with your father on a 
major issue.         
Betting a day’s income at a high stake 
poker game.         
Arguing with a friend about an issue 
on which he or she has a very 
different opinion.  
       
Investing 5% of your annual income 
in a very speculative stock.         
Approaching your boss to ask for a 
raise.         
Betting a day’s income on the 
outcome of a sporting event (e.g. 
baseball, soccer, or football).  
       
Telling a friend if his or her significant 
other has made a pass at you.         
Investing 5% of your annual income 
in a conservative stock.         
Wearing shocking or unconventional 
clothes on occasion.         
Investing 10% of your annual income 
in government bonds (treasury bills).         
Gambling a week’s income at a 
casino.         
Taking a job that you enjoy over one 
that is prestigious but less enjoyable.        
Defending an unpopular issue that 
you believe in at a social occasion.         
280 
 
Thank you for participating in this study! Please place this questionnaire back into Envelope 2 
and remain seated until the person administering the study instructs you to line up for payout.  
 
To ensure that you receive your payout, please have the following materials ready to bring with 
you:  
 Envelope 1 containing completed questions 
 Envelope 2 containing completed questions 
 Acknowledgement of Payment form – print your name, sign your name, and leave the 
“amount received” blank 
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[End of Envelope 2 Demographics Questionnaire – Blank page intentional spacer]  
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PAYMENT 
 
Thank you for participating in this study on reporting decisions conducted by Bonnie Brown. 
Please sign below to acknowledge receipt of payment for your participation in this study. 
In addition, by signing below you acknowledge that you will NOT discuss the study with 
other students. To get valid and useful results, we need each participant’s honest and unfiltered 
reactions to his/her experiences in the study. Thank you very much for your cooperation. 
 
Session Date and Time: [Insert Date] ([Insert Day of the Week]) [Insert Time] 
 
 
______________________________________________ 
Amount Received (in U.S. dollars) 
 
 
 
______________________________________________ 
Printed Name 
 
 
 
______________________________________________ 
Signed Name 
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
283 
 
Condition 2: Individual / Other 
[Paper format] 
Explanation of Research  
 
Title of Project: Decision Making and Reporting  
Principal Investigator: Bonnie Brown 
Faculty Supervisor: Vicky Arnold 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Whether you take part is up to you. Your 
professor has agreed to award you extra credit for your participation. If you wish to earn extra 
credit in your class, but do not wish to participate in the research study or are under 18 years of 
age, your professor will provide you with an alternate assignment of comparable time and effort. 
If you have decided to participate in this project, please understand that your participation is 
voluntary and that you have the right to withdraw your consent or discontinue participation at 
any time without penalty. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to 
which you are otherwise entitled. The purpose of this research is to examine individual decision 
making and reporting. You will be asked to read instructions for a decision involving reporting. 
You will then be asked to make your decision and answer some questions about your opinions 
and demographic questions. This research study will be conducted in a behavioral lab. The 
estimated time to complete this study is approximately 30 minutes.     
 
You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study. 
 
Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints: Bonnie Brown, Doctoral Candidate, Kenneth G. Dixon School of 
Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 823-1478 or by email at 
bonnie.brown@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor, Kenneth G. Dixon School of 
Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 823-3192 or by email at 
vicky.arnold@ucf.edu. 
 
IRB contact about your rights in the study or to report a complaint:   Research at the University 
of Central Florida involving human participants is carried out under the oversight of the 
Institutional Review Board (UCF IRB). This research has been reviewed and approved by the 
IRB. For information about the rights of people who take part in research, please contact: 
Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of Research & 
Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by 
telephone at (407) 823-2901. 
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TASK INSTRUCTIONS [Paper format] 
 
You will be participating in a task in which you are provided with Francs and then are asked to 
make a reporting decision. Note that Francs are the experimental currency, and there are no right 
or wrong answers.  
 
The Francs will belong to another person, and you will make the reporting decision for that other 
person. At the conclusion of the task, Francs will be converted into dollars using a positive 
conversion rate and the other person will be paid based upon the net Francs from your decision. 
In other words, your decision affects the payout that someone else will receive. Your own 
payout will be based upon the net Francs of another person deciding on your behalf. Assignment 
is completely random – you should assume the person deciding on your behalf is not the same 
person for whom you are deciding.  
 
After being provided with Francs, you will decide how much of the Francs to report on a form, 
ranging from zero Francs to all of the Francs. Francs reported on the form are subject to a 50% 
fee. Francs that you decide not to report on the form are not subject to a fee unless the form is 
selected for inspection. If the form is selected for inspection, the amount of Francs reported is 
compared to the initial amount of Francs provided, and any Francs not reported on the form are 
subject to a 100% fee. The form has a 50% chance of being selected for inspection. Inspections 
are determined completely at random and do not depend on your decisions or the decisions of 
others.  
 
After you have decided the amount of Francs to report and have submitted the form on behalf of 
another person, you will be notified whether or not the form was selected for inspection. After 
the inspection period, net Francs will be calculated as the initial Francs provided, less total fees 
(Net Francs = Initial Francs - Total Fees). Thus, any fees assessed reduce the other person’s 
payout at the end of the task. Total Fees depend upon both the amount you decide to report on 
the form and whether the form is selected for inspection: 
 
If selected for inspection, Total Fees equals 50% of the Francs reported on the form, plus 
100% of the Francs not reported on the form. 
 
If not selected for inspection, Total Fees equals 50% of the amount reported on the form.  
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PRACTICE REPORTING DECISION 
Just for practice, imagine you are provided with 2,000 Francs and are asked to decide what 
amount to report on a form, ranging from 0 Francs to 2,000 Francs (in 200 Franc increments). 
The 2,000 Francs will belong to another person, and you will make the reporting decision for that 
other person.  
 
The following chart has been provided to help you decide how much of the 2,000 Francs you 
want to report. The chart presents examples of both the maximum and minimum Net Francs that 
may be possible outcomes, given the Francs you decide to report.  
 
Francs You Could 
Choose to Report 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000 
Maximum Possible 
Net Francs 2,000 1,900 1,800 1,700 1,600 1,500 1,400 1,300 1,200 1,100 1,000 
Minimum Possible 
Net Francs 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1,000 
 
Several amounts are shown on the top row of the chart as “Francs you could choose to report.” 
For each reporting option, the chart presents both the maximum (no inspection) and minimum 
(inspection) possible net Francs if you choose to report that particular amount.  
 
EXAMPLE 1: Note (towards the top right of the chart) if you decide to report all 2,000 Francs, 
net Francs would be 1,000 Francs regardless of whether the form is selected for inspection.  
 
EXAMPLE 2: On the other end of the chart, note that if you decide to report 0 Francs, net Francs 
depend upon whether the form is selected for inspection.  
 
If the form is selected for inspection and you have decided to report 0 Francs, net Francs would 
be 0 Francs, calculated as follows:  
 
Total fees equal 50% of the 0 Francs reported on the form, plus 100% of the 2,000 Francs not 
reported on the form, so Total Fees equal 2,000. Net Francs are calculated as the 2,000 Initial 
Francs, less 2,000 Total Fees, so Net Francs equal 0. 
 
If the form is not selected for inspection and you have decided to report 0 Francs, net Francs 
would be 2,000 Francs, calculated as follows:  
 
Total fees equal 50% of the 0 Francs reported on the form, so Total Fees equal 0. Net Francs 
are calculated as the 2,000 Initial Francs, less 0 Total Fees, so Net Francs equal 2,000. 
 
As shown in the chart, the other reporting options fall between these two examples. Please take a 
few minutes to review this chart.  
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[End of Task Instructions – Blank page intentional spacer]  
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[QUALTRICS PORTION; SCREEN 1] 
 
Your participant number is displayed on the outside of the envelopes you were given. Do 
not open the envelopes. 
  
Please locate your PARTICIPANT NUMBER and enter it in the space provided below. 
 
________________ 
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[SCREEN 2] 
 
YOU HAVE NOW BEEN PROVIDED WITH 10,000 FRANCS 
 
Your task is to decide how much of the 10,000 Francs you would like to report.  
The 10,000 Francs will belong to another person, and you will make the reporting decision for 
that other person. 
Please feel free to refer back to your paper hardcopy of the Task Instructions. 
 
The following chart has been provided to help you decide how much of the 10,000 Francs you 
want to report. The chart presents examples of both the maximum and minimum Net Francs that 
may be possible, given the Francs you decide to report.  
 
Possible Net Francs 
Francs You  
Could Choose  
to Report 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 10,000 
Maximum  
Possible Net  
Francs 10,000 9,500 9,000 8,500 8,000 7,500 7,000 6,500 6,000 5,500 5,000 
Minimum  
Possible Net  
Francs 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 4,500 5,000 
 
 
Please type in the textbox provided below to share your thought process as you decide how much 
of the 10,000 Francs to report.  
 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
 
 
 
How much of the 10,000 Francs would you like to report? 
 
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 10,000 
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[SCREEN 3] 
 
Please open Envelope 1 and complete the contents individually on your own. Only open 
“Envelope 1” at this time. Once complete, place materials back inside the envelope and 
wait for further instruction.   
 
 
WAIT Do not click on the computer until the person administering the study tells you to proceed 
in the computer survey.  
 
 
Please remain quiet. After everyone is ready, you will be instructed to continue. 
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[SCREEN 4] 
 
INSPECTION PERIOD 
 
Reports will now be randomly selected for inspection. On the next screen, you will be 
notified whether or not your report was selected for inspection. 
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[SCREEN 5] 
 
Your report was selected for inspection.  
[Your report was not selected for inspection.] 
 
Net Francs = [Insert Net Francs]  
 
 
Please click “>>” below to proceed.  
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[SCREEN 6 – Custom Final Qualtrics Screen] 
 
Please WAIT here for further instruction.  
 
As a reminder, please remain quiet while you are waiting.  
After everyone is ready, you will be instructed how to proceed. 
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[End of Qualtrics Study – Blank page intentional spacer]  
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ENVELOPE 1  
[Contains Covariate Questionnaire]  
 
[Envelope 1 Outside Label]  
IMPORTANT – Do not open this envelope until instructed to do so. 
 
 
YOUR PARTICIPANT NUMBER IS: 000000 
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[Covariate Questionnaire]  
 
Please enter your PARTICIPANT NUMBER in the space provided below. 
PARTICIPANT NUMBER: __________ 
 
 
 
ADDITIONAL RESPONSE QUESTIONS: Please respond to the following questions. 
There are no right or wrong answers. Therefore, please respond as honestly and accurately 
as possible.  
 
Regarding the reporting decision that you just made, please indicate your agreement or 
disagreement with the following statements:  
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
It was hard for me to care very much 
about whether or not a good reporting 
decision was made. 
       
I felt a very high degree of personal 
responsibility for the decision about 
how much to report. 
       
I feel I should personally take the credit 
or blame for the results of the reporting 
decision. 
       
Whether or not a good reporting 
decision was made is clearly my 
responsibility. 
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When deciding how many Francs to report on the form, how concerned were you about the 
possibility that the report would be inspected? 
 Extremely Concerned 
 Moderately Concerned 
 Somewhat Concerned 
 Slightly Concerned 
 Not at all Concerned 
 
 
 
Compared to the average person, how risky was the decision you just made?  
 Much more risky than average 
 More risky than average 
 Somewhat more risky than average 
 Neither more or less risky than average 
 Somewhat less risky than average 
 Less risky than average 
 Much less risky than average 
 
 
 
Which best describes how your payment is determined for this study? 
 Based on a reporting decision I made 
 Based on a reporting decision that someone else made 
 Based on a reporting decision that my group made 
 Based on a reporting decision that another group made 
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 [End of Envelope 1 Covariate Questionnaire– Blank page intentional spacer]  
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ENVELOPE 2  
[Contains Demographics Questionnaire]  
 
[Envelope 2 Outside Label]  
IMPORTANT – Do not open this envelope until instructed to do so. 
 
 
YOUR PARTICIPANT IS: 000000 
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[Demographics Questionnaire]  
Please enter your PARTICIPANT NUMBER in the space provided below. 
PARTICIPANT NUMBER: __________ 
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DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS: Please tell us a little about yourself to help categorize 
your responses. All responses to this survey are anonymous and confidential.  
 
 
What is your age? 
 18 - 20 
 21 - 25 
 26 - 30 
 31 - 35 
 36 and over 
 I would prefer not to answer 
 
 
What is your gender?     
 Male 
 Female 
 
 
How many tax classes have you taken? Include the current semester. 
 0 
 1 - 2 
 3 - 4 
 5 or more 
 
 
How much total work experience have you had in public accounting? 
 No experience in public accounting 
 Less than 6 months 
 6 – 12 months 
 More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________ 
 
 
How much work experience have you had in public accounting, specifically in tax? 
 No tax experience in public accounting 
 Less than 6 months 
 6 – 12 months 
 More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________ 
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What size public accounting firm did you work for? Check all that apply. 
 Big 4 
 International/National (does not include Big 4) 
 Regional/Local 
 Sole Proprietorship 
 Other (Please specify)_________ 
 No experience in public accounting 
 
 
 
What is your status regarding becoming a Certified Public Accountant (CPA)? 
 Currently a licensed CPA 
 Passed the CPA exam but not yet licensed 
 Plan to take CPA exam in the future 
 Do not plan to be a CPA 
 
 
 
If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your personal tax return, how certain would 
you want to be of your tax position before taking a deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
 
 
 
 
If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your personal tax return and engaged a paid 
tax preparer for assistance, how certain would you want your paid preparer to be of your tax 
position before taking a deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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Who prepared your most recent individual income tax return? 
 I prepared my own tax return 
 I hired a paid preparer 
 A friend or relative prepared my tax return 
 I do not file a tax return 
 Other (Please specify)_________ 
 
 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging in each activity 
or behavior.  
 
 Very 
Unlikely 
Unlikely Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Neither 
Likely 
nor 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Likely Very 
Likely 
Admitting that your tastes are 
different from those of your friends.         
Betting a day’s income at the horse 
races.         
Investing 10% of your annual income 
in a moderate growth mutual fund.         
Disagreeing with your father on a 
major issue.         
Betting a day’s income at a high stake 
poker game.         
Arguing with a friend about an issue 
on which he or she has a very 
different opinion.  
       
Investing 5% of your annual income 
in a very speculative stock.         
Approaching your boss to ask for a 
raise.         
Betting a day’s income on the 
outcome of a sporting event (e.g. 
baseball, soccer, or football).  
       
Telling a friend if his or her significant 
other has made a pass at you.         
Investing 5% of your annual income 
in a conservative stock.         
Wearing shocking or unconventional 
clothes on occasion.         
Investing 10% of your annual income 
in government bonds (treasury bills).         
Gambling a week’s income at a 
casino.         
Taking a job that you enjoy over one 
that is prestigious but less enjoyable.        
Defending an unpopular issue that 
you believe in at a social occasion.         
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Thank you for participating in this study! Please place this questionnaire back into Envelope 2 
and remain seated until the person administering the study instructs you to line up for payout.  
 
To ensure that you receive your payout, please have the following materials ready to bring with 
you:  
 Envelope 1 containing completed questions 
 Envelope 2 containing completed questions 
 Acknowledgement of Payment form – print your name, sign your name, and leave the 
“amount received” blank 
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[End of Envelope 2 Demographics Questionnaire – Blank page intentional spacer]  
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PAYMENT 
 
Thank you for participating in this study on reporting decisions conducted by Bonnie Brown. 
Please sign below to acknowledge receipt of payment for your participation in this study. 
In addition, by signing below you acknowledge that you will NOT discuss the study with 
other students. To get valid and useful results, we need each participant’s honest and unfiltered 
reactions to his/her experiences in the study. Thank you very much for your cooperation. 
 
Session Date and Time: [Insert Date] ([Insert Day of the Week]) [Insert Time] 
 
 
______________________________________________ 
Amount Received (in U.S. dollars) 
 
 
 
______________________________________________ 
Printed Name 
 
 
 
______________________________________________ 
Signed Name 
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
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Condition 3: Group / Self 
[Paper format] 
Explanation of Research  
 
Title of Project: Decision Making and Reporting  
Principal Investigator: Bonnie Brown 
Faculty Supervisor: Vicky Arnold 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Whether you take part is up to you. Your 
professor has agreed to award you extra credit for your participation. If you wish to earn extra 
credit in your class, but do not wish to participate in the research study or are under 18 years of 
age, your professor will provide you with an alternate assignment of comparable time and effort. 
If you have decided to participate in this project, please understand that your participation is 
voluntary and that you have the right to withdraw your consent or discontinue participation at 
any time without penalty. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to 
which you are otherwise entitled. The purpose of this research is to examine individual decision 
making and reporting. You will be asked to read instructions for a decision involving reporting. 
You will then be asked to make your decision and answer some questions about your opinions 
and demographic questions. This research study will be conducted in a behavioral lab. The 
estimated time to complete this study is approximately 30 minutes.     
 
You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study. 
 
Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints: Bonnie Brown, Doctoral Candidate, Kenneth G. Dixon School of 
Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 823-1478 or by email at 
bonnie.brown@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor, Kenneth G. Dixon School of 
Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 823-3192 or by email at 
vicky.arnold@ucf.edu. 
 
IRB contact about your rights in the study or to report a complaint:   Research at the University 
of Central Florida involving human participants is carried out under the oversight of the 
Institutional Review Board (UCF IRB). This research has been reviewed and approved by the 
IRB. For information about the rights of people who take part in research, please contact: 
Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of Research & 
Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by 
telephone at (407) 823-2901. 
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TASK INSTRUCTIONS [Paper format] 
 
You will be participating in a task in which your group is provided with Francs and then is asked 
to make a reporting decision. Note that Francs are the experimental currency, and there are no 
right or wrong answers.  
 
The Francs will belong to your group, and your two member group will make the reporting 
decision together for your entire group. At the conclusion of the task, Francs will be converted 
into dollars using a positive conversion rate and your group will be paid based upon the net 
Francs from your group’s decision. In other words, your group’s decision affects the payout 
that your group will receive. Payouts will be divided equally between group members. 
 
After being provided with Francs, your group will decide how much of the Francs to report on a 
form, ranging from zero Francs to all of the Francs. Francs reported on the form are subject to a 
50% fee. Francs that you decide not to report on the form are not subject to a fee unless the form 
is selected for inspection. If the form is selected for inspection, the amount of Francs reported is 
compared to the initial amount of Francs provided, and any Francs not reported on the form are 
subject to a 100% fee. The form has a 50% chance of being selected for inspection. Inspections 
are determined completely at random and do not depend on your group’s decisions or the 
decisions of other groups.  
 
After your group has decided the amount of Francs to report and has submitted your form, you 
will be notified whether or not the form was selected for inspection. After the inspection period, 
net Francs will be calculated as the initial Francs provided, less total fees (Net Francs = Initial 
Francs - Total Fees). Thus, any fees assessed reduce your group’s payout at the end of the task. 
Total Fees depend upon both the amount your group decides to report on the form and whether 
the form is selected for inspection: 
 
If selected for inspection, Total Fees equal 50% of the Francs reported on the form, plus 
100% of the Francs not reported on the form. 
 
If not selected for inspection, Total Fees equal 50% of the amount reported on the form.  
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PRACTICE REPORTING DECISION 
Just for practice, imagine your group is provided with 4,000 Francs and is asked to decide what 
amount to report on a form, ranging from 0 Francs to 4,000 Francs (in 400 Franc increments). 
The 4,000 Francs will belong to your group, and your two member group will make the reporting 
decision together for your entire group. Payouts will be divided equally between group members.  
 
The following chart has been provided to help your group decide how much of the 4,000 Francs 
you want to report. The chart presents examples of both the maximum and minimum Net Francs 
that may be possible outcomes, given the Francs your group decides to report.  
 
Francs You Could 
Choose to Report 0 400 800 1,200 1,600 2,000 2,400 2,800 3,200 3,600 4,000 
Maximum Possible 
Net Francs 4,000 3,800 3,600 3,400 3,200 3,000 2,800 2,600 2,400 2,200 2,000 
Minimum Possible 
Net Francs 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000 
 
Several amounts are shown on the top row of the chart as “Francs you could choose to report.” 
For each reporting option, the chart presents both the maximum (no inspection) and minimum 
(inspection) possible net Francs if your group chooses to report that particular amount.  
 
EXAMPLE 1: Note (towards the top right of the chart) if your group decides to report all 4,000 
Francs, net Francs would be 2,000 Francs regardless of whether the form is selected for 
inspection.  
 
EXAMPLE 2: On the other end of the chart, note that if your group decides to report 0 Francs, 
net Francs depend upon whether the form is selected for inspection.  
 
If the form is selected for inspection and you have decided to report 0 Francs, net Francs would 
be 0 Francs, calculated as follows:  
 
Total fees equal 50% of the 0 Francs reported on the form, plus 100% of the 4,000 Francs not 
reported on the form, so Total Fees equal 4,000. Net Francs are calculated as the 4,000 Initial 
Francs, less 4,000 Total Fees, so Net Francs equal 0. 
 
If the form is not selected for inspection and you have decided to report 0 Francs, net Francs 
would be 4,000 Francs, calculated as follows:  
 
Total fees equal 50% of the 0 Francs reported on the form, so Total Fees equal 0. Net Francs 
are calculated as the 4,000 Initial Francs, less 0 Total Fees, so Net Francs equal 4,000. 
 
As shown in the chart, the other reporting options fall between these two examples. Please take a 
few minutes to review this chart. 
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[End of Task Instructions – Blank page intentional spacer]  
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[QUALTRICS PORTION; SCREEN 1] 
 
Your group name and participant number are displayed on the outside of the envelopes 
you were given. Do not open the envelopes. 
 
Please locate your GROUP NAME and enter it in the space provided below. 
 
________________ 
 
 
 
 
Please locate both of your PARTICIPANT NUMBERS and enter them in the spaces 
provided below. 
 
 
1st PARTICIPANT NUMBER  
________________ 
 
 
2nd PARTICIPANT NUMBER  
________________ 
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[SCREEN 2] 
 
YOUR GROUP HAS NOW BEEN PROVIDED WITH 20,000 FRANCS 
 
Your task is to decide as a group how much of the 20,000 Francs your group would like to 
report.  
The 20,000 Francs will belong to your group, and your two member group will make the 
reporting decision together for your entire group. Payouts will be divided equally between group 
members. 
Please feel free to refer back to your paper hardcopy of the Task Instructions. 
 
The following chart has been provided to help your group decide how much of the 20,000 Francs 
you want to report. The chart presents examples of both the maximum and minimum Net Francs 
that may be possible, given the Francs your group decides to report.  
 
Possible Net Francs 
Francs You  
Could Choose  
to Report 0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000 18,000 20,000 
Maximum  
Possible Net  
Francs 20,000 19,000 18,000 17,000 16,000 15,000 14,000 13,000 12,000 11,000 10,000 
Minimum  
Possible Net  
Francs 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 10,000 
 
 
Please do not comment out loud. Rather, to keep your conversation private, please take turns 
typing in the textbox provided below to share your thought process to reach a group decision 
about how much of the 20,000 Francs to report.  
 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
 
 
How much of the 20,000 Francs would your group like to report? 
 
0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000 18,000 20,000 
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[SCREEN 3] 
 
Please open Envelope 1 and complete the contents individually on your own. Only open 
“Envelope 1” at this time. Once complete, place materials back inside the envelope and 
wait for further instruction.   
 
 
WAIT Do not click on the computer until the person administering the study tells you to proceed 
in the computer survey.  
 
 
Please remain quiet. After everyone is ready, you will be instructed to continue. 
  
313 
 
[SCREEN 4] 
 
INSPECTION PERIOD 
 
Reports will now be randomly selected for inspection. On the next screen, you will be 
notified whether or not your report was selected for inspection. 
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[SCREEN 5] 
 
Your report was selected for inspection.  
[Your report was not selected for inspection.] 
 
Net Francs = [Insert Net Francs]  
 
 
Please click “>>” below to proceed.  
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[SCREEN 6 – Custom Final Qualtrics Screen] 
 
Please WAIT here for further instruction.  
 
As a reminder, please remain quiet while you are waiting.  
After everyone is ready, you will be instructed how to proceed. 
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[End of Qualtrics Study – Blank page intentional spacer]  
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ENVELOPE 1  
[Contains Covariate Questionnaire]  
 
[Envelope 1 Outside Label (Label color matches group name color)]  
IMPORTANT – Do not open this envelope until instructed to do so. 
 
 
YOUR PARTICIPANT NUMBER IS: 000000 
 
You are a member of a two person group. YOUR GROUP IS BLUE  
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[Covariate Questionnaire]  
 
Please enter your GROUP NAME in the space provided below. 
GROUP NAME: __________ 
 
Please enter your PARTICIPANT NUMBER in the space provided below. 
PARTICIPANT NUMBER: __________ 
 
 
 
ADDITIONAL RESPONSE QUESTIONS: Please respond to the following questions. 
There are no right or wrong answers. Therefore, please respond as honestly and accurately 
as possible.  
 
Regarding the reporting decision that you just made, please indicate your agreement or 
disagreement with the following statements:  
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
It was hard for me to care very much 
about whether or not a good reporting 
decision was made. 
       
I felt a very high degree of personal 
responsibility for the decision about 
how much to report. 
       
I feel I should personally take the credit 
or blame for the results of the reporting 
decision. 
       
Whether or not a good reporting 
decision was made is clearly my 
responsibility. 
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When deciding how many Francs to report on the form, how concerned were you about the 
possibility that the report would be inspected? 
 Extremely Concerned 
 Moderately Concerned 
 Somewhat Concerned 
 Slightly Concerned 
 Not at all Concerned 
 
 
 
Compared to the average person, how risky was the decision you just made?  
 Much more risky than average 
 More risky than average 
 Somewhat more risky than average 
 Neither more or less risky than average 
 Somewhat less risky than average 
 Less risky than average 
 Much less risky than average 
 
 
 
Which best describes how your payment is determined for this study? 
 Based on a reporting decision I made 
 Based on a reporting decision that someone else made 
 Based on a reporting decision that my group made 
 Based on a reporting decision that another group made 
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 [End of Envelope 1 Covariate Questionnaire– Blank page intentional spacer]  
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ENVELOPE 2  
[Contains Demographics Questionnaire]  
 
[Envelope 2 Outside Label (Label color matches group name color)]  
IMPORTANT – Do not open this envelope until instructed to do so. 
 
 
YOUR PARTICIPANT IS: 000000 
 
You are a member of a two person group. YOUR GROUP IS BLUE 
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[Demographics Questionnaire]  
Please enter your GROUP NAME in the space provided below. 
GROUP NAME: __________ 
 
Please enter your PARTICIPANT NUMBER in the space provided below. 
PARTICIPANT NUMBER: __________ 
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DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS: Please tell us a little about yourself to help categorize 
your responses. All responses to this survey are anonymous and confidential.  
 
 
What is your age? 
 18 - 20 
 21 - 25 
 26 - 30 
 31 - 35 
 36 and over 
 I would prefer not to answer 
 
 
What is your gender?     
 Male 
 Female 
 
 
How many tax classes have you taken? Include the current semester. 
 0 
 1 - 2 
 3 - 4 
 5 or more 
 
 
How much total work experience have you had in public accounting? 
 No experience in public accounting 
 Less than 6 months 
 6 – 12 months 
 More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________ 
 
 
How much work experience have you had in public accounting, specifically in tax? 
 No tax experience in public accounting 
 Less than 6 months 
 6 – 12 months 
 More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________ 
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What size public accounting firm did you work for? Check all that apply. 
 Big 4 
 International/National (does not include Big 4) 
 Regional/Local 
 Sole Proprietorship 
 Other (Please specify)_________ 
 No experience in public accounting 
 
 
 
What is your status regarding becoming a Certified Public Accountant (CPA)? 
 Currently a licensed CPA 
 Passed the CPA exam but not yet licensed 
 Plan to take CPA exam in the future 
 Do not plan to be a CPA 
 
 
 
If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your personal tax return, how certain would 
you want to be of your tax position before taking a deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
 
 
 
 
If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your personal tax return and engaged a paid 
tax preparer for assistance, how certain would you want your paid preparer to be of your tax 
position before taking a deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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Who prepared your most recent individual income tax return? 
 I prepared my own tax return 
 I hired a paid preparer 
 A friend or relative prepared my tax return 
 I do not file a tax return 
 Other (Please specify)_________ 
 
 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging in each activity 
or behavior.  
 
 Very 
Unlikely 
Unlikely Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Neither 
Likely 
nor 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Likely Very 
Likely 
Admitting that your tastes are 
different from those of your friends.         
Betting a day’s income at the horse 
races.         
Investing 10% of your annual income 
in a moderate growth mutual fund.         
Disagreeing with your father on a 
major issue.         
Betting a day’s income at a high stake 
poker game.         
Arguing with a friend about an issue 
on which he or she has a very 
different opinion.  
       
Investing 5% of your annual income 
in a very speculative stock.         
Approaching your boss to ask for a 
raise.         
Betting a day’s income on the 
outcome of a sporting event (e.g. 
baseball, soccer, or football).  
       
Telling a friend if his or her significant 
other has made a pass at you.         
Investing 5% of your annual income 
in a conservative stock.         
Wearing shocking or unconventional 
clothes on occasion.         
Investing 10% of your annual income 
in government bonds (treasury bills).         
Gambling a week’s income at a 
casino.         
Taking a job that you enjoy over one 
that is prestigious but less enjoyable.        
Defending an unpopular issue that 
you believe in at a social occasion.         
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Thank you for participating in this study! Please place this questionnaire back into Envelope 2 
and remain seated until the person administering the study instructs you to line up for payout.  
 
To ensure that you receive your payout, please have the following materials ready to bring with 
you:  
 Envelope 1 containing completed questions 
 Envelope 2 containing completed questions 
 Acknowledgement of Payment form – print your name, sign your name, and leave the 
“amount received” blank 
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[End of Envelope 2 Demographics Questionnaire – Blank page intentional spacer]  
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PAYMENT 
 
Thank you for participating in this study on reporting decisions conducted by Bonnie Brown. 
Please sign below to acknowledge receipt of payment for your participation in this study. 
In addition, by signing below you acknowledge that you will NOT discuss the study with 
other students. To get valid and useful results, we need each participant’s honest and unfiltered 
reactions to his/her experiences in the study. Thank you very much for your cooperation. 
 
Session Date and Time: [Insert Date] ([Insert Day of the Week]) [Insert Time] 
 
 
______________________________________________ 
Amount Received (in U.S. dollars) 
 
 
 
______________________________________________ 
Printed Name 
 
 
 
______________________________________________ 
Signed Name 
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
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Condition 4: Group / Other 
[Paper format] 
Explanation of Research  
 
Title of Project: Decision Making and Reporting  
Principal Investigator: Bonnie Brown 
Faculty Supervisor: Vicky Arnold 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Whether you take part is up to you. Your 
professor has agreed to award you extra credit for your participation. If you wish to earn extra 
credit in your class, but do not wish to participate in the research study or are under 18 years of 
age, your professor will provide you with an alternate assignment of comparable time and effort. 
If you have decided to participate in this project, please understand that your participation is 
voluntary and that you have the right to withdraw your consent or discontinue participation at 
any time without penalty. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to 
which you are otherwise entitled. The purpose of this research is to examine individual decision 
making and reporting. You will be asked to read instructions for a decision involving reporting. 
You will then be asked to make your decision and answer some questions about your opinions 
and demographic questions. This research study will be conducted in a behavioral lab. The 
estimated time to complete this study is approximately 30 minutes.     
 
You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study. 
 
Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints: Bonnie Brown, Doctoral Candidate, Kenneth G. Dixon School of 
Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 823-1478 or by email at 
bonnie.brown@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor, Kenneth G. Dixon School of 
Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 823-3192 or by email at 
vicky.arnold@ucf.edu. 
 
IRB contact about your rights in the study or to report a complaint:   Research at the University 
of Central Florida involving human participants is carried out under the oversight of the 
Institutional Review Board (UCF IRB). This research has been reviewed and approved by the 
IRB. For information about the rights of people who take part in research, please contact: 
Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of Research & 
Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by 
telephone at (407) 823-2901. 
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TASK INSTRUCTIONS [Paper format] 
 
You will be participating in a task in which your group is provided with Francs and then is asked 
to make a reporting decision. Note that Francs are the experimental currency, and there are no 
right or wrong answers.  
 
The Francs will belong to another group, and your two member group will make the reporting 
decision for that other group. At the conclusion of the task, Francs will be converted into dollars 
using a positive conversion rate and the other group will be paid based upon the net Francs from 
your group’s decision. In other words, your group’s decision affects the payout that another 
group will receive. Your group’s own payout will be based upon the net Francs of another group 
deciding on your behalf. Assignment is completely random – you should assume the group 
deciding on your group’s behalf is not the same group for whom you are deciding. Payouts will 
be divided equally between group members.  
 
After being provided with Francs, your group will decide how much of the Francs to report on a 
form, ranging from zero Francs to all of the Francs. Francs reported on the form are subject to a 
50% fee. Francs that you decide not to report on the form are not subject to a fee unless the form 
is selected for inspection. If the form is selected for inspection, the amount of Francs reported is 
compared to the initial amount of Francs provided, and any Francs not reported on the form are 
subject to a 100% fee. The form has a 50% chance of being selected for inspection. Inspections 
are determined completely at random and do not depend on your group’s decisions or the 
decisions of other groups.  
 
After your group has decided the amount of Francs to report and has submitted the form on 
behalf of another group, you will be notified whether or not the form was selected for inspection. 
After the inspection period, net Francs will be calculated as the initial Francs provided, less total 
fees (Net Francs = Initial Francs - Total Fees). Thus, any fees assessed reduce the other 
group’s payout at the end of the task. Total Fees depend upon both the amount your group 
decides to report on the form and whether the form is selected for inspection: 
 
If selected for inspection, Total Fees equal 50% of the Francs reported on the form, plus 
100% of the Francs not reported on the form. 
 
If not selected for inspection, Total Fees equal 50% of the amount reported on the form.  
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PRACTICE REPORTING DECISION 
Just for practice, imagine your group is provided with 4,000 Francs and is asked to decide what 
amount to report on a form, ranging from 0 Francs to 4,000 Francs (in 400 Franc increments). 
The 4,000 Francs will belong to another group, and your two member group will make the 
reporting decision for that other group. Payouts will be divided equally between group members.  
 
The following chart has been provided to help your group decide how much of the 4,000 Francs 
you want to report. The chart presents examples of both the maximum and minimum Net Francs 
that may be possible outcomes, given the Francs your group decides to report.  
 
Francs You Could 
Choose to Report 0 400 800 1,200 1,600 2,000 2,400 2,800 3,200 3,600 4,000 
Maximum Possible 
Net Francs 4,000 3,800 3,600 3,400 3,200 3,000 2,800 2,600 2,400 2,200 2,000 
Minimum Possible 
Net Francs 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000 
 
Several amounts are shown on the top row of the chart as “Francs you could choose to report.” 
For each reporting option, the chart presents both the maximum (no inspection) and minimum 
(inspection) possible net Francs if your group chooses to report that particular amount.  
 
EXAMPLE 1: Note (towards the top right of the chart) if your group decides to report all 4,000 
Francs, net Francs would be 2,000 Francs regardless of whether the form is selected for 
inspection.  
 
EXAMPLE 2: On the other end of the chart, note that if your group decides to report 0 Francs, 
net Francs depend upon whether the form is selected for inspection.  
 
If the form is selected for inspection and you have decided to report 0 Francs, net Francs would 
be 0 Francs, calculated as follows:  
 
Total fees equal 50% of the 0 Francs reported on the form, plus 100% of the 4,000 Francs not 
reported on the form, so Total Fees equal 4,000. Net Francs are calculated as the 4,000 Initial 
Francs, less 4,000 Total Fees, so Net Francs equal 0. 
 
If the form is not selected for inspection and you have decided to report 0 Francs, net Francs 
would be 4,000 Francs, calculated as follows:  
 
Total fees equal 50% of the 0 Francs reported on the form, so Total Fees equal 0. Net Francs 
are calculated as the 4,000 Initial Francs, less 0 Total Fees, so Net Francs equal 4,000. 
 
As shown in the chart, the other reporting options fall between these two examples. Please take a 
few minutes to review this chart. 
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[End of Task Instructions – Blank page intentional spacer]  
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[QUALTRICS PORTION; SCREEN 1] 
 
Your group name and participant number are displayed on the outside of the envelopes 
you were given. Do not open the envelopes. 
 
Please locate your GROUP NAME and enter it in the space provided below. 
 
________________ 
 
 
 
 
Please locate both of your PARTICIPANT NUMBERS and enter them in the spaces 
provided below. 
 
 
1st PARTICIPANT NUMBER  
________________ 
 
 
2nd PARTICIPANT NUMBER  
________________ 
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[SCREEN 2] 
 
YOUR GROUP HAS NOW BEEN PROVIDED WITH 20,000 FRANCS 
 
Your task is to decide as a group how much of the 20,000 Francs your group would like to 
report.  
The 20,000 Francs will belong to another group, and your two member group will make the 
reporting decision for that other group. Payouts will be divided equally between group members. 
Please feel free to refer back to your paper hardcopy of the Task Instructions. 
 
The following chart has been provided to help your group decide how much of the 20,000 Francs 
you want to report. The chart presents examples of both the maximum and minimum Net Francs 
that may be possible, given the Francs your group decides to report.  
 
Possible Net Francs 
Francs You  
Could Choose  
to Report 0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000 18,000 20,000 
Maximum  
Possible Net  
Francs 20,000 19,000 18,000 17,000 16,000 15,000 14,000 13,000 12,000 11,000 10,000 
Minimum  
Possible Net  
Francs 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 10,000 
 
 
Please do not comment out loud. Rather, to keep your conversation private, please take turns 
typing in the textbox provided below to share your thought process to reach a group decision 
about how much of the 20,000 Francs to report.  
 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
 
 
How much of the 20,000 Francs would your group like to report? 
 
0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000 18,000 20,000 
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[SCREEN 3] 
 
Please open Envelope 1 and complete the contents individually on your own. Only open 
“Envelope 1” at this time. Once complete, place materials back inside the envelope and 
wait for further instruction.   
 
 
WAIT Do not click on the computer until the person administering the study tells you to proceed 
in the computer survey.  
 
 
Please remain quiet. After everyone is ready, you will be instructed to continue. 
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[SCREEN 4] 
 
INSPECTION PERIOD 
 
Reports will now be randomly selected for inspection. On the next screen, you will be 
notified whether or not your report was selected for inspection. 
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[SCREEN 5] 
 
Your report was selected for inspection.  
[Your report was not selected for inspection.] 
 
Net Francs = [Insert Net Francs]  
 
 
Please click “>>” below to proceed.  
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[SCREEN 6 – Custom Final Qualtrics Screen] 
 
Please WAIT here for further instruction.  
 
As a reminder, please remain quiet while you are waiting.  
After everyone is ready, you will be instructed how to proceed. 
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[End of Qualtrics Study – Blank page intentional spacer]  
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ENVELOPE 1  
[Contains Covariate Questionnaire]  
 
[Envelope 1 Outside Label (Label color matches group name color)]  
IMPORTANT – Do not open this envelope until instructed to do so. 
 
 
YOUR PARTICIPANT NUMBER IS: 000000 
 
You are a member of a two person group. YOUR GROUP IS BLUE  
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[Covariate Questionnaire]  
 
Please enter your GROUP NAME in the space provided below. 
GROUP NAME: __________ 
 
Please enter your PARTICIPANT NUMBER in the space provided below. 
PARTICIPANT NUMBER: __________ 
 
 
 
ADDITIONAL RESPONSE QUESTIONS: Please respond to the following questions. 
There are no right or wrong answers. Therefore, please respond as honestly and accurately 
as possible.  
 
Regarding the reporting decision that you just made, please indicate your agreement or 
disagreement with the following statements:  
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
It was hard for me to care very much 
about whether or not a good reporting 
decision was made. 
       
I felt a very high degree of personal 
responsibility for the decision about 
how much to report. 
       
I feel I should personally take the credit 
or blame for the results of the reporting 
decision. 
       
Whether or not a good reporting 
decision was made is clearly my 
responsibility. 
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When deciding how many Francs to report on the form, how concerned were you about the 
possibility that the report would be inspected? 
 Extremely Concerned 
 Moderately Concerned 
 Somewhat Concerned 
 Slightly Concerned 
 Not at all Concerned 
 
 
 
Compared to the average person, how risky was the decision you just made?  
 Much more risky than average 
 More risky than average 
 Somewhat more risky than average 
 Neither more or less risky than average 
 Somewhat less risky than average 
 Less risky than average 
 Much less risky than average 
 
 
 
Which best describes how your payment is determined for this study? 
 Based on a reporting decision I made 
 Based on a reporting decision that someone else made 
 Based on a reporting decision that my group made 
 Based on a reporting decision that another group made 
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 [End of Envelope 1 Covariate Questionnaire– Blank page intentional spacer]  
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ENVELOPE 2  
[Contains Demographics Questionnaire]  
 
[Envelope 2 Outside Label (Label color matches group name color)]  
IMPORTANT – Do not open this envelope until instructed to do so. 
 
 
YOUR PARTICIPANT IS: 000000 
 
You are a member of a two person group. YOUR GROUP IS BLUE 
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[Demographics Questionnaire]  
Please enter your GROUP NAME in the space provided below. 
GROUP NAME: __________ 
 
Please enter your PARTICIPANT NUMBER in the space provided below. 
PARTICIPANT NUMBER: __________ 
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DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS: Please tell us a little about yourself to help categorize 
your responses. All responses to this survey are anonymous and confidential.  
 
 
What is your age? 
 18 - 20 
 21 - 25 
 26 - 30 
 31 - 35 
 36 and over 
 I would prefer not to answer 
 
 
What is your gender?     
 Male 
 Female 
 
 
How many tax classes have you taken? Include the current semester. 
 0 
 1 - 2 
 3 - 4 
 5 or more 
 
 
How much total work experience have you had in public accounting? 
 No experience in public accounting 
 Less than 6 months 
 6 – 12 months 
 More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________ 
 
 
How much work experience have you had in public accounting, specifically in tax? 
 No tax experience in public accounting 
 Less than 6 months 
 6 – 12 months 
 More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________ 
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What size public accounting firm did you work for? Check all that apply. 
 Big 4 
 International/National (does not include Big 4) 
 Regional/Local 
 Sole Proprietorship 
 Other (Please specify)_________ 
 No experience in public accounting 
 
 
 
What is your status regarding becoming a Certified Public Accountant (CPA)? 
 Currently a licensed CPA 
 Passed the CPA exam but not yet licensed 
 Plan to take CPA exam in the future 
 Do not plan to be a CPA 
 
 
 
If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your personal tax return, how certain would 
you want to be of your tax position before taking a deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
           
 
 
 
 
If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your personal tax return and engaged a paid 
tax preparer for assistance, how certain would you want your paid preparer to be of your tax 
position before taking a deduction? 
 
Not 
At All 
Certain 
          
Extremely 
Certain 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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Who prepared your most recent individual income tax return? 
 I prepared my own tax return 
 I hired a paid preparer 
 A friend or relative prepared my tax return 
 I do not file a tax return 
 Other (Please specify)_________ 
 
 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging in each activity 
or behavior.  
 
 Very 
Unlikely 
Unlikely Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Neither 
Likely 
nor 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Likely Very 
Likely 
Admitting that your tastes are 
different from those of your friends.         
Betting a day’s income at the horse 
races.         
Investing 10% of your annual income 
in a moderate growth mutual fund.         
Disagreeing with your father on a 
major issue.         
Betting a day’s income at a high stake 
poker game.         
Arguing with a friend about an issue 
on which he or she has a very 
different opinion.  
       
Investing 5% of your annual income 
in a very speculative stock.         
Approaching your boss to ask for a 
raise.         
Betting a day’s income on the 
outcome of a sporting event (e.g. 
baseball, soccer, or football).  
       
Telling a friend if his or her significant 
other has made a pass at you.         
Investing 5% of your annual income 
in a conservative stock.         
Wearing shocking or unconventional 
clothes on occasion.         
Investing 10% of your annual income 
in government bonds (treasury bills).         
Gambling a week’s income at a 
casino.         
Taking a job that you enjoy over one 
that is prestigious but less enjoyable.        
Defending an unpopular issue that 
you believe in at a social occasion.         
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Thank you for participating in this study! Please place this questionnaire back into Envelope 2 
and remain seated until the person administering the study instructs you to line up for payout.  
 
To ensure that you receive your payout, please have the following materials ready to bring with 
you:  
 Envelope 1 containing completed questions 
 Envelope 2 containing completed questions 
 Acknowledgement of Payment form – print your name, sign your name, and leave the 
“amount received” blank 
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[End of Envelope 2 Demographics Questionnaire – Blank page intentional spacer]  
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PAYMENT 
 
Thank you for participating in this study on reporting decisions conducted by Bonnie Brown. 
Please sign below to acknowledge receipt of payment for your participation in this study. 
In addition, by signing below you acknowledge that you will NOT discuss the study with 
other students. To get valid and useful results, we need each participant’s honest and unfiltered 
reactions to his/her experiences in the study. Thank you very much for your cooperation. 
 
Session Date and Time: [Insert Date] ([Insert Day of the Week]) [Insert Time] 
 
 
______________________________________________ 
Amount Received (in U.S. dollars) 
 
 
 
______________________________________________ 
Printed Name 
 
 
 
______________________________________________ 
Signed Name 
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
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APPENDIX G: STUDY 3 ADDITIONAL MEASURES 
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Felt Responsibility 
Instructions: Please respond to the following questions. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Therefore, please respond as honestly and accurately as possible. Regarding the reporting 
decision that you just made, please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following 
statements:  
 
(Measured on a seven-point scale with labeled points ranging from 1 “Strongly Disagree” to 7 
“Strongly Agree”) 
 
1) It was hard for me to care very much about whether or not a good reporting decision was 
made. 
2) I felt a very high degree of personal responsibility for the decision about how much to report. 
3) I feel I should personally take the credit or blame for the results of the reporting decision. 
4) Whether or not a good reporting decision was made is clearly my responsibility. 
 
Adapted from Hackman and Oldham (1974)  
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Risk Attitude 
Instructions: For each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging in 
each activity or behavior.  
 
(Measured on a seven-point scale with labeled points ranging from 1 “Very Unlikely” to 7 “Very 
Likely”) 
 
1) Betting a day’s income at the horse races.  
2) Betting a day’s income at a high stake poker game.  
3) Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event (e.g. baseball, soccer, or football).  
4) Gambling a week’s income at a casino.  
 
Adopted from Weber et al. (2002) Domain-specific risk-attitude scale, gambling subscale   
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APPENDIX H: IRB APPROVALS 
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